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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an exploration of the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards 
the Middle East. The mainstream conceptualisation of Europeanisation in the foreign 
policy domain is based on a frequently used tripartite framework of uploading, 
downloading and socialisation. This framework is based on uploading preferences or 
templates by member states to the `EU level,` downloading policies from the `EU level` 
and socialisation of national foreign policy actors at the `EU level.` When the research 
direction turns towards EU candidates, the conceptualisation of the `EU level` 
becomes problematic due to the candidates being unable to upload their preferences 
to the EU. I argue in this thesis that these are issues that can benefit from a closer 
reflection on the conceptualisation of the so-called ‘EU level’ and how it interacts with 
domestic agency. Therefore, this thesis starts by conceptualising ‘EU candidacy’ as an 
institutional context to address the shortcomings of the mainstream Europeanisation 
model in its application to candidate states. This conceptualisation is based on the 
strategic-relational approach and a critical realist methodology for embedding this 
research into a new institutionalist agenda. It is analysed in this thesis how the usages 
of Turkey’s EU candidate role prescriptions by Turkish actors have shaped Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East between 1999 and 2010. In this vein, this 
thesis analyses how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled 
Turkey`s foreign policy towards the Middle East since the 1999 Helsinki decision of 
the EU to declare Turkey as a candidate country.  The main argument is that the 
institutionalisation of EU candidate role regarding compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria and the foreign policy acquis of the EU through the usages by domestic actors 
has had enabled Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is an exploration of the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards 
the Middle East. As the title reveals, this leads the thesis to straddle several literatures 
and concepts. This introductory chapter therefore aims to outline the motivation 
behind some background choices that have been made as well as to explain the main 
puzzle behind this work.  
Turkey has traditionally been categorised as an ally of the west. Its foreign 
policy has been pegged to the west in varying extents over the history of the Republic 
of Turkey. This was mostly due to the state ideology that perceived westernisation as 
the solution to the problems the country had been facing. Since the late Ottoman 
period, the political elite in Turkey have tried to catch up with the European 
civilisation. Therefore the elite who have founded the Republican Turkey out of the 
ashes of the Ottoman Empire were also eager to turn to the west for models, ideas and 
even cultural scripts. This intensive westernisation drive has also led to the shaping of 
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East as an extension of its alliance with the west. 
When the Middle East gained strategic importance in the eyes of Turkey’s western 
allies, as in the 1950s, Turkey has pursued policies that are in line with those of its 
western allies. When there were strategic openings in the Cold War context and 
perceived economic opportunities in the Middle Eastern regional context, Turkey has 
pursued more autonomous policies towards the Middle East, although still confined 
by the broader paradigm of westernisation. 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey was left with twin foreign policy 
goals: searching for ways to reinstate its strategic importance in the eyes of the west 
and addressing the intensified Kurdish separatism, the rise of political Islam and 
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terrorism. Turkey’s relationship with its Middle Eastern neighbours was conflictual 
due to the Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian sponsorship of terrorist movements. The 
relationship with Israel was improving due to the shared threat perception from the 
Middle Eastern neighbours. The military had gradually become the most influential 
actor in Turkish politics throughout the 1990s. The military’s influence has led to 
militaristic, hard line policies both in domestic politics and foreign policy towards the 
Arab Middle East and also a very close military alliance with Israel. There was a 
reversal in this trend after 1999, but especially after 2002 when the conservative 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. Turkey has started pursuing 
peaceful relations with the Arab Middle East at the expense of its relations with Israel. 
Mutual trade, business, tourism agreements were signed constantly alongside high-
level diplomatic visits between Turkey and its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours. This 
was accompanied by the Turkish government’s relentless efforts at regional peace-
building such as mediation efforts and the creation of bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic institutions.   
The students of Turkish foreign policy have analysed this shift mainly 
from a foreign policy analysis angle. These studies explored how the changing Middle 
Eastern security context, the rise of the pro-Islamic JDP and Turkey’s changing 
economic structure caused the change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East from the 1990s into the 2000s.1 Another potential route is to analyse the impact 
of EU integration of Turkey on its foreign policy towards the Middle East since 1999. 
In December 1999, the EU has granted Turkey candidacy and it is possible to study the 
direct and indirect impact of Turkey’s EU candidacy on foreign policy. In this thesis, I 
                                                             
1 See for example, Soner Cagaptay, ‘Hamas Visits Ankara: The AKP Shifts Turkey’s Role in the Middle East,’ 
Policy Watch, 1081 (2006), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-visits-
ankara-the-akp-shifts-turkeys-role-in-the-middle-east (16 February 2006); Stephen Larrabee, ‘Turkey 
Rediscovers the Middle East,’  Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007), pp.103-114; Kemal Kirisci, ‘The 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state,’ New Perspectives on Turkey, 40 
(2009), pp.29-57. 
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take the Europeanisation route to analyse Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East.  
The analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has been 
under-researched from the Europeanisation perspective. There are several reasons 
for this neglect, which altogether turn Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
into a critical and empirically interesting case for the Europeanisation literature.2 First 
of all, as the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature has focussed mostly on the 
member states of the EU, studying the Europeanisation of a candidate country’s 
foreign policy could offer potential conceptually and empirically. Secondly, Turkish 
foreign policy has a century-old history and foreign policy tradition. Indeed, Turkey is 
dubbed as an “awkward candidate” by some observers.3 Its ‘awkwardness’ is also 
evident in its century-old foreign policy tradition as opposed to the Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that are rather new members of the 
international community. Therefore due to the path-dependence of existing 
institutions, Turkey offers an interesting case for analysing the conflictual process of 
adaptation to European integration. Third, Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East 
renders this a critical case. The 1990s witnessed the securitisation of the Middle East 
by the military due to the perceived Islamic and Kurdish terrorist threat emerging 
from the region. Therefore an EU impact, understood in the broadest sense, on 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East is not very likely. Fourth, Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East has never been part of the conditionality for 
EU membership. The European Commission has given an opinion on Turkey’s 
relationship with the region in the annual Progress Reports, yet the improvement of 
relations with the Middle Eastern countries was never a direct condition for 
                                                             
2 For critical cases, see Berth Danermark, et.al., Explaining Society (Park Square: Routledge, 2002), p.170-
2. 
3 Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Membership? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
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membership. On the other hand, the resolution of border disputes with Cyprus for 
example, was made an explicit condition for accession.4 Moreover, around 2008, there 
emerged discussions over whether Turkey had shifted the axis of its foreign policy 
from a western-orientation to the east.5 These arguments have been grounded upon 
the lost momentum of the EU accession process as opposed to the continuous increase 
in Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East.  
Due to these factors, the Europeanisation of Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East has been a critical case and the students of the 
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy have rarely focussed on the foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, especially in a thesis-length study like this.6 I focus on the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy, a candidate country’s foreign policy and a least 
expected aspect of that foreign policy, thereby offering an empirical and a conceptual 
contribution to the Europeanisation literature by analysing a significantly critical case. 
 
 1.1 The Scope of the Middle East and the Time Frame 
 
As Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to 1963, the timeframe of 
the research must be pinned down to cover a certain period. I choose to focus on the 
period that began with 1999 when the EU’s Helsinki decision declared Turkey as a 
candidate country through 2010 when fieldwork for the thesis was finished.  
Also the geographical scope of the research needs to be limited. The 
Middle East is a very vague geographical scope that has been a discursive battlefield, 
especially since 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American foreign policy that followed. 
                                                             
4 Council of the European Union, Helsinki Presidency Conclusions,10–11 December 1999.  
5 See a review in Cengiz Candar, ‘Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World,’ 
SETA Policy Brief, 38 (2009) 
http://www.setadc.org/pdfs/SETA_Policy_Brief_No_38_Turkeys_Soft_Power_Strategy_Candar.pdf (3 May 
2010).   
6 For an exception, see Mesut Ozcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2008).  
5 
 
Phrases such as ‘the greater Middle East’ were coined to broaden the scope of the 
region’s coverage alongside the EU’s famous grouping for the region as 
‘Mediterranean,’ which comprises of quite distinct regions and countries of the Middle 
East (Mashreq) and North Africa (Maghreb). I focus on the Eastern Mediterranean 
countries (Mashreq) of the Middle East, rather than the western Mediterranean 
(Maghreb). I also limit the research analytically to the Arab Middle East, which 
comprises of Muslim-majority Arab countries and excludes Iran and Israel. Although 
this limitation is itself also vague, it covers mainly Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and 
Jordan. This limitation is due to Turkey having different tracks of relations with 
Mashreq and Maghreb, relations with Mashreq being more intensive. However, it must 
be acknowledged that this delimitation is for analytical purposes only and in reality 
regions are social constructs.7 Even Turkish diplomats do not draw clear boundaries 
between their areas of responsibility, thereby confirming the constructed nature of 
regions in practice.8 Therefore, the geographical focus of this thesis is based on why 
and how Turkish foreign policy actors have constructed and reconstructed the Middle 
East in the context of Turkey’s EU candidacy. 
Another very fundamental concept that requires clarification is ‘foreign 
policy’. The following section explains how foreign policy is defined in this thesis 
along with an elaboration on why Europeanisation has been chosen as the academic 
literature for this study instead of the Foreign Policy Analysis literature. 
 
1.2 Foreign Policy (Analysis) and Europeanisation  
 
                                                             
7 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Civilisational Geopolitics in the Mediterranean,’ Geopolitics 9/2 (Summer 2004), pp.269–
291. 
8 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011. 
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Foreign policy is defined in many ways to refer to a very wide range of 
activities and actors. It is sometimes defined broadly as “the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations...with a view to promoting the concerns of a single community.”9 Although a 
comprehensive and useful definition, it starts from the assumption of the state 
representing a single community, which covers up the struggle within the boundaries 
of the state over foreign policy. Hudson, on the other hand, has proffered a basic 
definition of foreign policy as the “approach chosen by the national government to 
achieve its goals in its relations with external entities.”10 This is again a valuable 
contribution, especially due to the emphasis placed on foreign policy being a chosen 
strategy.  Yet, the distinction between ‘foreign policy’ and ‘objectives’ is prone to 
excluding the most interesting element of foreign policy from the definition, which is 
the objectives of policy. A more suitable definition for the purposes of this study is 
proposed by Manners and Whitman as “attempts by governments to influence or 
manage events outside the state’s boundaries.”11 This is the definition adopted in this 
thesis since it includes both strategies and objectives of foreign policy. 
Foreign policy is not just another public policy as it is also a boundary-
creating activity. As Hill has suggested, “[f]oreign policy is at the hinge of domestic 
politics and international relations.”12 Domestic politics and foreign policy are two 
sides of the same coin, and cannot exist separately.13 Therefore its analysis requires a 
consideration for both sides of the coin, as well as agency, which the mainstream 
                                                             
9 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.3 
and 285. 
10 Valerie M. Hudson, ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis,’ in Foreign Policy, ed., Steve 
Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.12. 
11 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, ‘Introduction,’ in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member 
States, eds., Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p.2. 
12 Hill, The Changing, p.23. 
13 Simon Bulmer, ‘Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making,’ Journal of Common Market 
Studies 21/4 (1983), pp. 349-64. 
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Foreign Policy Analysis literature cannot provide. 14  Foreign Policy Analysis 
approaches can be broadly classified as those proceeding from the inside to the 
outside and vice versa. The outside-in approaches prioritise the external environment 
in explaining foreign policy decisions of states.  The major explanatory factor is 
located at the systemic level.15 Thus, the majority of International Relations theories 
fall under this category, such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism and some variants of 
constructivism. According to the inside-out approaches, domestic factors shape 
foreign policy of the state. Traditional foreign policy analysis literature with its 
comparative foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making clusters, and classical 
variants of realism and liberalism fall under this category.16  
All variants of realism and liberalism are characterised by rational choice 
assumptions and are therefore not well equipped to take into account any genuine 
kind of agency. They assume that any rational actor would behave the same way 
under the given circumstances, therefore allowing the context to determine 
behaviour.17 This basic realist assumption does not leave space for the national 
peculiarities of states or the characteristics of decision-makers: states are unitary 
actors that seek survival through power-maximisation in an international system 
characterised by anarchy.18 As Wohlforth puts it, the common question uniting all 
realists is “what any state would do in X’s position.”19 Therefore agents are 
interchangeable and their characteristics not important. In his societal approach to 
liberalism, Moravcsik argues that the state is a representative institution that reflects 
                                                             
14 Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds., European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 1994), p.11. 
15 Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign Policy,’ in Handbook of International Relations, eds.,Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2003), p.334. 
16 Carlsnaes calls inside-out approaches “innenpolitik” and finds realism juxtaposed against it and calls 
realist strands of foreign policy “realpolitik.” Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign Policy,’ p.334.  
17 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism,’ Political Studies 46/5 
(1998), pp.951-7. 
18 Timothy Dunne, ‘Realism,’ in The Globalization of World Politics, eds., John Baylis and Steve Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.114-7. 
19 William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and Foreign Policy,’ in Foreign Policy, eds., Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, 
Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.36. 
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interests of the dominant sub-national interest group. The main assumption is the 
primacy of individuals and societal actors who “are assumed to act rationally in 
pursuit of material and ideal welfare.”20 The national interest thus defined is then 
translated into the foreign policy agenda. Political actors then try to live up to this 
agenda on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, under the constraints imposed by the 
preferences of other states.21  
On the other hand, there is Allison’s ‘governmental politics model,’ which 
argues that foreign policy is made under conditions far from rationality. Rather, 
foreign policy is the outcome of departmental and ministerial struggles to pursue their 
versions of the national interest, or worse their parochial interests.22 Although, this 
approach makes a very valuable case against rational choice assumptions, it fails to 
offer an account of choice instead of rationality.23 The governmental politics approach 
is thus prone to either reproducing rational choice assumption or depicting decision-
makers as programmed by their position in bureaucracy.24  
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, as Manners and 
Whitman have pointed out none of these mainstream approaches have attempted to 
understand “the European condition as currently experienced by EU citizens, the 
states they live in, and the scholars who study them.”25 Europeanisation literature 
therefore is a fertile starting point for understanding this ‘European condition’ and its 
effects on foreign policies. Europeanisation has been a buzzword within EU studies 
since the late 1990s. As a budding literature there are many debates surrounding the 
concept. The Europeanisation literature mainly studies the domestic impact of EU 
integration. The range of policies, actors, institutions that are studied by the students 
                                                             
20 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,’ 
International Organization, 51/4 (1997), p.517. 
21 Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences,’ pp.516-20. 
22 Hill, The Changing Politics, pp. 86-7. 
23 Hill, The Changing Politics, p.87. 
24 Hill, The Changing Politics, p.89. 
25 Manners and Whitman, ‘Introduction,’ p.1. 
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of Europeanisation is very broad and it also includes foreign policy. One of the debates 
surrounding the concept has been on how researchers come to know that the cause of 
a domestic development is the EU integration process.26 This focus on establishing 
causality has recently paved the way for the students of Europeanisation from diverse 
theoretical backgrounds to share their understanding of causation and ways to know 
it.27  
Due to its focus on the ‘European condition’ as well as the domestic actor, 
policies, politics and polities that are related to this European condition, 
Europeanisation by definition offers a useful link between structure and agency; and 
inside-out and outside-in approaches that the mainstream Foreign Policy Analysis 
literature advocates. Therefore, this thesis takes as its main research question 
whether and how Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has been 
Europeanised in the 2000s.  
Yet, this research question requires to be fleshed out by sub-questions. 
How should Europeanisation be conceptualised? What is the relationship between the 
EU structure and Turkish agency? How should we define causation in the context of 
Europeanisation? In this thesis, I offer answers to these sub-questions and the main 
research question. The main conclusion and the answer to the research question is 
that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has significantly enabled 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is conceptualised as the 
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. To provide 
answers to the sub-questions identified above, the thesis also offers a reflection on 
how the so-called ‘European condition’ interacts with domestic agency in Turkey 
within a strategic-relational approach (SRA) and a broadly critical realist methodology 
                                                             
26 Markus Haverland, ‘Methodology,’ in Europeanization, eds., Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). 
27 See the contributions to Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli, eds., Research Design in European 
Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012). 
10 
 
and understanding of causation. I argue in this thesis that the way we conceptualise 
how the EU and a candidate country are related and where we look for causation are 
important components of Europeanisation research. This thesis contributes to the 
literature a healthy dose of reflection on ontology, so that the scholars can ponder 
what about the EU interacts with what kind of agency, and a healthy dose of reflection 
on methodology, so that causation is defined realistically and not too narrowly. 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
 
Chapter two reviews the mainstream conceptualisation of 
Europeanisation in the foreign policy domain, which is based on a frequently used 
framework centred on uploading, downloading and identity change. Uploading refers 
to member states projecting their preferences and ideas to EU institutions in order to 
magnify the influence of their foreign policies. Downloading refers to the institutional 
adaptation by the member states to the decisions and rules adopted by the EU. Finally, 
identity change refers to the gradual reconstruction of national identities in the 
context of EU institutions. Yet, this framework has shortcomings when applied to 
Turkey, as a candidate state. Not being members of the EU, candidate states lack the 
opportunity to formally ‘upload’ their preferences or policy templates to the EU. 
Therefore, as a candidate state Turkey seems to be left with the option of adapting 
itself to the EU’s foreign policy rules in a top-down manner and/or socialise to EU 
norms according to the logic of appropriateness without even becoming a member of 
the EU. Likewise the Europeanisation of candidate countries has been studied 
extensively from a materialist perspective, where candidates mostly adopt EU rules to 
achieve membership, which is almost a given in the literature on candidate countries.  
I argue in this thesis, these are issues that can greatly benefit from a closer reflection 
11 
 
on the ontology of Europeanisation, and the conceptualisation of the so-called ‘EU 
level’ and how it interacts with agency.  
Therefore, chapter three conceptualises ‘EU candidacy’ as an institution to 
address the shortcomings of the mainstream Europeanisation model in its application 
to candidate states. By theorising candidacy as a separate institutional context, we are 
able to analyse the opportunities and constraints that the EU candidacy presents 
domestic actors differentially. EU candidacy is a set of rules and roles, which can be 
adopted for reasons other than membership of the EU. Indeed, bottom-up 
Europeanisation research fits well with such an understanding of candidate 
Europeanisation by taking the reasons and perceptions of domestic actors as the 
departure point for analysis. It will be analysed in this thesis how the 
institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role enabled and constrained Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East between 1999 and 2010. 
Chapter four offers a historical account of Turkish foreign policy between 
the west and the Middle East. It will be argued that westernisation has been the 
foreign policy paradigm of Turkey since the late Ottoman Empire. Since the late 19th 
century, the west, i.e. Europe, has been perceived as the standard of civilisation and 
modernity. Upon the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the westernisation 
paradigm has been articulated with Kemalism, the coordinative discourse of the 
founding Republican elite of Turkey.28 Kemalist westernisation continued perceiving 
the west as the source of modernity and civilisation, although ‘the west’ as a category 
started referring to the US in especially the Cold War period. After the end of the Cold 
War, Turkish foreign policy has gone through a period of uncertainty, where the 
Turkish military became a very dominant actor in politics in the 1990s. This chapter 
                                                             
28 Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘The Role of Discourse in European Social Democratic Reform Projects,’ European 
Integration Online Papers, 9/8 (2005).  
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therefore offers the background for the analysis of Turkey’s relations with the EU as 
‘the west’ after Turkey’s proclamation as an EU candidate in 1999. 
Chapter five analyses the EU candidate role prescribed by the EU in line 
with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria and its institutionalisation in 
Turkish politics. It is argued that the relationship of actors and the nature of the policy 
paradigms they have advocated for foreign policy making have changed due to the 
institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in such a way that the resulting 
balance of actors and paradigms has enabled the materialisation of the foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in the 2000s. This chapter also serves as an introduction to 
the actors in Turkish foreign policy. 
Chapter six looks at the implementation of the foreign policy that was 
enabled by the tipping of the balance of forces among Turkish foreign policy actors 
and discourses due to the institutionalisation of the EU candidate role prescription for 
Turkey. In this chapter, the roles Turkey plays in the Middle East and how Turkey’s EU 
candidacy enabled some of these roles that Turkey has played will be analysed. It will 
be argued that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidacy role enabled Turkish 
foreign policy actors to play certain roles in the Middle East by altering the Middle 
Eastern actors’ expectations of Turkey as an EU candidate. 
Chapter seven analyses the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role with regards to the rule of alignment with the EU foreign policy acquis. This 
chapter analyses the convergence and divergence between Turkey’s foreign policy 
and the EU foreign policy acquis towards the Middle East. After identifying partial 
convergence/divergence it focuses on the discursive strategies used by the Turkish 
actors to change the EU’s role prescription for Turkey in line with Turkey’s strategic 
depth policy. It is argued in this chapter that candidate state agency can actually 
13 
 
change the role prescriptions of the EU by using the strategies that are favoured by the 
EU candidacy context. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by restating the main findings and 
contributions of the research. The main finding is that the institutionalisation of 
Turkey’s EU candidate role has significantly enabled Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East in the 2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO: EUROPEANISATION AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
This chapter offers a review of the Europeanisation literature with a focus on the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy. The main aim of this chapter is to offer a bird’s eye 
view of the gaps and strengths of the specialised literature on the Europeanisation of 
member/candidate state foreign policies. The literature reviewed is limited to 
published academic work in the politics discipline that explicitly tackles the concept of 
‘Europeanisation’. First a brief review of the broader Europeanisation literature will 
be provided. Here, the main debates and findings of the Europeanisation literature 
will be explained. Secondly, the specific literature focussing on agency in the 
Europeanisation literature will be analysed in terms of their criticisms of the 
mainstream literature and their contributions. Third, the literature on 
Europeanisation of foreign policy will be reviewed with a focus on the main debates, 
theoretical positions and findings. As Europeanisation literature has emerged in 
relation to analysing the domestic transformation of EU member states, the fourth 
section will analyze broader approaches to the issue of Europeanisation of candidate 
countries and also a specific review of Europeanisation of candidate countries’ foreign 
policies will be provided. Studies on the Europeanisation of candidate countries’ 
foreign policies are very rare in the field yet there are numerous studies on the 
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy, which will be reviewed in detail in the last 
section of the chapter. 
 
2.1 Europeanisation 
 
Europeanisation has emerged as a vibrant sub-field of EU studies, which 
aims to broadly analyse and explain how member states are affected by being part of 
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the EU. The research agenda has produced a significant level of empirical research 
with regard to the mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanisation. To begin with, there 
is more or less consensus over what can be Europeanised. It is undisputed by the 
scholarship that any aspect of domestic politics, policies and polity is permeable to 
Europeanisation.29  
One of the first definitions of Europeanisation came from Ladrech and 
significantly shaped the path of studies and definitions that followed. Ladrech defined 
Europeanisation as an “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.”30 Radaelli has criticised 
Ladrech’s definition for relegating agency and omitting the possibility of the 
Europeanisation of identities and cognitive structures. Radaelli offered a revised 
version of Ladrech’s definition as follows: 
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies.31  
Yet, as Featherstone has warned, the phrase ‘logic’ in this definition 
requires attention, since it might be incorrectly interpreted as giving less emphasis to 
agency in making possible the incorporation of EU policies, norms, ways of doing 
things into the domestic policy process in the first place.32  
Misfit between the EU institutions, policies, norms, ways of doing things 
and those at the domestic level is identified by some scholars as a necessary but 
                                                             
29 For a typology of these domains see Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanization of Public Policy,’ in The 
Politics of Europeanization, eds., Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp.27-57. 
30 Robert Ladrech, ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32/1 (1994), p.69. 
31 Radaelli, ‘Europeanization of Public Policy,’ p.30. 
32 Kevin Featherstone, ‘Introduction: In the Name of “Europe”,’ in The Politics, eds. Featherstone and 
Radaelli, p.18. 
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insufficient condition of Europeanisation, which is complemented by mediating 
domestic factors.33  The proposition that the incompatibility between the EU level 
policies or institutions and the domestic ones causes misfit, which in turn entails 
adaptational pressure, has been quite common in the literature.34 The analyses of 
Europeanisation, which first identify misfit and proceed with investigating its effects 
are labelled as “top-down” research.35 Top-down analyses assume that there is always 
an EU template to cause misfit.  
However the critiques of misfit/adaptational pressure argument have 
aptly pointed out its limited explanatory power. For example Knill and Lehmkuhl have 
argued that misfit could be a necessary condition only in cases of positive integration 
where there is an EU policy prescription that is capable of exerting adaptational 
pressure on the member states.36 Knill and Lehmkuhl have identified two more modes 
of governance in the EU. One of them is negative integration, which stands for policy 
areas where the EU abolishes certain practices, thus altering the domestic opportunity 
structures. The other one is framing integration, which refers to those areas where the 
EU competence is limited to inculcating the idea of reform and legitimising pro-reform 
circles in the domestic debates.37 Knill and Lehmkuhl therefore have argued that 
misfit is not applicable to negative and framing integration. Another critique of misfit 
has come from more agency-based approaches, who have asserted how ‘misfit’ itself is 
a social construct that requires agency and how agency can actively construct misfit. 
Actors may also socialise with the EU ways of doing things or simply choose the EU 
                                                             
33 Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction,’ Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, eds. Maria Green Cowles, 
James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.4. 
34 See for example, Christopher Knill, The Europeanization of National Administrations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Tanja Borzel, ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional 
Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 37/4 (1999), 
pp.573-96. 
35 Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli, ‘Research Design in European Studies: The Case of 
Europeanization,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 47/3 (2009), p.510. 
36 Christopher Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl ‘How Europe Matters,’ European Integration Online Papers 3/7 
(1999). 
37 Knill and Lehmkuhl, ‘How Europe.’ 
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way of doing things without there being any misfit or adaptational pressure.38 Such 
proponents of starting from the agency at the domestic level and who trace causality 
backwards to the EU have coined “bottom-up research” in response to top-down 
models.39 
Top-downers argue that misfit is never sufficient in bringing about change; 
therefore they have been identifying mediating factors that transmit EU impact in 
domestic politics. Borzel and Risse have identified the number of veto points, formal 
institutions as mediating factors for Europeanisation through resource redistribution 
(rational choice institutionalism); whereas informal institutions and norm 
entrepreneurs are identified as mediating factors for socialisation and learning 
(sociological institutionalism).40 Therefore, the fewer the number of institutional veto 
points with a potential impact on policy change, the more facilitating the formal and 
informal institutions are, and the more influential the norm entrepreneurs are; the 
more likely domestic change is to occur. However as research progressed and 
empirical findings accumulated, scholars added more mediating factors. With every 
new mediating factor added to the literature the distinction between top-down and 
bottom-up research designs blurred further as more agency was integrated to the 
originally top-down research paradigm. For example Featherstone and Kazamias41, as 
well as Sbragia;42 have included the image of the EU in the eyes of the elites as   
mediating factors. The more the EU is seen as a source of modernisation by the elites 
and the society, the better the chances are for adopting what it prescribes. Last but not 
                                                             
38 Vivien Schmidt and Claudio Radaelli, ‘Policy Change and Discourse in Europe,’ West European Politics, 
27/2 (2004); Robert Ladrech, ‘Europeanization of Interest Groups and Political Parties,’ in Member states 
of the European Union, eds., Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Ian Bache, Europeanization and Multilevel Governance (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2007), p.160. 
39 Exadaktylos and Radaelli, ‘Research Design,’ p.510-1. 
40 Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘When Europe Hits Home,’ European Integration Online Papers 4/15 
(2000). 
41 Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
42 Alberta Sbragia, ‘Italy Pays for Europe: Political Leadership, Political Choice and Institutional 
Adaptation,’ in Transforming Europe, eds. Cowles, Caporaso and Risse. 
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least, Ladrech has identified partisan politics as a mediating factor, whereby interest 
groups’ capability to seize the opportunities offered by the EU is partly conditioned by 
their proximity to the ruling party.43  
However, these ‘mediating factors’ are usually conceptualised as ‘static 
transmission belts’ in top-down models, which is the main difference between top-
down and bottom-up designs.  They are assumed to have an impact on whether or not 
and the extent to which EU pressure results in change.44 Likewise, policy, polity and 
politics aspects of Europeanisation are also usually kept separate analytically despite 
the theoretical acknowledgment of the need to address the interactive dynamics 
among the polity, policy and politics aspects of Europeanisation. For instance, Radaelli 
has argued in 2004 that analysing the dynamic relationship between these three areas 
in the context of Europeanisation could be a fertile ground for future research.45 For 
example, Schmidt and Radaelli have added the discourse surrounding the policy area 
as another mediating factor.46 In this line of argument all mediating factors become 
functional and interpreted through discourse in bringing about change.47 Although 
Schmidt and Radaelli have contributed to such analyses of the interaction among 
policy, polity, politics, there is a dearth of studies analysing the interactive 
relationship between the Europeanisation of policy, politics and polity within the 
mainstream Europeanisation literature. This is partly due to the difficulties of 
methodology. As argued by Lenschow, “[s]uch empirical interrelations between the 
three domains will pose some difficulty (a) for measuring and comparing effects of 
                                                             
43 Robert Ladrech, ‘Europeanization of Interest Groups and Political Parties,’ in The Member States, eds., 
Bulmer and Lequesne. 
44 Cornelia Woll and Sophie Jacquot, ‘Using Europe: Strategic Action in Multi-Level Politics,’ Comparative 
European Politics 8/1 (2010), p.116. 
45 Claudio Radaelli, ‘Europeanization: Solution or Problem?’ European Integration Online Papers 8/16 
(2004). 
46 Schmidt and Radaelli, ‘Policy Change.’ 
47 Schmidt and Radaelli, ‘Policy Change,’ p.187. 
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Europeanisation and (b) for developing parsimonious explanatory models.” 48 
Therefore, this poses a methodological problem mainly for research traditions that 
aim to produce parsimonious models to explain law-like social regularities, based on 
empiricism rather than empirical study. For example, when discourse is given 
explanatory power, parsimony is lost. 
There are many supporting references in the literature to how 
Europeanisation of one area cannot be neatly contained in separate boxes, as any 
transformation always reverberates in other aspects. For example, Bulmer and Burch 
posited that even though the British administrative machinery by and large retained 
its long-standing British traditions, the considerable pressure for change emanating 
from the EU strained the underlying constitutional and political framework.49 Bache 
and Jordan formulated two types of Europeanisation in response to this analytical 
challenge: direct and indirect Europeanisation. Direct Europeanisation refers to the 
intended consequences in a policy area as opposed to indirect Europeanisation, which 
refers to the unintended consequences of an EU initiative.50 Unintended consequences 
in the same or another policy area are the spill-over effect of direct Europeanisation. 
This differentiation between intended and unintended consequences supports the 
proposition that Europeanisation in a single policy might have deeper reverberations 
in other aspects of politics and polity, and vice versa.  
Another relevant finding in the literature is that Europeanisation does not 
cause homogeneity. On the contrary, it engenders “domestic adaptation with national 
colors.”51 Borzel and Risse have identified three different forms of domestic change: 
                                                             
48 Andrea Lenschow, ‘Europeanisation of Public Policy,’ in European Union: Power and Policy-making, ed. 
Jeremy Richardson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p.62. 
49 Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and European 
Union,’ Public Administration 76 (Winter 1998), p. 624. 
50 Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan, ‘The Europeanization and Domestic Change,’ in Europeanization of 
British Politics, eds., Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 24.  
51 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, ‘Europeanization,’ p. 1.  
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absorption, accommodation and transformation. 52  Absorption means minimal 
institutional adjustment. The core processes and philosophy of policymaking remains 
the same. Accommodation is when the member state undergoes deeper changes in its 
policy processes, but still retains its core philosophy. Finally transformation refers to 
the wholesale change in the policies, processes and underlying understandings of 
politics. A slightly different categorisation has been suggested by Radaelli as 
absorption, transformation, inertia and retrenchment. Absorption refers to a rather 
superficial accommodation of EU requirements while retaining core philosophies. In 
this definition Radaelli therefore combined absorption and accommodation categories 
of Borzel and Risse. According to Radaelli, transformation refers to a change in the 
underlying core philosophies in response to EU requirements. The major innovation 
in Radaelli’s categories is that he also includes inertia and retrenchment as possible 
outcomes of Europeanization. Inertia refers to the absence of domestic change and 
retrenchment means political elite opting for going against EU level developments, let 
alone harmonising their practices accordingly.53 Thus, Radaelli first of all successfully 
has broken down the equation of Europeanisation with observable change and 
convergence on the empirical level. In doing so, he has drawn attention to the 
underlying mechanisms linking the EU structure with agency, which may or may not 
cause observable change. 
The next section reviews studies in the Europeanisation literature that 
have been pointing to the need to incorporate more agency-based accounts in the 
analysis of Europeanisation. This literature therefore offers a critique of the 
mainstream Europeanisation literature and makes an important contribution.  
 
                                                             
52 Borzel and Risse, ’When Europe,’ p.10. 
53 Radaelli, ‘Whither Europeanization,’ p. 15. 
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2.1.1 Agency in Europeanisation 
 
There has emerged a recent body of scholarship that argues for a more 
agency-based approach within the Europeanisation literature. McCauley, for example, 
has focused on how French anti-genetically modified organism social movements have 
responded to EU opportunities.54  McCauley has identified different modes in which 
agents respond to the EU. Proaction refers to domestic actors choosing to be active in 
lobbying at the EU level, rejection/promotion refers to the emergence of anti- or pro-
EU groups, and finally usage refers to the empowerment of domestic actors by the top-
down EU pressures, either through direct material or ideational resources or indirect 
effects of the EU on the national policymaking modes.55 McCauley’s focus on agency 
has brought to the fore the conclusion that “opportunity, resources or ideological 
empowerment are useless if domestic actors are not willing to use them” and their 
predisposition to use the EU is shaped by their ideology, identity, framing of the EU, 
and leadership.56  
Woll and Jacquot have focussed on a sub-set of the taxonomy McCauley 
outlined, namely “using Europe”.57 Woll and Jacquot have specifically placed their 
study as a critique of the misfit model, “where policy actors are reduced to ‘mediating’ 
factors.”58 Woll and Jacquot have argued that the misfit model and the institutional 
                                                             
54 Darren McCauley, ‘Bottom-Up Europeanization Exposed: Social Movement Theory and Non-state 
Actors in France,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 49/5 (2011), pp.1009-42. 
55 McCauley, ‘Bottom-Up,’ pp.3-4. 
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constraints that it is based on are blinding researchers to policy change that is 
deliberate and takes place in the absence of misfit.59 The authors have cautioned 
against institutional analyses that treat individual actors as simple 
transmission belts. Institutional contexts need to be interpreted and 
actors do not give automatic responses to political pressure: they can 
choose and learn and thus develop agency independent of structural 
conditions.60 
By utilising this framework, Woll and Jacquot have aimed at expanding 
the two traditional logics of action utilised by the Europeanisation literature, namely 
the logic of consequences and that of appropriateness. The logic of consequences is 
premised on the assumption that actors analyse the costs and benefits of a particular 
action with an eye on its potential of fulfilling their pre-designated preferences.61 The 
minds, personalities and perspectives of actors are not important since in every 
situation it is assumed that there are only a given number of rational courses of action 
for an actor. As Hay suggests, “actors are interchangeable” in the eyes of those who 
share this view.62 As actors are in the pursuit of given material interests rationally 
within the constraints and opportunities presented by the (mainly material) context, 
their behaviour can be inferred from the context. Therefore, in studies that utilise the 
logic of consequences, actors are interchangeable as the context determines what 
actors want and do. 
On the other hand, those who see action as resulting from a logic of 
appropriateness assume that actor preferences are developed endogenously within 
the institutions and actors are driven by their identities and the rules pertaining to 
those institutions.63 March and Olsen point out that personalities of the actors are not 
as important as the historical experience and the established rules of particular 
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political institutions and political conflicts are usually conflicts on deciding which set 
of rules should prevail.64 Therefore, action requires evoking an identity and the 
obligations of that identity.65 
Against this background, Woll and Jacquot argued that what is 
incompatible between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness is 
the materialism of the former. Put simply, as long as strategic action is premised on 
material interests by the proponents of the logic of consequences, it cannot be 
combined with the logic of appropriateness, which is premised on the assumption that 
interests are social constructs. To find a middle ground, Woll and Jacquot have 
introduced “strategic usage of Europe” as an alternative.66 Rather than assuming that 
domestic actors act appropriately in the way ‘good Europeans’ act or rationally to 
pursue their material interests within the resources and constraints posed by the EU, 
this framework assumes that actors interpret, appropriate, translate or ignore the 
dynamics of EU integration.67 While acknowledging that actors have goals and 
projects that they pursue, this framework puts into empirical question how these 
projects have come to being in the first place and how actors pursue them by making 
use of Europe. Although usages are strategic initially, in the long run they have 
repercussions on the projects of actors and the context.68  All in all, such elaboration 
on the usage of Europe diversifies the traditional logics of action and dilutes the 
structuralist tendencies in the so-called logics of consequences and appropriateness. 
By shifting the analytical focus from the institutions to how domestic 
actors interpret, appropriate or reject the resources and constraints posed by these 
institutions, actor-based approaches to Europeanisation offer an alternative path of 
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analysis. Yet, so far these approaches have remained spatially limited to using Europe 
to achieve objectives in domestic politics leading to a lacuna in its application to 
foreign policy. Recent work emphasising agency in this manner has explored how 
domestic actors used ‘Europe’ to achieve their goals in the domestic arena. An 
extension of this research agenda to foreign policy would introduce domestic actors’ 
usage of ‘Europe’ in the international arena. By the same token, Europeanisation of 
foreign policy literature can benefit from this research agenda, as explained below. 
 
2.2 Europeanisation of Foreign Policy 
 
The literature on Europeanisation of foreign policy usually touches upon 
the ‘unique’ nature of foreign policy, understood mainly as the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), for the Europeanisation literature.69  Europeanisation is 
perceived by these scholars as a literature that has grown in response to the transfer 
of competences to the EU, which comprised of the policies that fell under the first 
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty the pillar structure was 
abolished yet foreign policy decisions are still made by unanimity.70 Therefore the 
literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has usually underlined this 
difference between foreign policy and policies where the EU has joint or sole 
competence.  
Yet there are many studies that focus on national foreign policy 
adaptation to EU foreign policy, usually to the CFSP in particular. Common themes can 
be observed in the assumptions of convergence as a result of the Europeanisation of 
                                                             
69 Eva Gross, ‘Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies,’ Security Dialogue 38/4 (2007), 
p.503; Reuben Wong, ‘Foreign Policy,’ in Europeanization, eds., Vink and Graziano, pp.330-1; Claudia 
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foreign policy, the assumption of misfit, the three dimensions of Europeanisation, i.e. 
uploading, downloading, identity reconstruction/cross-loading. 
 
2.2.1 Convergence and the Europeanisation of foreign policy  
Despite the wide-spread arguments within the broader Europeanisation 
literature that convergence is not a necessary outcome of Europeanisation, there are 
numerous leading scholars studying the Europeanisation of foreign policy who have 
defined Europeanisation as convergence. Brigghi has also identified and criticised 
such “accounts of Europeanization as a progressive, inevitable and predetermined 
transformation of not only the objectives, but the identities of the actors involved.”71 
One of the most cited studies on the Europeanisation of foreign policy is that of 
Wong’s research on the Europeanisation of French foreign policy towards East Asia. 
Wong has defined the Europeanisation of foreign policy as:  
a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating 
from actors (such as EU institutions and statesmen) in Brussels, as well as 
policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). 
Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as 
policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national 
policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection).72 
Wong has therefore identified Europeanisation as the dependent variable, 
having described it as a process; and identified the independent variables leading to 
this process as the ideas and directives of EU actors as well as policy ideas and actions 
of national actors. Wong has suggested that the outcome is policy convergence across 
EU members in the long run. Wong’s approach poses a few problems. First of all, it is 
not clear how independent are the independent variables in this formulation. It is 
difficult to argue that national actors are independent from Europeanisation defined 
as a process. Europeanisation does not fit well within the independent-dependent 
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Foreign Policies, eds., Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (Park Square: Routledge, 2011), p. 68. 
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variable language due to the endogeneity of the process. In Bulmer and Burch’s words, 
“the relationship between the EU and member state institutions is iterative and 
interactive…It is difficult to try to conceive of the relationship in conventional, 
positivist social science terms.”73 Secondly, Wong assumes a final destination for the 
process of Europeanisation as convergence, therefore offering a teleological account 
of Europeanisation. Wong has explained the reason for convergence as the rational 
action of Member States to coordinate their action and positions on a matter so as not 
to let third countries take advantage of the rifts among EU Member States.74 Wong and 
Hill have likewise pointed out the “pendulum effect” to say there is “negotiated 
convergence between ‘extreme’ positions within the EU involving both Community 
and national actors.”75 Wong and Hill also have taken into consideration discursive 
convergence among the member states in their increasing reference to the European 
Union for their foreign policies. Their definition of Europeanised foreign policy is 
illustrative of the general tendency in the field to label convergence with the EU as 
Europeanisation. According to Wong and Hill, a Europeanised foreign policy is one 
which: complies with EU common positions; at least takes EU values as expressed by 
the EU internationally and EU common positions as its primary reference point; and 
tends to pursue its national goals through the EU means.76  
Although he does not refer explicitly to an assumption of convergence, 
Tonra’s definition also implicitly suggests that the Europeanisation of foreign policy 
leads to ideational convergence.  
a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are 
constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and 
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pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations 
arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.77 
According to this definition, domestic actors eventually internalise EU 
policy-making norms thereby demonstrating convergence across national settings in 
foreign policy norms. 
Yet, as the broader literature on Europeanisation that has been reviewed 
earlier demonstrated, Europeanisation need not imply convergence. Although 
convergence might be observed in the ways member state officials perceive the 
pressure they face, this convergence does not automatically lead to convergence in the 
policies.78  
 
2.2.2 Misfit and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy 
Another group of scholars placed emphasis on the degree of adaptational 
pressure on national foreign policies due to European integration. For example, 
Miskimmon and Torreblanca have defined Europeanisation of foreign policy as  
the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies, preferences 
or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the 
European integration process; a process of change whose intensity and 
character depend on the ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic institutions and 
adaptation pressures…. I will define adaptation as a move by national 
actors towards a greater consistency with the EU foreign and security 
policy.79 
As explained in the earlier review of the broader Europeanisation 
literature, these studies fall within the category of top-down Europeanisation. By 
taking misfit between the EU foreign and security policy and the national foreign 
policies as the starting point, they rule out by definition domestic actors’ potential for 
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creative usages of European integration. However, as Irondelle’s study has aptly 
showed, the Europeanisation of French military policy started even before the 
establishment of European defence policy. Irondelle has explained that when the 
French military reforms took place in 1996 there was no template in that policy field 
at the EU. Therefore, he has analysed the framing effects of the European Union on 
French policymakers. Irondelle has suggested that the French military reforms were 
enabled and constrained by the emergent peace community in the EU, budgetary 
pressures of the European Monetary Union, the empowerment of pro-reform actors in 
decision-making and socialisation to the EU norms.80 Irondelle’s study is refreshing in 
terms of his analysis that goes beyond the misfit model, which is very much applicable 
in the foreign policy domain. In this line, he has traced back the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation “to determine whether the pressures from European integration play 
a role and, if so, whether this role is significant.”81 
 
2.2.3 Downloading, Uploading and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy 
The literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy is by and large 
built on the three dimensions of Europeanisation.82 The first one is the top-down 
process of national adaptation to the requirements of EU membership, which is also 
called downloading.83 As explained earlier Wong has defined this top-down process as 
a process leading to policy convergence among EU members. Miskimmon has 
borrowed Smith’s indicators of domestic adaptation in response to top-down pressure 
by the EU to trace the downloading in German foreign policy. These indicators are 
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elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, and the level of constitutional change 
and the extent of shifts in public opinion.84  
The second dimension is the bottom-up process, where member states 
upload their preferences, ideas and policy models to the EU.85 Miskimmon has 
identified formal and informal agenda-setting, acting as an example-setter and 
ideational export by member states as ways of uploading. 86  Member states’ 
participation in the EU institutions gives them the opportunity to shape EU policies, 
institutions and ways of doing things. While for Pomorska uploading is limited to 
exporting national preferences to the EU, for Major it means the export of ideas to the 
EU level.87 In this process, states are agents of change rather than simply reacting to 
the requirements of the CFSP. Miskimmon has shown how Germany had always 
attempted to upload its foreign policy preferences and templates since its unification 
to shape the blueprint for the CFSP to match German preferences.88 Other examples of 
such uploading dynamics include Greece’s success in uploading its bilateral disputes 
with Turkey regarding Cyprus.89 Spain has also perceived EU membership as an 
opportunity considering the scarcity of its own foreign policy resources and uploaded 
its foreign policy agenda regarding Latin America and the Mediterranean even during 
the negotiations of its accession to the EC.90 
There has been a debate in the literature as to whether uploading and 
downloading are dimensions, concepts or mechanisms of Europeanisation. 
Moumoutzis for example has engaged with a similar kind of questioning and 
concluded by ruling out ‘uploading’ or ‘projection’ of member state preferences as a 
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form of Europeanisation.91 He argued that “[i]f agency (EU Member States) and 
structure (the EU) are mutually constitutive and integration theory informs us of how 
agency is structuring, then Europeanization is best suited to direct our attention to 
how agency is being structured.”92 This statement basically suggests that only 
domestic change caused by the EU opportunities and constraints can be called 
Europeanisation. Moumoutzis’ account is a welcome contribution due to his 
ontological and conceptual reflection, yet it causes a limitation on the spatial 
boundaries of Europeanisation by excluding anything that happens within the EU 
institutions as outside the scope of the Europeanisation literature.  
Gross has offered a conceptualisation of Europeanisation, which is 
implicitly a very plausible defence for categorising uploading as Europeanisation. 
Gross has argued that Europeanisation is “the impact of the EU institutions on 
national politics, both as a potential platform to export policy preferences and as a 
constraint that influences national foreign policy-making.” 93   Therefore Gross’ 
definition of the Europeanisation of foreign policy encompasses both the top-down 
and the bottom-up processes as the enabling and constraining effects of the EU 
institutions. 
As De Flers and Muller have also noted, existing literature is not clear 
whether uploading and downloading are dimensions, concepts or mechanisms.94 De 
Flers and Muller have suggested a clarification of the concepts such as mechanisms 
and dimensions of Europeanisation in foreign policy. Accordingly, they have 
conceptualised uploading and downloading as “dimensions”; socialisation and 
learning as “mechanisms”; and national projection and foreign policy adaptation as 
                                                             
91 Kyriakos Moumoutzis, ‘Still Fashionable Yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the 
Europeanisation of Foreign Policy,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 49/3 (2011), p. 608. 
92 Moumoutzis, ‘Still Fashionable,’ p.612. 
93 Eva Gross, The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), p.8 and xiv. 
94 De Flers and Muller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms,’ p.22. 
31 
 
“outcomes” of Europeanisation.95 De Flers and Muller have proffered socialisation and 
learning as the dominant mechanisms of Europeanisation in foreign policy arguing 
that these mechanisms “can explain why European foreign policy cooperation worked 
in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and against initially diverging 
policy preferences of member states.”96 Indeed, socialisation and learning occupy a 
central place in the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature.  
 
2.2.4 Identity Reconstruction, Socialisation and Cross-loading  
Some authors include a third dimension of Europeanisation in their 
categorisation as “cross-loading” or “identity reconstruction/ socialisation,”97 for 
others they are the mechanisms of Europeanisation.98 Cross-loading broadly refers to 
exchange of policy ideas and ways of doing things among EU members within EU 
institutions. As Pomorska has pointed out cross-loading is Europeanisation within the 
EU rather than because of the EU.99 In Major’s words, it involves a “learning process 
about good policy practice for the elites, where the EU sets the scene, offering a forum 
for discussion.”100 Here, the word ‘discussion’ is imperative. Due to not being members, 
candidate countries do not participate in the discussions of CFSP decisions of the EU 
until they sign the Accession Treaty and become active observers in the CFSP. The 
signing of the Treaty brings to an end the episode of ‘being informed ex-post of the 
CFSP decisions’ and starts an active participation episode.101 
Identity reconstruction refers to long-term identity change caused by 
being part of the EU and socialisation to EU norms over time. Wong argued that 
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socialisation to EU norms leads to identity change and therefore interest change.102 A 
long-term outcome of these two mechanisms is socialisation, in Wong’s words “a 
process of identity and interest convergence.”103 As a result of their interaction within 
the EU institutions, national elites become familiar with each other’s’ policy positions 
and some level of convergence and cooperation ensue.104 Some scholars refer to this 
identity change as internalisation of EU roles and norms.105 
However, there are mainly methodological problems with focusing on 
internalisation of foreign policy norms as the cause of foreign policy Europeanisation. 
One way of studying internalisation is treating the state as an individual. Yet, this 
would mean to anthropomorphise the state and giving the state a ‘mind’ to internalise 
norms.106 The other way is to focus on the socialisation of state elites as an indicator of 
the socialisation of the state.107 However, there is a need to analyse how these elites’ 
socialisation caused the Europeanisation of state policy. For example, Wang’s analysis 
of the socialisation of China into the norms of multilateralism has demonstrated that 
elite socialisation does not automatically entail institutionalisation of the norm, and 
change in policies as an extension.108 An analysis of internalisation of EU norms would 
require longitudinal qualitative analyses of the same actors and verification that these 
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actors’ input into the decision-making structures was an outcome of their socialisation 
to EU norms.109  
All in all, the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature is over-reliant on 
uploading-downloading-cross-loading/identity reconstruction dynamics. However, a 
theoretically under-elaborated replication of such a model may be hiding more than it 
reveals. Such over-reliance comes at the expense of fruitful but marginalized 
alternative frameworks such as the ‘using Europe’ and ‘role theory’ (see below).  
The uploading-downloading and crossloading framework offers a very 
limited conceptualisation of agency within the Europeanisation of foreign policy 
literature. As the earlier review of the turn towards more agency-centric explanations 
in the broader Europeanisation literature has demonstrated, there is more to agency 
than uploading policy preferences and templates to the EU level. The creative ways 
that agency can use European institutions should be elaborated more in the literature 
on the Europeanisation of foreign policies. As also pointed out by Moumoutzis in a 
recent literature review, the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature is based on 
overrated socialisation arguments. 110 He has also argued that the usage of EU norms, 
practices and processes by domestic policy actors need to be brought back into the 
analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign policy.   
Another helpful alternative has been offered by Aggestam, who applied 
role theory to analyse the Europeanisation of foreign policies. A focus on the roles 
actors play, rather than their internalisation of the EU norms or identity changes over 
the long run has been a necessary corrective in the literature. The concept of role 
provides a useful link between structure and agency. Accordingly, actors 
conceptualise their roles based on their perceptions of the institutional contexts they 
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find themselves in.111 According to role theory, actors are guided both by rules and 
their motivations, therefore foreign policy roles are a combination of foreign policy 
objectives, perceived context, and path-dependence of the past roles and actions.112 
Aggestam has applied role theory to the Europeanisation of foreign policy by 
borrowing the distinction between preference and position roles coined by Barnett.113 
Position roles have more detailed guidelines for action and are generally associated 
with institutions whereas preference roles are less constraining and leave more room 
for interpretation to actors. According to Aggestam, Europeanisation entails the 
adoption of position roles in relation to the EU structure.114  
These frameworks can contribute greatly to the analysis of the 
Europeanisation of foreign policies by addressing the limitations of the uploading-
downloading-crossloading framework in conceptualising agency and its relationship 
with the EU structure. Another limitation is in terms of alternative spaces of foreign 
policy action. As Bates and Smith have noted, there is a widespread neglect of the 
space in political analysis.115 Foreign policy by definition involves the ‘foreign’ as a 
spatial category in addition to ‘European’ and ‘domestic’ which are usual categories of 
Europeanisation research. Foreign policy is mainly outward oriented as opposed to 
other public policies that are oriented towards inside the national borders.116 
Analysing the interaction between EU institutions and agency in different spatial 
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contexts, i.e. outside the EU and nation-state boundaries can shed further light on how 
Europeanisation might be a constraint or a resource in different spatial contexts.117  
Thirdly, in a significant number of studies in the literature there is an 
assumption that Europeanisation manifests itself as observable convergence with the 
EU templates or norms. Such accounts mainly tell a story of isomorphism, where 
structure and agency do not work at the same time so as to create diversity. Rather 
agency creates the structure (usually conceived as the CFSP structure) and the 
structure determines the agency afterwards, which leads to equating convergence 
with Europeanisation, and anything that falls shorter than convergence with non-
Europeanisation. A more fruitful conceptualisation of structure and agency would be 
one where agency takes place in a structured environment, and structural 
opportunities and constraints are only interpreted by and realised through agency. In 
other words, ‘uploading’ takes place within a structured environment and 
‘downloading’ is done by and through strategic agents, which is lacking in the 
literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy so far.  
Finally, as the next section will demonstrate, this conceptualisation based 
on the three dimensions of Europeanisation of foreign policy does not fit well with the 
Europeanisation of candidate states. Downloading and identity reconstruction seem to 
be the only options for candidate state agency. Since candidate states are outside the 
decision-making structures, they seem to be deprived of any meaningful agency in the 
Europeanisation of their foreign policies. The next section therefore elaborates how 
this issue is tackled by the specific literature on the Europeanisation of candidate 
countries.  
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2.3 Europeanisation of Candidate Country Foreign Policies 
 
Europeanisation of candidate countries as a literature has emerged with 
the 2003 Eastern enlargement and within the context of the CEECs’ accession to the 
EU. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have defined Europeanisation “as a process in 
which states adopt EU rules.”118 Likewise, Heather Grabbe’s focus is also on the 
conditions and mechanisms of rule transfer from the EU to candidate countries.119 The 
literature broadly focuses on membership conditionality and power asymmetry 
between the EU and candidate countries as a crucial ingredient of rule transfer from 
the EU to the candidate countries.120 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have concluded 
in their review of the literature that “[t]he main findings of the research on the 
Europeanisation of accession countries point to the paramount causal relevance of 
asymmetrical interdependence and credible accession conditionality for the quick and 
pervasive adoption of EU rules in the accession countries.”121  
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have assessed the explanatory power of 
alternative mechanisms of rule adoption in the CEEC. They have mainly questioned 
the relative impact of the EU external incentives on rational CEEC actors, in 
comparison with social learning and lesson-drawing by these actors. The main 
proposition of the external incentives model is that the candidate country government 
adopts EU rules if the benefits exceed the domestic costs.122 The determinacy of EU 
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conditions, the size and speed of EU rewards, the credibility of conditionality, the 
number of domestic veto players and the size of adoption costs for the target 
government are all variables that determine the likelihood of rule adoption according 
to this model.123 
The alternative model identified by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier is the 
social learning model, which is based on the logic of appropriateness assumption 
whereby the CEEC actors adopt EU rules only if they are persuaded by the 
appropriateness of EU rules.124 The likelihood of rule adoption in this model depends 
on the legitimacy of EU rules in the eyes of domestic actors, actors’ self-perception as 
the EU’s in-group, resonance of EU rules with the domestic rules. Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier have taken into account the importance of normative suasion of the CEEC 
actors by the EU as strengthening the likelihood for rule adoption in the social 
learning model.125 The previous two models identified by Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier have focused upon the EU induced rule adoption, i.e. EU rewards and 
sanctions as in the external incentives model and EU persuasion of target 
governments of the appropriateness of the rules or empowerment of domestic non-
governmental actors through external legitimacy as in the social learning model. The 
final model Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have identified is the lesson-drawing 
model which is based on voluntary adoption of EU rules by candidate governments 
when formulating domestic policies without EU conditionality or involvement. The 
main logic of action in the lesson-drawing model is the assessment of domestic utility 
rather than an assessment of EU rewards and sanctions. 126  Lesson drawing, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have argued, is more likely to take place when there 
is a perceived policy failure and domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo, existence 
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of epistemic communities with a specialisation on EU rules, suitability of EU rules to 
transfer. 
Building on these models, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have 
distinguished between two different types of EU conditionality: democratic 
conditionality and acquis conditionality, where external incentives, the legitimacy and 
utility of EU rules vary. Authors have argued that in democratic conditionality, the 
domestic political structure, costs of adoption and party politics make the 
difference.127 Whereas the external incentives model explains acquis conditionality the 
best when there is clarity, consistency of an EU reward and salience of the issue in the 
EU’s approach.128  
Grabbe also has argued that a certain tension between the possibility of 
accession and rejection and willing partners in the candidate countries is necessary 
for EU conditionality to work.129 Grabbe has confined her study on Europeanisation to 
the “influence of EU accession policy on public policy-making” and analysed how the 
“EU used its accession conditions to exercise influence.”130 Grabbe has analysed the 
impact of the Schengen acquis and the single market acquis in the regulation of the 
free movement of persons. Still, Grabbe has focussed on policy transfer from the EU to 
candidate countries thereby has taken polity and politics as rather fixed transmission 
belts for policy transfer. Therefore, she has not attempted to bridge the evolving 
policy, politics and polity aspects of Europeanisation. Finally, Grabbe has also pointed 
out the power asymmetry in the EU-Candidate relationship, which works in favour of 
the EU. The underlying power asymmetry assumption renders candidate countries the 
receivers of EU constraints without any opportunity to use them as a resource.  
                                                             
127 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Candidate Countries,’ p.91. 
128 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Candidate Countries,’ p.91. 
129 Grabbe, The EU’s, p.53. 
130 Grabbe, The EU’s, p.73 and p.1. 
39 
 
In Grabbe’s framework, the EU exerts influence through the provision of 
legislative and institutional models, money and technical assistance, benchmarking 
and monitoring, advice and twinning, and finally gate-keeping candidates’ access to 
negotiations and the later stages of accession. 131  The effectiveness of these 
mechanisms is influenced by certain mediating factors such as the diffuseness of the 
EU’s influence, uncertainty surrounding the accession process; as well as the country’s 
institutional capacity, political salience of the issue and the country’s macro-strategy 
of adaptation.132 Diffuseness of influence could be caused by the EU’s lack of 
institutional templates, inconsistencies in the EU’s advice to applicants, and the 
multiplicity of EU institutions or the Member States involved in expressing the EU 
conditions.133 Uncertainty can be caused by a lack of linkage between certain duties 
and the rewards; information on the hierarchy of tasks, content of the policy agenda to 
be undertaken, whom to satisfy and what counts as meeting the demands.134 On the 
receiving end of the relationship, mediating factors include the peculiar political 
culture of the candidate state, i.e. legacy of communism, tendency to create 
dysfunctional institutions, the match between EU acquis and the candidate’s needs; 
the overall public opinion in the candidate country on EU membership and the 
particular policy area; and finally the broader framework strategy the candidate 
pursues in the accession process.135 Grabbe has also pointed out the path-dependence 
effects of the accession process on candidate countries, as turning away from the EU 
process becomes too costly for the candidate country governments as their 
investment in and commitment to EU accession deepens.136 
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As with the literature on the Europeanisation of member state foreign 
policies, convergence and internalisation are equated with true Europeanisation. For 
example Grabbe has concluded that “[i]t is when people stop referring to ‘EU policies’ 
that they have become truly Europeanised.”137 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have 
pointed out that Europeanisation means compliance with EU conditionality.138 The 
agency-based approach to Europeanisation in non-members is useful in diverting 
attention beyond rule transfer from the EU towards the usage of the EU in different 
ways. In other words, rather than adopting an ‘objective’ view of what the EU rules are 
and whether they are complied with, agency-based approaches to the Europeanisation 
of candidate states aim to understand what domestic actors make of the EU rules, why 
and how they comply with them if they do. 
The literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has tended to 
overlook candidate countries. It can be argued that with strong assumptions of 
socialisation in EU institutions and processes, and the projection of national 
preferences to the EU level, the existing literature on the Europeanisation of foreign 
policy has by definition marginalised candidate countries. An exception to this 
exclusion came from Major, who has deliberately adopted a broad enough definition 
of Europeanisation as “domestic change occurring on account of an EU impact” 
thereby covering “also the consequences of fulﬁlling EU requirements and of 
voluntary orientation towards EU standards in candidate countries.”139   
There are a few studies dealing with the Europeanisation of new member 
states such as Poland and Slovenia, however their main focus remains on post-
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membership Europeanisation.140 These studies provide brief overviews of the pre-
candidacy period, which usually focus on the candidate countries’ alignment with the 
CFSP acquis politique. Pomorska noted that the pre-candidacy alignment of candidate 
countries’ foreign policies with the EU and the related political dialogue led to the 
broadening of territorial interest of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.141 Against 
the backdrop of such dearth of studies on the Europeanisation of candidate foreign 
policies, it is striking that there is a notable number of studies on the Europeanisation 
of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
The findings of this literature on the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign 
policy mostly resonate with the broader literature on the Europeanisation of Member 
State foreign policies. Ustun has argued that due to the “one-sided character” of the 
EU-candidate state relationship, “[w]hile the member states get the opportunity to 
affect the decisions during the process, candidates are informed at the end of the 
process about the policies to which they need to adapt.”142 Similarly, Ozcan has bluntly 
argued “[u]sing Europeanization as a strategic tool for pursuing foreign policy interest 
is not applicable for Turkey. This issue is valid for the members and especially for 
Cyprus and Greece.”143 In line with these assumptions, there is not any study of the 
Europeanisation of candidate countries and their foreign policies delving into the 
possibility of uploading to the EU or to candidate countries using the EU structure as a 
resource. The focus on socialisation and learning as Europeanisation is also evident in 
the literature on the Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy. For example, Ustun 
has argued, “in regards to foreign policy matters, the EU lacks supranational 
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characteristics; so, the logic of appropriateness… is a more suitable method for 
understanding the Europeanization process in the foreign policy domain.”144 A similar 
norm-based definition comes from Terzi, who has argued that the Europeanisation of 
Turkish Foreign Policy “would imply an acquisition of ‘European identity’ signifying 
belonging in a new community with new values and norms.”145 However, as stated 
earlier, these accounts only refer to the adoption of EU norms and identity by the 
candidate state in a by and large automatic manner, without an analysis of how 
domestic actors edit, translate, reject or use the EU accession process and EU norms 
and policies in foreign policy. 
On the other hand, there is another approach analysing the 
Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy on a pure conditionality basis. Aydin and 
Acikmese for example have argued that in the case of candidate countries the only 
mechanism of Europeanisation is conditionality.146 They have identified three types of 
EU foreign policy conditionality toward Turkey. The first one is the condition of 
alignment with the CFSP acquis politique including joint actions, common positions, 
declarations, conclusions reached as part of the CFSP. Secondly, Aydin and Acikmese 
have enlisted democratic conditionality “which stands at the top of the membership 
conditions for any country wishing to join the EU.”147 Finally, they have identified the 
condition of peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, Aydin and Acikmese did not 
confine their analysis to EU foreign policy decisions or norms and their impact on 
national foreign policy; rather they have also covered democratic conditionality of the 
EU. Therefore, authors have undertaken a fruitful expansion of what constitutes the 
‘independent variable’ to include more than CFSP conditionality. Yet they omit the 
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external dimension of the EU’s trade policy and the related rules in Turkey’s 
candidacy. Also, whether or not the alignment with the CFSP acquis is a ‘condition for 
membership’ is an empirical issue to be resolved. As explained earlier, for policy areas 
such as Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus conditionality framework could be 
applicable, yet it is not directly applicable in the case of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. 
Muftuler Bac and Gursoy have defined Europeanisation as “an adaptation 
to EU [foreign policy] norms” and its outcome.148 They have identified the EU foreign 
policy norms that are relevant to the case of Turkey as the civilian control of the 
military and the use of diplomatic and economic means to solve disputes.149 Authors 
do not favour a more sociological or a rationalist explanation of this adaptation 
process explicitly and focus on the changes evident in Turkish Foreign Policy that fall 
in line with their definition of Europeanisation based on indicators such as the 
increased influence of the elected officials and civil society groups in foreign 
policymaking, and the use of economic and diplomatic tools in solving disputes.150 The 
value-added in this approach is the emphasis on both adaptation to the EU and the 
indirect consequences of this adaptation are included in the definition of 
Europeanisation. What lacks in this approach is any explanation of how 
Europeanisation occurs. By focussing on how Europeanised foreign policy looks like, 
the authors have skipped the analysis of the causal complex that brought about such a 
foreign policy. 
An interesting twist to this literature has come from Oguzlu, who has 
utilised a definition which distinguishes between “apparent Europeanization” and 
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“true Europeanisation.”151 As Oguzlu has labelled as apparent Europeanisation those 
cases of observed convergence between Turkish Foreign Policy and EU foreign policy, 
which “would probably have occurred had Turkey not been pursuing membership in 
the EU.” 152  True Europeanisation, on the other hand, has been defined as 
“Europeanisation as cause”: 
Europeanisation as cause would appear mainly as a top-down process in 
the sense that the hierarchical relationship between the EU and candidate 
countries would not allow the latter to challenge the normative 
underpinnings of EU foreign policy. EU norms gradually become part of 
national identities and foreign policy practices throughout the accession 
process.153 
Oguzlu’s approach is useful in the sense that it points to the need to go 
beyond appearances and observable correlations, which is a main premise of this 
study too. However, Oguzlu’s definition of Europeanisation privileges the EU’s 
normative structure over Turkish agency and again offers a hardly researchable 
account of internalisation. Therefore it is not surprising that he does not offer 
empirical work to support his argument.  
Another interesting approach has come from Onis and Yilmaz, who have 
taken into account the reasons actors have as part of the causal analysis. They have 
coined the terms “loose Europeanisation” to refer to:  
a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the 
government to what was previously the focal point of Turkish foreign 
policy efforts, namely joining the EU as a full-member…foreign policy 
activism is pursued with respect to all neighbouring regions, but with no 
firm EU axis as was previously the case.154  
This approach extends the horizon of research to include more agency in 
the definition by the incorporation of reasons and motivations as part of causal 
analysis, even if this point is not theoretically elaborated by Onis and Yilmaz. 
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Finally, as already mentioned before, in the case of Turkey there is a 
strong emphasis on the EU’s democratic conditionality and its impact on Turkish 
foreign policy. This is partly due to the military’s traditionally central presence in 
Turkish politics and especially Turkish foreign policy. The role of the military has been 
presented by the EU in the candidacy process as a major roadblock.155 Therefore many 
studies have placed significant emphasis on the impact of the EU’s democratic 
conditionality on the configuration of foreign policy actors in Turkey.156 However, 
Ulusoy has linked this process directly to democratic peace theory.157 Ulusoy has 
pointed out that 
It is the contention of this study that Turkey’s cooperative relationships 
with the EU would go in parallel to Turkey’s democratization. Democratic 
Turkey would in turn adopt a more compromising style, a more multi-
dimensional process and more EU-oriented outcomes in its foreign policy.  
As the country gradually becomes more democratized, the participation of 
various societal groups in the foreign policy-making process would lead to 
the adoption of more cooperative attitudes towards other democracies.158 
This assumption is also in line with the main tendency in the literature on 
the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy that Europeanisation is a progressive 
force that pushes Turkish foreign policy to a benign and peaceful form and that 
democratisation and pro-EU foreign policy go together, which I contest in this study. I 
argue in the following empirical chapters that the retreat of the military in Turkish 
foreign policy led to more political space for other actors; however this process by no 
means automatically entails a pro-EU foreign policy or peaceful foreign policy. Instead 
how this process led to a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is 
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part of the empirical puzzle this thesis answers rather than assuming an automatic 
and benign process. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis addresses some of the shortcomings that the preceding 
literature review has demonstrated. First of all, in line with the calls for adopting a 
complex interaction between the policy, politics and polity domains it adopts a 
dynamic and interactive view of Europeanisation. Accordingly, it is acknowledged that 
policy is located within a broader political context, which is also in flux in the 
Europeanisation process. Therefore, domestic politics will not be utilised as a fixed 
transmission belt, rather it is affected by the EU and it holds causal powers. The 
Europeanisation of politics also leads to Europeanisation of policy in an indirect 
fashion, alongside the direct impact of the EU policies.  
Also, I argue that the analysis of foreign policy Europeanisation cannot be 
confined to the CFSP, as the political and economic aspects of foreign policy are 
intertwined. Therefore a limited focus on the CFSP and its rules overshadows the 
economic dynamics of foreign policy, such as trade and the progressive consolidation 
of neo-liberalism in candidate countries. In the case of Turkey for example, an 
important part of the rules of EU candidacy was the alignment of Turkey’s preferential 
trade policy with that of the EU’s, which factored into the puzzle of Turkey’s foreign 
policy toward the Middle East as will be shown in chapter five. 
Moreover, none of the studies on the Europeanisation of candidate 
country foreign policies that have been reviewed so far has dealt with the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy from a role theory perspective. This is due to the 
focus on the ideal typical division between conditionality and norm internalisation, 
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namely rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. This division 
has led to a lack of conceptualisation of the so-called ‘EU impact’. In the next chapter I 
engage with this issue and offer a conceptualisation of EU candidacy as an institutional 
context of relational roles. 
As a contribution to the literature on candidate countries, this thesis 
analyses how Turkish actors used EU candidacy as a resource in their relationship 
with the Middle East. Such an emphasis on agency in the Europeanisation of candidate 
countries and a focus on alternative spaces of ‘using Europe’ also helps to question 
definitions of Europeanisation as convergence. This contribution requires the 
research to be clear about the theoretical riverbeds in the Europeanisation literature 
and ontological and methodological underpinnings of Europeanisation. The following 
chapters will address these issues in turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Europeanisation has been called an “attention diverting device” by Olsen.159 On top of 
using Europeanisation as an attention-diverting device, the mainstream literature has 
also often followed a new institutionalist route in explaining the impact of EU 
institutions (broadly defined, see below) on domestic politics. 160  Yet, new 
institutionalism is also an “organizing principle,” which does not qualify as a theory 
itself.161 In a way, the Europeanisation literature has shied away from explicit theory 
and theorising.  
Theory can be defined in many ways. Sayer has categorised theory as a 
filing system to classify data, theory as hypothesis, and theory as conceptualisation.162 
The first definition of theory as a filing system is based on an empiricist approach to 
social sciences. Behaviourism assumes that reality is directly accessible to observers 
and it is possible to collect theory-neutral data and classify them to reach 
generalisations of social life. The second definition is the most common in politics, 
which is based on positivism, views theory as a cycle of hypothesis-generation and 
hypothesis-testing with an aim to reach generalisable correlations between variables. 
In this thesis I adopt the third definition and usage of theorising as “to prescribe a 
particular way of conceptualising something.”163 Sayer has argued this approach to 
theorising is more common in contested disciplines that demonstrate fundamental 
divisions. Considering the dividedness of the Europeanisation literature itself, I 
believe this approach to theorizing is extremely useful in conceptualising the objects 
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of analysis and their relationship rather than building generalisable hypotheses 
leading to parsimonious theories. This chapter firstly outlines the analytical strategy I 
follow in conceptualising the objects and relations of my analysis. This strategy is 
based on new institutionalism as a meso-level conceptual framework and a strategic-
relational approach to structure and agency. Secondly, this framework will be applied 
to the EU candidacy of Turkey and its effects on Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. Finally, the methodology that assists this analytical and conceptual 
strategy will be explicated.  
 
3.1 The Four New Institutionalisms  
 
Although there is an inflationary trend in the emergence of new 
institutionalisms, in this section I will mainly limit my review to the new 
institutionalisms that have informed the majority of the institutionalist studies in the 
Europeanisation literature. The three new institutionalisms are rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, which 
have grown in relatively discrete disciplinary trajectories based on differing shades of 
social ontologies.164 The disciplinary trajectories of these three institutionalisms have 
also significantly shaped their definitions and conceptualisations of institutions.165 
Discursive institutionalism has emerged as a critique of these three new 
institutionalisms and has been welcomed by the Europeanisation literature. 
 
                                                             
164 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,’ 
Political Studies, 44/5 (1996), pp.936-57. 
165 Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science;’ Bob Jessop, ‘Institutional Re(turns) and the Strategic-Relational 
Approach,’ Environment and Planning A, 33 (2001), p.1218. 
50 
 
3.1.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism broadly conceptualises institutions as 
“arrangements of rules and incentives” that do not alter the preferences of the 
participants in the institution.166 Rational choice institutionalism sees institutions as 
created by rational actors to solve problems of exchange.167 Therefore, individual 
preferences are ontologically prior to institutions and remain untouched by 
institutional rules according to rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice 
institutionalism is premised on the assumption that, in its crudest sense, individuals 
are rational actors who calculate in order to maximise their gain. Individuals have 
fixed and given preferences to act upon. 168  According to rational choice 
institutionalism, institutions are exogenously given rules of the game by which actors 
play the game.169 The actors and the institutions they are located within vary 
according to the level of analysis. In International Relations for instance, actors are 
usually seen as unitary states.170 According to rational choice institutionalism these 
states act rationally within the international institutions they are located. In sum, this 
variant analyses the “institutional constraints on individual behaviour.”171  
The rational choice assumption that individuals precede institutions 
makes rational choice institutionalism appear to be placing due emphasis on 
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agency.172 Indeed, many students of rational choice institutionalism converge on the 
idea that it has an individualist ontology, due to the emphasis placed on individual 
preferences and individual calculations that lead to political outcomes.173  
However, Hay and Wincott have identified a deeper structuralism at play 
in rational choice institutionalism. They argue that no matter how individualist 
rational choice theories look, in the final analysis they take away the ability to choose, 
which is the essence of individualism, and replace it with rational calculations. In their 
own words, “rational choice strips away all distinctive features of individuality, 
replacing political subjects with calculating automatons.”174 Therefore, rational choice 
institutionalism is innately structuralist in the sense that any agent would eventually 
choose the rational way of pursuing their exogenously given interests, within the 
limits imposed by the institutional context.  
In time rational choice institutionalism has evolved to incorporate ideas 
into its explanatory framework so as to account for institutional stability. In Blyth and 
Varghese’s words, “for the rationalists, ideas became focal points in situations of 
multiple equilibria that could be used to signal convergence, and thus explain stability, 
or were more or less failures of information.”175 The second inroad of ideas into 
rational choice institutionalism was made when rationalist scholars softened their 
approach to rationality. An example of this is the assumption of bounded rationality, 
coined by Simon, which assumes that actors do not have perfect information, a 
perfectly calculating mind and a long time to search for alternative actions.176 
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Therefore, there is no assumption of perfect knowledge of the context. As Hay has 
suggested,  
it is now conventional for rational choice theorists to declare themselves 
agnostic about the specific utility function to be maximized in any given 
context, insisting that the term rationality refers only to the efficiency 
with which means are deployed in the service of given preferences.177 
In other words, contemporary rational choice theorists have laxer 
definitions of rationality, implying the possibility of their rational agents seeking non-
material gains, as long as they engage in calculation. These revisions give rational 
choice institutionalism a more realistic approach to explaining political life, yet they 
are still embedded within an understanding of theory that aims to reach law-like 
generalisations through hypothesis-testing or formal modelling.  
Rational choice institutionalists working within the Europeanisation 
literature focus on the opportunity structures that European integration create for 
domestic actors and the importance of veto players in adaptation to the EU.178 The 
“External Incentives Model” of Europeanisation is an example of rational choice 
institutionalism. According to this model, “the EU sets the adoption of its rules as 
conditions that the [candidates] have to fulfil in order to receive rewards from the 
EU.”179 The underlying assumption is that domestic actors more or less automatically 
respond to new opportunity structures created by the EU regardless of their identities 
and their ideas.  
 
3.1.2 Sociological Institutionalism 
In certain respects, sociological institutionalism is diametrically opposed 
to rational choice institutionalism. The first difference lies in the definition and 
function of institutions. According to sociological institutionalism, institutions range 
                                                             
177 Hay, ‘Theory, Stylized Heuristic,’ p.41. 
178 Kevin Featherstone, ‘Introduction,’ in The Politics, eds., Featherstone and Radaelli, p.9. 
179 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction,’ p.10. 
53 
 
from major containers of values to symbol systems, moral templates, and cognitive 
scripts.180  The function of institutions is also different from that in rational choice 
institutionalism. In sociological institutionalism institutions shape actor preferences 
and identities rather than simply shaping the interaction among individual agents. 
According to sociological institutionalists, individuals and their preferences are 
constituted by institutions and individuals seek legitimacy in their actions instead of 
pursuing an exogenously given self-interest. In other words, “exogenous scripts are 
embraced through cognitive and mimetic processes” by agents.181 This is not to say 
that sociological institutionalists rule out utility-maximising behaviour. In fact, most 
sociological institutionalists acknowledge such behaviour within cultural contexts that 
prescribe and legitimate utility-maximising behaviour. In Finnemore’s words, 
“rationality is ‘myth’ and conformance with it is ‘ceremony’.”182 Thus sociological 
institutionalism embraces various reasons for action including rational choices of 
actors, so long as those reasons are culturally embedded in that society or community. 
Legitimacy is the key to action according to sociological institutionalism, which 
sometimes even leads to inefficient but culturally appropriate behaviour and 
organisation.  
Sociological institutionalism is diametrically opposed to rational choice 
institutionalism in its treatment of ideas, as agency is constituted by cultural 
institutions in the sociological variant. Finnemore puts it nicely when she writes that 
“the individual as autonomous social actor is a product, not a producer, of society and 
culture.”183 Ideas and institutions are ontologically prior to individuals; they constitute 
individuals and give meaning to the physical surroundings. A good example of such an 
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approach is the socialisation assumption in the Europeanisation of foreign policy 
literature. Much of this literature conceptualises socialisation of foreign policy actors 
in this fashion, as a process without much agency (see chapter two). 
Sociological institutionalists’ emphasis on the ideational structure leads 
critics to argue that they treat the individual as “a largely dependent and rather 
unimportant variable.” 184  The structuralism in some variants of sociological 
institutionalism is so evident that Schmidt points out that this approach can be 
considered “culturally deterministic” due to its strength in explaining norm-following 
and weakness in explaining norm-breaking behaviour.185 However, as with rational 
choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism is also a broad church and it 
undergoes revisions. Some of these approaches bring agency back into the frame and 
reject the view of individuals as cultural dopes. Finnemore has supported this position 
by arguing that there is a so far neglected aspect of normative competition in the 
sociological variant of new institutionalism.186 As culture is a broad category that 
consists of contradictory values under one umbrella, there is always room for 
interpretation and contestation of norms by agents. For instance, Woll and Jacquot 
have fore grounded agency by arguing that social institutions such as EU norms and 
practices can be used strategically by agents, as chapter two has reviewed.187 Woll and 
Jacquot have identified three broad types of usage. The most common is strategic 
usage, which refers to using Europe to achieve a certain goal. This kind of usage could 
refer to the mobilisation of EU resources to achieve a better position in decision-
making or increasing one’s action capacity.  The transformation of an anti-EU interest 
group into a pro-EU group to achieve a more favourable position in the domestic bids 
                                                             
184 Thomas A. Koelble, ‘The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology,’ Comparative Politics, 
27/2 (January 1995), p.232; Aspinwall and Schneider, ‘Same Menu,’ p.4. 
185 Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Approaches to the Study of European Politics,’ ECSA Review, 12/2 (Spring 1999), 
p.3. 
186 Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture,’ pp.340-3. 
187 Woll and Jacquot, ‘Using Europe.’ 
55 
 
for EU projects could be an example. Cognitive usage refers to the usage of Europe by 
an actor in understanding her situation and persuading others to understand a 
problem in a certain way. This kind of usage covers institutional learning and policy 
diffusion within the EU. The lessons and the policies to be learned from the EU need 
the interpretation of and persuasion by domestic actors. Therefore, the cases of 
interpretation of the EU ideas and usage of these ideas by domestic actors in policy 
deliberation fall under cognitive usage. Finally, legitimising usage covers cases where 
domestic actors refer to European constraints or a broader European interest to 
legitimise a policy decision to the general public. This kind of usage is more likely 
when the public opinion is more pro-EU, therefore references to Europe have stronger 
appeal than references to national identity or interest.188 
Such sociological approaches indeed broaden the scope of institutions to 
include power relations embedded within institutions. Instead of offering a 
frictionless account of socialisation to social norms, these accounts of sociological 
institutionalism show how actors appropriate norms strategically, in relation to each 
other. In Jenson and Merand’s words, according to these sociological institutionalists, 
“[a]n institution can be a set of formal rules and informal norms that persists through 
time, but it is also always a pattern of social relations, which can be competitive, 
oppositional and characterized by unequal power relations.”189  
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3.1.3 Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism at a basic level is interested in political struggle 
within its temporal context. 190 Any formal and informal recurring pattern can be 
counted as an institution according to historical institutionalists. According to Peters, 
Pierre and King, institutions can be defined in historical institutionalism as  
deliberately created institutions charged with the implementation of 
public policy, and the formal rules structuring relations between the state 
and interest groups…formal administrative institutions within the state 
such as civil service departments or legislatures, as well as informal rules, 
agreements, and customs within the state and between the state and 
society.191  
As the title implies, history matters for historical institutionalists. History 
is the context in which events take place, which directly affects the decision or the 
outcome. Historical institutionalists are interested in historical context out of which 
institutions emerge.192 Unlike rational choice institutionalists who are interested in 
coordinating functions of institutions, historical institutionalists are interested in the 
temporal processes that lead to the emergence of institutions.193 Secondly, the order 
in which things happen affect how they happen and their outcomes.194  This is also 
reflected in the assumption of path-dependence in historical institutionalism. 
Accordingly, historical institutionalists traditionally conceptualise institutions as 
‘sticky’ and institutional change as path-dependent. Such a focus on history leads 
historical institutionalists away from a view of causality based on the presumed 
independence of variables. For historical institutionalists, there is no ‘independent’ 
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variable that is responsible for an event; rather there are causal complexes that 
comprise of historically interrelated factors. As Immergut has aptly put it,  
they tend to see complex configurations of factors as being casually 
significant. These configurations become apparent through historical-
comparative observation, and it may be extremely difficult, if not possible, 
to break such models down into casually [sic.] independent variables.195   
Historical institutionalists straddle both logics of action, that of 
appropriateness and that of consequences. In historical institutionalism, the 
mechanisms that reinforce institutions can be both “‘rules of the game’, and even 
citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world.”196 Following this duality, 
historical institutionalism does not embrace a specific logic of action for actors: 
sometimes they are interest maximisers; sometimes they just conform to norms 
habitually.197 Historical institutionalism in this respect is a highly eclectic approach. 
When referring to the more cultural variants of historical institutionalism, Peters, 
Pierre and King assert that “historical institutionalism is even more structuralist than 
more traditional models of structure and agency because it conceives of institutions as 
sustained by—and representing—systems of values, norms, and practices in 
society.”198 Therefore, if it were to adopt a logic of action, it would be in Schmidt’s 
words, “a logic of path dependency”.199 Accordingly, actors are bounded by the 
evolving structure. Historical institutionalists working within the Europeanisation 
literature focus on the impact of timing and tempo of EU developments on national 
adaptation and the stickiness of national institutions in the adaptation process.200 
Gross’s finding that there is more continuity than change in member states’ crisis 
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response policies due to national actors’ predisposition towards using the already 
tried methods of crisis response is a good example of this logic of path-dependence 
(see chapter two). 
Historical institutionalism has been criticized mainly for its eclecticism, its 
structuralism including the lack of an account of endogenous institutional change and 
insufficient conceptualisation of the role of ideas and micro-foundations of 
institutional behaviour. First of all, historical institutionalism has been criticised for 
lacking an endogenous account of change.201 The first line of such criticism was that 
according to many historical institutionalist work institutions explained everything 
until they explained nothing. 202  For example, Krasner’s oft-cited “punctuated 
equilibrium” theory of institutional change attributes change to critical junctures 
while in the remaining time, stasis settles in hence the “equilibrium.”203 Secondly 
within this line of criticism, historical institutionalists have been criticised for not 
being able to account for ideational factors in the dynamics of institutional continuity 
and change. Along this line, Bulmer has argued that the incorporation of learning into 
historical institutionalist analyses offers the potential of easing the structuralist and 
deterministic tendencies of this variant of new institutionalism.204 Likewise Peters, 
Pierre and King concluded that the role played by ideas and the conflict over them 
should be central to historical institutional analyses.205  
 Hall’s work on the role of changing policy paradigms in institutional 
change is a pioneer in historical institutionalism.206  According to Hall, policy 
paradigms are broad ideational frameworks held collectively by groups of actors, 
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which define what problems and solutions are legitimate even to consider. Policy 
paradigms provide actors with a framework of institutional goals, hierarchy of these 
goals and appropriate ways of addressing problems.207 Hall’s argument is that there 
are policy instruments, settings and paradigms, which are all elements that make up a 
policy system. Minor changes in the settings in which policy instruments are used 
represent first order change, whereas changes in the policy instruments represent 
second order change. Finally, if a more dramatic change that takes place in the 
hierarchy of goals and standards, then it is called third order change, i.e. paradigmatic 
change.208 
Palier’s criticism of Hall’s framework is that not all paradigmatic 
institutional change is necessarily abrupt and explicit, but sometimes slow-moving 
and incremental.209 As Streeck and Thelen have identified, layering is a potential mode 
of incremental change where actors with a reform agenda work around the 
unchangeable aspects of an institution by adding new elements to the existing 
institution with the aim of revising, correcting and amending it. Thus the newly added 
elements do not explicitly threaten the unchangeable aspects of the institution, i.e. the 
basic goals of the institution, and the supporters of those unchangeable aspects.210 
Layering is achieved by actors’ active promotion of revisions, amendments and 
corrections to the old system and when it leads to differential growth and 
replacement of the existing unchangeable elements of the institution it entails 
institutional change. As Palier has demonstrated, for layering to succeed, there has to 
be consensus among key actors on the failure of past practices and policies and an 
ambiguous agreement among key actors over the introduction of new elements to the 
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system to fix the system. What renders this agreement ambiguous is that the parties to 
the agreement all have their own reasons for agreeing with the new measures.211 
Therefore, ‘layering’ is a very helpful concept that explains how incremental change, 
which may or may not lead to paradigmatic change in the long run, is initiated.  
Although layering is a quite useful analytical concept, it still emphasizes 
the process unleashed by the annexation of new instruments to an existing policy at 
the expense of the goals actors had for layering new instruments in the first place and 
their strategies of layering. In this respect, layering explains what happens to the 
institution in the long run rather than showing how actors actually managed to layer 
their ideas onto the existing institution. Likewise, while Hall has successfully 
examined the importance of policy paradigms in institutional change, his explanation 
of how ideas can be strategically used by actors remained underdeveloped. This point 
is taken up by discursive institutionalists, who place actors, their strategies, ideas and 
discourses at the heart of their analyses. 
There is a fine line between historical institutionalist analyses that take 
ideas on board and discursive institutionalism that emerged as a critique mainly of the 
lack of sufficient handling of ideas by historical institutionalists.212 The students of 
historical institutionalism suggested that the approach is capable of renovating 
historical institutionalism to be able to take ideas and agency into account rather than 
creating new institutionalisms.213 Yet, discursive institutionalism emerged on the 
grounds that historical institutionalism is not capable of adapting itself to take ideas 
seriously. 
 Secondly, by straddling both logics of appropriateness and consequences 
when explaining agency, historical institutionalists have been criticized for combining 
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insights from competing social ontologies.214 Thus, sympathetic critics have suggested 
that historical institutionalism should adopt its own social ontology.215 This line of 
criticism led to the emergence of a self-labelled constructivist institutionalism, which 
will be explained below.216   
 
3.1.4 Discursive Institutionalism 
A consequence of the increasing recognition of the need for ideas in the 
new institutionalist research is the recent flourishing of what Schmidt has called 
“discursive institutionalism.”217 According to Schmidt, discursive institutionalists are 
those new institutionalist scholars who use ideas as a causal factor in decision-making 
processes.218 Discursive institutionalism, therefore, starts from the assumption that 
discourse and ideas matter in bringing about any political reality and aims to 
incorporate this perspective to the existing three institutionalisms. The 
institutionalism in this approach is that ideas and discourse matter in changing or 
maintaining institutions.219 This way, Schmidt has aimed to emphasise actors’ 
ideational and discursive capabilities to transform or maintain institutions. Schmidt 
has coined helpful analytical categories for the analysis of ideas. Communicative 
discourse “consists of the individuals and groups at the centre of political 
communication involved in the public presentation, deliberation, and legitimization of 
policy, programmatic, as well as philosophical ideas”; whereas coordinative discourse 
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is the organizing discourse of policy construction and elaboration by policy actors in 
the policy formulation stage.220 This approach qualifies discursive institutionalism as 
institutionalist in the sense that it acknowledges that all discursive interactions take 
place within institutions. Schmidt for instance argued that compound political systems 
are more likely to have strong coordinative discourses whereas simple polities are 
more likely to have strong communicative discourses.221 
Contrary to Bell’s criticism that Schmidt offers an idealist account of 
institutionalism, Schmidt does not actually deny the existence and significance of the 
material context.222 What she has argued is that discursive institutionalists rather 
deconstruct ‘material interests’ by separating material reality from interests that the 
actors conceive in the context of material reality.223 Otherwise, Schmidt has argued 
that discursive institutionalism speaks the language of incentive structures with 
rational choice institutionalism, path-dependency with historical institutionalism and 
culture with sociological institutionalism while infusing them with agency and 
ideas.224 Yet, this theoretical pragmatism is not shared by all proponents of the role of 
ideas in institutionalist analysis. Hay, therefore, has coined constructivist 
institutionalism to be able to highlight his particular strategic-relational ontology. 
 
3.1.5 Constructivist Institutionalism and the Strategic-Relational 
Approach 
Starting from the inability of the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness to explain endogenous institutional change as well as the lack of 
ideational analysis in institutionalism, Hay has put forward constructivist 
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institutionalism. In tune with Hay’s version of the strategic-relational approach, 
constructivist institutionalism explains institutional change as contingent upon 
strategic actors’ interaction with the strategically selective context in which they are 
embedded and the intended and unintended consequences of this interaction. Yet, the 
context and action are intermediated by the actors’ perceptions of the context. Change 
is both path-dependent and path-shaping. Constructivist institutionalism places due 
emphasis on strategic yet ideationally motivated actors’ ability to change the path of 
institutional development, while acknowledging that institutional change is also partly 
dependent on the past succession of events and evolution.225 The most significant 
contribution to the mainstream institutionalist variants is constructivist 
institutionalism’s emphasis on not only institutional but also ideational path-shaping 
and path-dependence. In Hay’s words,  
Institutions are built on ideational foundations that exert an independent 
path-dependent effect on their subsequent development…. Constructivist 
institutionalism thus seeks to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to 
which—through processes of normalization and institutional 
embedding—established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive 
filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals and, 
in so doing, to conceive of their own interests. Yet, crucially, they are also 
concerned with the conditions under which such established cognitive 
filters and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced.226 
The institutional context, actors’ ideas of that context and path-dependent ideational 
paradigms altogether shape actors’ perceptions of feasible, desirable, legitimate 
action.227  
Many students of new institutionalism have complained about the 
disciplinary boundaries and highlighted the need for more dialogue among the 
variants of new institutionalism.228 As Hay and Wincott have aptly pointed out this 
should not invite an eclectic approach without any attention paid to the underlying 
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ontological and epistemological differences.229 This is what Hay has aimed to 
accomplish by embedding his constructivist institutionalism within a strategic-
relational ontology. However, the title ‘constructivist institutionalism’ has been 
confused with either ‘sociological institutionalism’ or ‘discursive institutionalism’ by 
the literature, thereby diminishing the impact of constructivist institutionalism and its 
strategic-relational ontology.230 
The strategic-relational approach is an ontological framework for the 
relationship between structure and agency, which is rooted in critical realist 
metatheory.231 According to the SRA, agency and structure are always present 
simultaneously at any given situation. The SRA analogy of structure and agency is the 
metals in an alloy out of which a coin is forged to highlight the inseparability of 
structure from agency. Following from this analogy, it can be argued that both 
structure and agency have causal powers (just like the metals in the alloy) that cannot 
exist without each other in a causal complex (the alloy) that make a certain political 
reality possible (the resulting coin). The main premise is that every action is the 
outcome of the interaction between a strategically selective context and a strategic 
actor.232  
Structures are always selective towards “some actors, some identities, 
some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others” 
therefore their effects can only be observed in relation to action.233 This is probably 
why Jessop does not proffer an elaborate definition of what a structure is. Likewise 
Hay has opted for defining structure as the “setting within which social, political and 
economic events occur and acquire meaning” in particular referring to “the ordered 
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nature of social and political relations—to the fact that political institutions, practices, 
routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or structure over time.”234  
One of the key assumptions of the SRA is therefore the assumption that 
reality is produced through an interaction between a strategically selective context 
and a strategic actor. This assumption sets it apart from raw dichotomies between 
structure and agency.235 Strategic selectivity of the context favours certain strategies, 
therefore enabling and constraining the actors on the basis of the strategies they 
adopt. In other words, “politics is the art of the possible” and actors are the artists.236 
Yet, this position does not imply voluntarism, which dispenses with any notion of 
structure.237 It implies a relational approach to both structure and agency, without 
discarding either side.  
Strategic selectivities of the context are path-dependent in the sense that 
the selectivities that actors face now are the outcomes of past political struggles and 
strategies. However, strategic selectivities of the context are also shaped by the 
strategic action by contemporary actors.238 It is never possible to predict the future 
trajectory of structural change because “the reproduction of structures is only ever 
tendential, so too are their strategic selectivities.”239 Structures do not determine 
action and actors by imposing certain logics of action or certain goals; rather they only 
privilege some strategies, actors and spatio-temporal horizons of action. Consequently 
there is always room for transformation of structures. Likewise, actors are complex, 
having incomplete information about the context, never fully equipped for the 
strategic analysis of the context, and facing opposition from actors pursuing other 
strategies. This leads to failure as an ever-present possibility. Finally structures are 
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never monolithic constructs; they embody strategic contradictions that can be 
strategically used by actors, which make the reproduction of structures a probability 
not a rule. 
Actors are taken to be intentional and capable of monitoring strategic 
selectivities embedded in the context and of devising certain strategies based on their 
perceptions of the context to achieve their preferences. Hay defines strategy as:  
intentional conduct oriented towards the environment in which it is to 
occur. It is the intention to realise certain outcomes and objectives, which 
motivates action. Yet for that action to have any chance of realizing such 
intentions, it must be informed by a strategic assessment of the relevant 
context in which strategy occurs and upon which it subsequently 
impinges.240  
Strategic action can be both intuitive and explicit. Intuitively strategic 
action entails habitual or routine practices based on a certain perception of the 
context and the likely outcomes of specific actions. Such intuitive action usually 
remains unchallenged unless it is rendered explicit by a crisis or failure.241 On the 
other hand, explicitly strategic action is based on a certain perception of the context 
coupled with a strategic investigation and mapping of the context and its strategic 
selectivities.242 Both kinds of strategic action are fallible and likely to co-exist in a 
given case of action. Strategies are fallible because agents are not assumed to be fully 
knowledgeable of the context. Actors may be acting strategically but based upon 
incomplete and/or false information, or well-informed systematic assessments of the 
context.243 After strategic action takes place, agents monitor the direct and indirect 
consequences of their action,244 which leads to strategic learning and the maintenance 
of or change in the selectivities of the context. As a consequence of strategic learning, 
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actors might enhance their knowledge of the strategic context and in turn revise their 
strategies to achieve their objectives, or they might transform their objectives.  
Ideas, in the form of perceptions, discourses, and goals are at the heart of 
the SRA since actors’ perceptions of their context are crucial ingredients in strategic 
context analysis. Actors do not have unmediated knowledge of the context; they act 
within a discursively mediated context.245 Failure might be the result of an unrealistic 
discursive construction of the context, so upon perceived failure actors might also 
change their discourse regarding the context. Agents “come to orient their strategies 
and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their `feel 
for the game'.”246 Such ‘understandings of the context’ and ‘feel for the game’ are 
conditioned by the dominant policy paradigms. 247  According to Hay, actors’ 
perceptions of what is feasible, legitimate and efficient are filtered by the policy 
paradigms (or discursive selectivities) of the context.248  Hay has argued that 
policymaking takes place within an evolving policy paradigm and an evolving material 
context.249 This approach highlights the importance of perceptions and discursive 
framing of the context by actors in conducting strategic context analysis.250 When 
agents reorient their strategies, it may also affect their goals.251  
All in all, the SRA offers a realistic account of structure and agency. The 
SRA is capable of bringing together useful insights from different variants of 
institutionalism within a consistent ontological framework. Yet, the SRA aims to 
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deconstruct, demystify and denaturalises institutions, which goes against the 
tendency in some of the earlier variants of new institutionalism as explained earlier.  
In Jessop and Nielsen’s words, “[d]urable institutions always require 
micro-foundations and usually exist in specific macro-contexts.”252 While actors are 
strategic, reflexive, in pursuit of complex and ever changing goals, the institutional 
context privileges certain strategies. Institutions are analysed not as abstract entities 
but in terms of their strategic and discursive selectivities. In Jessop’s words, “[t]he 
material, discursive and spatio-temporal selectivities of an organization, institution or 
institutional ensemble privilege some practices and strategies and make it harder to 
realize others.”253 A significant contribution of the SRA is in offering a dynamic view of 
institutionalization rather than offering a static definition of institutions.  
 
3.2 Combining the New Institutionalisms and the SRA 
 
The preceding review of the advances in the new institutionalisms and the 
SRA as an ontological framework informs the analysis in this thesis. Strategic-
relational framework provides the most basic ontological assumptions, which glues 
insights drawn from different institutionalisms together. The main value-added of the 
SRA will be the relationality of structure and agency.  Such ontological clarification is 
important as the concepts drawn from different new institutionalisms will be 
reworked within a strategic-relational framework during the analysis. For example, 
‘strategic action’ will be used throughout the analysis not in a rational choice 
conceptualisation but in a strategic-relational conceptualisation as explained above. 
Likewise, path-dependence will not be used in a structuralist sense of the concept, but 
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it will refer to the intentional and unintentional reproduction of the path of 
institutional development by agency. Also, by using the concepts drawn from 
historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and discursive institutionalism, 
the path-dependent evolution of institutions will be complemented by path-shaping 
activities of agency. Therefore, not only path-dependence but also incremental change 
due to path-shaping activities of agency such as institutional change through layering 
will also be adopted in the analysis. While path-dependence and incremental change 
through layering will be used to explain institutional change, agency that brings about 
change and continuity in institutions will be explained through conceptual 
frameworks such as ‘using Europe’ and ‘communicative and coordinative 
discourses.’254 There are significant parallels between the usages of Europe identified 
by Woll and Jacquot and the communicative and coordinative discourses identified by 
Schmidt when applied to a Europeanisation framework. The legitimating usage of 
Europe can be found in the communicative discourses that domestic actors adopt and 
the cognitive usage of Europe can be found in the coordinative discourses. 
However, all agency is situated in line with the SRA. Paradigms are the 
structured programmatic ideas that underpin formal institutions and actors operate 
within the boundaries set by paradigms. This is not to say there is full consensus 
among actors within the same paradigm. There could be dissent within the same 
paradigm and alternative paradigms can exist.255 Operating within the ideational 
boundaries set by the programmatic ideas underpinning institutions, actors interact 
through their coordinative and communicative discourses in the policymaking and 
policy implementation stages. Within this conceptual framework, this thesis will 
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mainly explore how ‘Europe’ is used by domestic actors to enable and give meaning to 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s.  
Yet, it is not sufficient to analyse how ‘Europe’ is used by candidate state 
agency. As ‘using Europe’ is a framework that was initially devised for the member 
states of the EU, further elaboration is needed to appropriate it as a framework for 
candidate states. In the next section, I delve into this question of how to conceptualise 
‘Europe’ that is being used by domestic agency by conceptualising EU candidacy as an 
institutional context. 
 
3.3 EU Candidacy as an Institutional Context  
 
Many students of EU-Turkey relations mark the importance of the EU’s 
Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidacy ‘status’ as a cornerstone in this 
relationship. In what follows I argue that EU candidacy is more than just a decision but 
an institutional context. As the review of recent trends in new institutionalism has 
demonstrated earlier, I argue there is already a call within the literature for the 
adoption of a dynamic view of institutions and their relationship with agency and 
context. Utilising insights from the SRA, within which I have located my understanding 
of institutionalism for the purposes of this thesis, I will now turn to briefly explain 
how and why EU candidacy can be conceptualised as an institution. Although such an 
understanding is non-existent within the Europeanisation literature, there have been 
similar attempts within other literatures.  
As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have noted, conceptualising 
enlargement as institutionalisation is a significant contribution to the study of 
enlargement. Authors have defined the enlargement of an organisation as the 
horizontal institutionalisation of that organisation’s rules and norms in non-member 
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countries.256 However, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have pointed out, the 
Europeanisation of candidate countries have not been analysed from an 
institutionalisation perspective. 257  A study from the broader literature on 
international organisations is Mower’s article on the evolution of the observer status 
within the UN. Mower has argued that “[o]bserver status is an institution which the 
United Nations has acquired through historical accident and usage rather than 
through planning.” 258  Accordingly, observer status-as-institution is located 
somewhere between membership and non-membership. This middle position offers 
its participants, the UN and the observing state, certain roles and rules. Although there 
is no theoretical discussion on either institutionalism or the concept of institution in 
Mower’s article, important parallels can be drawn with the conceptualisation offered 
in this thesis. First of all is Mower’s reconceptualisation of ‘status’ as an institution. 
Secondly, the implication of his argument that observer status-as-institution is not an 
entity on its own but it is based on the relationship between the UN and the observing 
state. These similarities will become more salient once the account of EU candidacy-
as-institutional context is clarified below. 
 
3.3.1 Relational nature of EU candidacy  
The study of institutions has recently moved away from static conceptions 
of institutions, as the review of new institutionalism earlier has demonstrated. This 
has meant a turn to agency but also away from the disregard for how institutions 
emerge in the first place and what they stand for. Historical institutionalist work 
especially has focused on how institutions emerge from, reproduce and transform 
power relations in the society. Katznelson has suggested that: 
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this body of scholarship [new historical institutionalism] shifted away 
from the macrostructures of the state, the economy, and civil society to 
focus on institutions understood both as rules of transaction between 
these sites and as the actual array of formal organizations inside each 
macrostructure and astride their interactions. Institutions emerged as 
ligatures fastening sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to each 
other.259 
In line with these attempts and the SRA, this thesis also conceptualises EU 
candidacy as a relational institutional context. It is based on the asymmetrical political 
relation between the EU and the candidate state, in the same way as “[t]he relations of 
money and banking systems….in which one object in a relation can exist without the 
other, but not vice versa.”260 Without the EU, there would not be an EU candidate, yet 
without Turkey as a candidate the EU would continue to exist. As long as there are 
other candidates for EU membership, the EU would continue to exist in its present 
“widening organization” identity.261  
EU candidacy is temporally and spatially located between EU membership 
and non-membership. The dividing line between candidacy and association can be 
rightly questioned as some association agreements that the EU has signed contain a 
membership prospect, such as those with Turkey and Greece.262 As Sedelmeier has 
argued, after the association agreements signed with Turkey and Greece, the EU has 
been keen to put water between association and membership and used association 
agreements rather as an alternative to membership.263 Also, the pre-accession process 
runs together with association rather than replacing it, which blurs the boundaries of 
EU candidacy as an institution. The EU started declaring countries as candidates in 
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1999 with the decision on Turkey. Since then Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
has been declared as candidate in 2005, Montenegro in 2010.264 It could be argued 
that EU candidacy has been institutionalising between Turkey and the EU since the 
Turkish candidacy decision in 1999.   
More significantly, as an institution, EU candidacy is the 
institutionalisation of position roles and a paradigm. Institutional paradigms serve as 
a cognitive framework for the actors involved in the definition of problems, legitimate 
and appropriate solutions to problems and behaviour.  The paradigm of EU candidacy 
is accession of the candidate country to the EU. Problems are identified and solutions 
are offered within the framework of ‘EU accession’.265 Neither the EU actors nor 
candidate country politicians can legitimately put forward problems and issues that 
are not relevant to the candidate’s accession to the EU.  Moreover, EU candidacy 
comprises of social positions out of which actors construct their roles in relation to 
each other and the institutional context.  
Roles that are prescribed, made and chosen by actors in relation to each 
other within institutions should occupy a central place in the analysis of international 
institutions such as EU candidacy.266 However, definitions so far have mostly 
emphasised the constraining nature of roles within institutions so that these 
persistent roles shape expectations. For example, Keohane has defined institutions as 
a “persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”267 Although establishing 
the link between institutions and roles is a helpful starting point for future analyses, 
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such an approach ignores agency and privileges institutional structure in the 
conception and performance of roles. This structuralist bias is also shared by Barnett 
in that he has also argued that roles constrain state action.268  
Barnett has identified two types of roles that constrain its occupants to 
varying degrees. Position role refers to roles that are associated with formal 
institutions. According to Barnett, they leave less room for interpretation to the actors 
that occupy them. Preference role on the other hand, refers to role conceptions 
associated with informal institutions. Preference roles, therefore, are less constraining 
than position roles and they leave more room for interpretation according to 
Barnett.269 However, some informal institutions such as religion can be more 
constraining than certain position roles such as The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) membership. Therefore, the distinction is more about varying 
levels of institutionalisation rather than the type of institutions. As institutionalisation 
is about actors’ perceptions of and strategies towards institutional roles, it can offer a 
balance to the structuralist bias of institutionalist role theory. 270  Therefore, 
reconceptualising role theory within a strategic-relational approach to institutions 
would establish the balance in favour of agency in role theory. 
Role prescription refers to “roles that other actors or groups prescribe 
and expect the role-beholder to enact.”271 Role prescription therefore is the role 
expected by others in the institution, individuals of the occupant of a certain social 
position.272 The EU is the main rule-maker in relation to the EU candidacy institution, 
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therefore role prescriptions of EU candidacy are those codified by the EU and its 
member states in the Accession Partnership Documents and annual Progress Reports. 
The literature on the Europeanisation of Turkey also confirms the rule-making role of 
the EU and the rule-taking role of Turkish political actors by usually depicting the 
relationship between the EU and the candidate state as asymmetrical “between a 
‘wannabe’ or ‘demandeur’ and an exclusive club having strict rules for 
membership.”273 The EU Commission and the European Council together prescribe 
certain rules to be followed by Turkey, therefore providing Turkish actors with a 
prescription of an EU candidate role. 274 These rules and roles have been evolving on a 
case by case basis, in relation to the applicants. Since the enlargement towards the UK, 
the role prescription for EU candidates has been the complete adoption of the acquis 
communautaire prior to accession. 275  There are procedural rules that are 
institutionalised in EU candidacy as well. The European Council decides whether an 
application is appropriate or not; and whether an applicant is ‘European’ or not.276 If 
the first opinion of the Council is positive, then the Commission produces a report and 
a recommendation as to whether to start accession negotiations with or without 
delay.277 Once the pre-accession process starts, the candidate is given an Accession 
Partnership outlining the specific conditions and priorities to be observed by the 
candidate state while adopting the acquis.278 The Copenhagen criteria have initially 
emerged as a set of criteria for assessing the eligibility of applications; however they 
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were later on adopted as criteria for opening the negotiations as well.279 The 
Copenhagen criteria require “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning 
market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.”280  Two 
sets of position role prescriptions offered by the EU for Turkey as a candidate that will 
be analysed in this study are: 
Role 1(Copenhagen criteria): The candidate should be in compliance with 
the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.  
Role 2(foreign policy acquis): The candidate’s foreign policy should be 
aligned with the foreign policy acquis of the EU. 
In Maresceau’s words, “[t]he publication of progress reports, or even the 
simple fact that such reports are anticipated, creates an atmosphere of permanent 
follow-up.”281 The Accession Partnership also constitutes a single framework for 
enhanced financial support to the candidate countries to support them in their reform 
efforts to institutionalise the role prescriptions of the EU. A political dialogue 
mechanism is also established on both a bilateral and multilateral basis between the 
EU and the candidates as part of this institution for the EU to keep candidates 
informed of its foreign policy positions and other political issues.282Therefore, the EU 
decides, supports, judges and knows the candidate states, which creates a power 
asymmetry between the EU and the candidate state.  
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What shapes the institutionalisation of the position role is, however, 
Turkish political actors’ strategies towards each other and the EU’s role prescriptions. 
National role conceptions refer to the sum of national political actors’ strategies as to 
how they should act on behalf of their state, based on their perceptions of the role 
prescriptions, the material and ideational context, and their goals.283 In strategic-
relational terms, national role conceptions are domestic actors’ strategies towards the 
role prescriptions of the EU and their context. Normatively oriented strategic 
behaviour of domestic actors, their definitions of the situation and their ideas of 
appropriate ways of addressing that situation alters the way the EU candidate role is 
institutionalised in Turkish politics. Role performance is the output of the interaction 
between role prescriptions and Turkish actors’ strategies towards these prescriptions. 
As Holsti has observed, “[i]f ‘the position makes the man [sic],’ the re- verse of the coin 
is that man interprets and defines for himself the rights, duties, privileges and 
appropriate forms of behaviour associated with his positions and relationships in 
society.”284   
This power of agency gives national actors more leeway for interpreting 
and defining what it takes to occupy a position role than it is presumed by Barnett. 
Thus, the asymmetry between the EU and the candidate can be alleviated to a certain 
extent. The candidates can transform the position role through skilled agency.285 As all 
structures (a fortiori institutions) contain contradictions and strategic openings, 
agency can effect changes if they adopt appropriate strategies. A good example is the 
Polish and Hungarian officials’ argument that the CEECs should be more involved in 
shaping the CFSP decisions during candidacy. They built upon previous arrangements 
that allowed CEECs to unilaterally align themselves with CFSP outputs and in tandem 
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with the Commission and the British, German and Italian governments’ support they 
secured an arrangement allowing their indirect input into the CFSP decision-
making.286 The paradigm institutionalised within EU candidacy institution is the 
accession of the candidate state to the EU. Therefore role prescriptions can be 
redrawn by making appropriate references to the ‘accession’ paradigm in a skilful way. 
EU candidate role prescriptions and the rules that are designed for each 
applicant reflect a different configuration.287 But also, as historical institutionalism 
and the SRA suggest, institutions are located within a broader spatio-temporal context, 
so is EU candidacy. The domestic, regional, international context can be used 
strategically by national actors to alter their country’s role as an EU candidate. The 
international context for instance has contributed to a change in the rules of the game 
several times. The Southern enlargement towards Greece, Spain and Portugal was 
heavily shaped by geo-strategic factors and this also shaped the role prescriptions of 
EU candidacy for these countries.288 Likewise Phinnemore has demonstrated how 
Romania’s candidacy was by and large impacted on by political developments in the 
broader European and international context.289 
The institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role is contingent upon 
domestic actors’ adaptation, usage, adoption of the EU’s candidate role prescriptions 
for Turkey. A relational definition of institutions is closer to process ontology than it is 
to substance ontology. Institutions are not reified ‘things’ that remain constant, they 
are processes of relations.290 In this respect, EU candidacy can be referred to as 
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institutionalisation rather than an institution. When actors adopt strategies that are 
selectively favoured by the institutional context, a pattern emerges in the 
institutionalisation of EU candidacy. Yet, institutions are “fragile accomplishments.”291 
They are reproduced by agents within certain macro contexts, which render 
institutions open to de-institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation dynamics.  
  
3.3.2 The Value-added of conceptualising EU candidacy from an 
institutionalist perspective  
I have argued for conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context 
that is strategically selective and relational between the EU and the candidate state. 
This offers potential in certain ways. First of all, this conceptualisation brings together 
elements drawn from different institutionalisms within a single ontological 
framework. The strategic-relational framework allows institutions to be viewed as 
changing, relational, path-dependent yet shaped by agency; as embedded within 
broader spatio-temporal contexts and strategically selective. This ontology highlights 
the role of agency; actors’ perception of the situation and discourses to narrate it in 
transforming or maintaining a social reality. In this respect, the role prescriptions do 
not determine what actors do or think, they enable and constrain certain strategies 
and discourses.  
I have opted for conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context 
rather than specific EU policy processes, such as the CFSP, or modes of interaction, 
such as conditionality. Such a conceptualisation also addressed the question “what 
about the EU is the context for the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.” CFSP is 
an ‘EU policy’ and its institutional structure usually does not include candidates as its 
participants. Therefore, analysing the impact of the CFSP on Turkey as 
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Europeanisation, would not have given Turkish actors much ability to change the 
rules.292 When this lack of formal decision-making powers is combined with the 
methodological separation between the so-called ‘EU level’ structure and the 
‘domestic level’ agency in the literature, while member states are conceptualised as 
first uploading to the ‘EU level’ and then downloading from it, candidate states are 
supposed to be left only with downloading and socialisation options (see Chapter 
1).293 This has translated to a literature assessing the extent to which Turkish actors 
downloaded the EU acquis and socialised to an EU identity. Rather than adopting such 
an approach depriving Turkish actors of meaningful agency, I opt for 
reconceptualising EU candidacy as an institution since institutions constrain but also 
enable actors.  I have argued that the EU and Turkey are relationally positioned to 
each other within EU candidacy, which is the institution that enables and constrains 
domestic agency in turn. In sum, this conceptualisation also allows me to transcend 
the artificial distinction between the ‘EU level’ and ‘domestic level’.  
Conceptualising EU candidacy as an institution rather than a ‘status,’ or 
‘decision’ allowed me to look at the rules and roles associated with EU candidacy as an 
institution. This institution gives Turkey and the EU a certain social position and the 
institutionalisation of its EU candidate role is contingent upon the domestic actors’ 
strategic but also normative orientation towards the role prescriptions and each other. 
However, it is an open-ended question whether, how and why these rules are used 
and what role is constructed out of the EU candidacy position.  
 
3.4 Research Design  
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Having conceptualised EU candidacy as an institution, I define 
Europeanisation from an institutionalist perspective. At the most general level 
Europeanisation is conceptualised as the process through which EU candidacy enables 
and constrains Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. The SRA places 
perceptions, discourses of actors and their strategies at the heart of causal analysis. 
For the strategic-relational approach the reasons and motivations of actors are also 
causes (see below). Therefore an understanding of the perceptions of actors and the 
meaning systems are key components of causal analysis. Both perceptions and policy 
paradigms within which actors define ‘feasible’, ‘normal’, ‘legitimate’ have causal 
status in the SRA. 
This makes structural constraints and opportunities matters of 
perspective, they are experienced differently by different actors.294 Therefore, in order 
to make enabling and constraining powers of EU candidacy researchable, I 
conceptualise Europeanisation as the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU’s candidate 
role by domestic actors as a strategy to achieve their objectives based on their 
perception of the context. These objectives can range from EU membership to any 
other objective.295 In this respect, actors in Turkey (foreign policy actors in this 
research) are situated in a strategically selective context and they strategise to achieve 
their political objectives.296 I define Europeanisation as the intended and unintended 
consequences of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role. In short, the 
mechanism of Europeanisation that brings together agency and EU candidacy is a 
complex of strategy and discourse, strategic and discursive selectivities and 
perception. Actors are reflexive and they might change their goals or strategies over 
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time due to perceived failure or learning. Therefore without understanding how 
actors perceived their context and their reasons for acting, it is not possible to 
understand how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and how it 
enabled or constrained Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Such a research agenda necessitates the adoption of an intensive research 
design as coined by critical realist researchers.297 Intensive research designs are more 
suitable for finding causal relations. Intensive research aims to answer in-depth 
explanatory questions such as how a process works in a small number of cases, what 
produced change and what did the agents do.298 On the contrary, extensive research 
design aims to identify regularities, patterns in large numbers of cases. Extensive 
research is based on a representative sample of formal relations and correlations 
rather than causality. At this point, it is imperative to briefly review the distinction 
between the Humean definition of causation and the critical realist definition adopted 
in this thesis. 
Causality in critical realism is not based on observable regularities and 
correlations that are associated with the Humean notion of causality, which assumes 
temporal asymmetry between and independent existence of cause and effect.299 
Accordingly, if A causes B, A must take place before B, they must exist independently 
from each other and whenever A happens B must follow. This conception of causality 
boils down to correlation, without incorporating the causal powers of entities in order 
to answer the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. On the contrary, as critical realism grants 
causal powers to unobservable entities such as reasons and structures, tracing 
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causality means more than identifying correlations between As and Bs. There are 
multiple causal complexes at work in producing a certain event. Critical realism 
ascribes causal powers to a wide range of factors, thereby broadening the traditional 
conception of causality. As Kurki elaborates in detail, these are the material, formal, 
final and efficient causes. They all hold causal powers and they bring about social and 
political reality when combined.300  
As opposed to the more traditional understanding of causes as things or 
forces that push and pull thereby bringing about movement and change, Kurki has 
adopted an ontologically deep understanding of causes. According to Kurki, causes not 
only move things but they also condition and constitute objects. She has outlined four 
types of causes in line with an Aristotelian understanding of causation as material, 
formal, efficient and final causes. Material cause refers broadly to the potential of the 
matter, anything that yields itself to making something out of. For example money is 
the material cause of buying and a gun is the material cause of killing. As the examples 
show, material causes are not necessarily raw substances such as wood or iron, they 
can be processed into a certain form.301 Kurki has defined formal cause as the 
intelligibility of the object, “’according to which’ something is made or constructed.”302 
Formal causes give meaning to objects and social relations, which make it possible for 
actors to create new meanings. Whereas material causes can be thought of as the 
geographical context of a country, its industrial production or EU funds, the formal 
cause can be thought of as its predominant policy paradigm and the discourses of 
sovereignty. Efficient cause is the notion of cause that is more similar to the 
traditional understanding of ‘movers’ and ‘makers’. Efficient causes are triggers that 
set into motion the potential. However, efficient cause is closely related to final causes, 
                                                             
300 Kurki, ‘Causes,’ pp. 202-8. 
301 Kurki, Causation, p.221. 
302 Kurki, Causation, p.221. 
84 
 
which are the actors’ reasons for acting in a certain way. Final causes are “the ends 
and purposes ‘for the sake of which a thing is.’”303 They reflect the intentionality of 
actors. Final causes are the objectives these actors have in doing the things they do. All 
in all these four types of causes are inter-related and represent the interactive nature 
of structure and agency in bringing about social reality. Material and formal causes are 
structural conditions and constitutions that enable, constrain agency and constitute 
meaning. Efficient and final causes are more agential causes that are related to the 
practices of actors, which reproduce or transform the context through their 
practices.304 
Such a critical realist understanding of causation also bears upon the oft-
used concept of ‘causal mechanism’ and it provides an opportunity to mark how a 
critical realist understanding of causal mechanisms is different than more mechanistic 
understandings of the term. The concept of causal mechanisms is usually understood 
in terms of individual parts of an object pushing and pulling each other in a pattern. 
The Humean understanding of the concept is more about identifying ‘intervening 
variables’ that make the correlation between an independent and a dependent 
variable possible. The understanding of causal mechanisms as intervening variables is 
also very common in the literature of Europeanisation as chapter two has explored. 
The static transmission belts that have been identified, which mediate the EU impact 
to translate into domestic change, are all intervening variables. The critical realist 
definition of causal mechanism is simply causal complexes that bring about a certain 
social reality.305 A causal complex is the combination of causes that make a certain 
reality contingently possible.306 Causation understood as a combination of factors that 
contingently brings about a certain social reality is based on an assumption that 
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reality is complex. The assumption of complexity of reality does not lend itself to 
reaching parsimonious theories of reality since due to the reflexivity of the actors that 
we study and the openness of reality.307  
This kind of causation therefore can only be established by using an 
intensive research design. I therefore opt for an intensive research design aimed to 
find how the EU candidacy role prescriptions worked in causing change or continuity 
in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. In doing so I also adopt a bottom-
up research design that is commonly used in Europeanisation studies, which starts 
from the domestic agency that is at the receiving end of EU role prescriptions and that 
is exerted to effect change or maintain a social reality.308 All in all such a research 
design is sensitive towards actors’ motivations, discourses and strategies. This leaves 
a significant stamp on how I utilise methods of data collection and interpret the data. 
Methodologically I have utilised retroduction to interpret and verify my 
inferences. Retroduction broadly means reasoning in order to find the constitutive 
mechanisms underlying a particular event. In Danermark’s words, “the core of 
retroduction is transcendental argumentation, as it is called in philosophy. By this 
argumentation one seeks to clarify the basic prerequisites or conditions for social 
relationships, people’s actions, reasoning and knowledge.” 309  Counterfactual 
reasoning is a method of retroduction, which is extensively used in this thesis. It aims 
to analyse causal powers and interactions, i.e. causal complexes, which bring about a 
social reality.310 According to this strategy, the analyst should speculate on what 
would have happened had the EU candidate role of Turkey been absent from the 
picture. The aim in this thesis is to reason whether Turkey’s foreign policy towards 
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the Middle East would be the same had EU candidacy been absent. Counterfactual 
reasoning is quite commonly prescribed in the Europeanisation literature, although 
rarely practiced.311 I have conducted counterfactual reasoning on two levels: as the 
researcher, I have filtered my findings from the counterfactual question as to whether 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s would be possible 
without the existence of the EU candidacy institution. I have also asked my 
interviewees if they believed Turkey would still be able to pursue the same foreign 
policy towards the Middle East had Turkey not been an EU candidate. This level of 
counterfactual reasoning has ensured that Turkish actors have at least behaved as if 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was not possible without Turkey’s 
role as an EU candidate, thereby institutionalising EU candidate role in Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
As the concept of causation adopted in this study is based on the 
interaction between structures and agency within a bottom-up research design, it is 
important to specify what historical methodology is adopted. The idea of historicity is 
present in critical realist methodology. As the past is only transformed and sustained 
by agents, the past is still present. As Archer has ably put,  
the stratified nature of reality introduces a necessary historicity (however 
short the time period involved) for instead of horizontal explanations 
relating one experience, observable or event to another, the fact that these 
themselves are conditional upon antecedents, requires vertical 
explanations in terms of the generative relationships indispensable for 
their realisation.”312 
An understanding of political time as ‘punctuated evolution’ rather than 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ is adopted in this study. Hay has proffered the concept of 
‘punctuated evolution’ as a response to the commonly adopted punctuated 
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equilibrium model of Krasner.313 Hay has argued that defining the periods between 
critical junctures as ‘equilibrium’ could have a misleading effect. Indeed, the word 
equilibrium has been criticized in the literature for implying stasis.314 On the other 
hand, the concept of punctuated evolution emphasizes the moments of crisis, i.e. 
critical junctures, yet also drawing attention to the incremental change that takes 
place between critical junctures.315 While adopting this conceptualisation of time, it is 
also important to bear in mind that change and stability are also internally-related 
concepts, therefore there is always an element of stability in all change and vice 
versa.316 
Therefore, a focus on agency within an evolving context should be 
complemented with a historical methodology that is sensitive towards both short-
term and long-term time horizons of causes and outcomes. As Pierson has explained 
in detail, not all causal processes operate in short time horizons, leading to quick 
outcomes. Both causes and outcomes can be slow-moving, therefore an abrupt cause 
can lead to a long-term consequence and a cumulative cause can lead to an abrupt 
outcome.317 Therefore, although I adopt a bottom-up research design in the thesis I 
complement it with such a historical methodology to be able to account for long-term 
cumulative effects of strategy and cumulative causes of the strategies adopted by 
actors. 
 
3.4.1 Research Methods  
This study in the Europeanisation of foreign policy employs qualitative 
methods such as semi-structured interviews, document analysis and discourse 
                                                             
313 Colin Hay, Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.163. 
314 David Marsh, ‘Stability and Change: The Last Dualism,’ Critical Policy Studies, 4/1 (2010), p.92. 
315 Hay, Political Analysis, p.163. 
316 Marsh, ‘Stability and Change,’ p.98. 
317 Paul Pierson, ‘Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible,’ in Comparative Historical Analysis in Social Sciences, 
eds., James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp.177-208. 
88 
 
analysis. Document analysis includes mainly the EU Commission’s Annual Reports, the 
Accession Partnership Documents for Turkey, the EU Negotiating Framework for 
Turkey, the legislation passed in Turkey’s reform packages. This analysis has yielded 
details of the EU candidacy role prescriptions for Turkey and also the reception of the 
foreign policy and other developments in Turkey by the EU Commission. By analysing 
the relevant legislation in Turkey I have learned what has been reformed by Turkey in 
this period. Therefore, documentary analysis has provided an entry point for the 
research, which was complemented by interviews and discourse analysis.  
Interviews with policymakers shed light on the reasons behind Turkish 
foreign policymaking towards the Middle East. As explained earlier, adopting an 
intensive research design has certain repercussions on interviewee selection, 
interview questions and data interpretation. Intensive research comes at the expense 
of “representativeness”.318 As I aim to uncover motivations, perceptions, strategies of 
actors, I do not take a representative sample of interviewees and ‘code’ their answers 
to reach generalisable findings. On the contrary I formulated semi-structured 
interview questions and asked each interviewee the questions that are relevant to 
their position.319 I included very broad questions such as the overall impact of the EU 
accession process, and very specific questions such as whether Turkey signed free 
trade agreements with Middle Eastern countries to comply with EU candidacy role 
prescriptions. Also I allowed sufficient flexibility in interviews for times when the 
interviewee disputed even the relevance of my question. As Sayer explains, such an 
approach to interviewing opens up the possibility of meaningful social interaction 
between the interviewee and the interviewer, increases the flow of information by 
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giving the interviewee the chance to dispute the questions and emphases placed by 
the interviewer in the questions.320  
I have conducted a total number of 41 interviews in fieldwork in Brussels 
and Ankara. The interviewees in Turkey are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Turkish Parliament, the European Union Secretariat General of Turkey, the 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, think-tanks, and business associations such as the 
Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish 
Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Interviewees in Brussels were chosen from 
the EU Commission Enlargement Directorate-General, External Relations Directorate-
General, Council enlargement Directorate-General, Member State diplomats Turkey’s 
permanent representation to the EU, and Turkish Business Associations’ Brussels 
offices.   
Finally discourse analysis of foreign policy speeches is conducted. In 
Wooffitt’s words, the goal is “to describe the way that such texts [all forms of verbal 
and textual materials] are constructed, and to explore the functions served by specific 
constructions at both the interpersonal and societal level.”321 The concept ‘discourse’ 
raises important theoretical baggage due to its close connection with poststructuralist 
studies. The use of discourse analysis in this thesis is based on a critical realist 
metatheory. According to critical realism agents are situated within both material and 
discursive structures and they are capable of reflexive action, which can change or 
sustain these structures. Therefore, unlike some poststructuralist approaches that 
assume there is nothing meaningful outside discourse, including the self, critical 
realists start with the assumption that there is also a material reality that conditions 
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the way meaning is constructed while agreeing that reality is mediated by discourse. 
In Sayer, Jessop and Fairclough’s words,  
the objection to post-structuralist accounts of emergence is that they 
idealise semiosis [meaning-making]—they ignore reference and truth 
conditions and attribute properties to semiosis as such in a way that 
ignores the dialectical interpenetration of semiotic and non-semiotic 
facets of social events.322 
The selection of particular discourses over others that are available is 
conditioned by discursive structures and meaning systems.323 An analysis of the 
discursive structures and the discourses adopted are useful to understand the reasons 
of actors to act in a certain way.324 Discourse can be defined as “positioned ways of 
representing—representing other social practices as well as the material world, and 
reflexively representing this social practice, from particular positions in social 
practices.”325 This ontological assumption reflects on this thesis as the discourse 
analysis applied here is about understanding how Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East has been coordinated and communicated through foreign policy 
discourse of actors. On the contrary, the main goal is to understand how discourse 
was used to explain and justify foreign policy, or to make it meaningful, to a certain 
audience.  
To analyse how Turkey’s EU candidacy is represented in Turkish foreign 
policy actors’ discourse in Turkey’s role performance in the Middle East, foreign policy 
speeches will be analysed.326  As Holsti has acknowledged, due to this interactive 
nature of role theory, agents hold overlapping roles, and different roles become 
salient in different contexts. In this light, the audience of foreign policy discourse is 
important. In this line, an analysis of Turkish governments’ foreign policy discourse 
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addressing a European audience would be different from the one addressing a Middle 
Eastern audience. As this thesis analyses the impact of EU candidacy on Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy towards the Middle East, it is imperative to analyse the speeches made 
by Turkish foreign policymakers towards a Middle Eastern and a wider Islamic 
audience.327 If the said speech is given in an international forum addressing issues 
pertaining directly to the Arab Middle East and/or Islam and if there is potentially 
substantial participation by Arab diplomats in the audience, that speech is included in 
the sample. If the speech is given as part of a joint press conference with a 
representative from an Arab Middle Eastern country, then it is included too.  
Turkey’s foreign policy discourse is narrated in this thesis with references 
to the speeches of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs since 1999 and the sample consists 
of speeches delivered by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Presidents. Since 
1999 there has been a coalition government between 1999- 2002 and since 2002 the 
JDP has held office. Due to the recurrent economic crises and the prevalence of the EU 
candidacy agenda, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government, Ismail 
Cem and Sukru Sina Gurel, did not appear in the sample sufficiently.  Among the 
former ministers of foreign affairs Ismail Cem (from Democratic Left Party (DLP)), 
Sukru Sina Gurel (DLP), Yasar Yakis (JDP), Abdullah Gul (JDP), Ali Babacan (JDP) and 
Ahmet Davutoglu (JDP), there is no speech from Yasar Yakis and Sukru Sina Gurel and 
only one from Ismail Cem. There are several reasons behind this dearth. Ismail Cem 
held the position during the most volatile years of 1999-2002. The year 1999 was 
dominated by the EU agenda in the run up to the Helsinki Council decision to grant 
Turkey candidacy. The years 2000 and 2001 were the years of the twin economic 
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crises, which again overshadowed the Middle East agenda.328 Only in 2002, could 
Ismail Cem focus on the Middle East agenda when Turkey hosted the EU-OIC Joint 
Forum. Sukru Sina Gurel and Yasar Yakis only held the office for very short periods: 
both of them acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for four months. I included the 
President’s speeches in the analysis as the President is also part of the executive 
according to the Turkish constitution.329 Ahmet Necdet Sezer remained as the 
President from 2000 to 2007 covering both the coalition government and the JDP 
governments’ terms. In 2007, Sezer was replaced as President by Abdullah Gul, a 
founding member of the JDP and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer was not a politician before he was elected as President, however Abdullah Gul 
was from the JDP. Therefore, including the President’s speeches provided a qualitative 
opportunity to assess discourses of the whole executive rather than the government 
only.  By including the President’s speeches, I have ensured that the discourses 
analysed are not only representative of the JDP, rather they represent the high-level 
political elite involved in foreign policy making and implementation.  
To corroborate the data collected from different interviewees I used 
triangulation. Denzin has identified variants of triangulation such as data triangulation 
and methodological triangulation, both of which are used in this research.330 
Methodological triangulation is the most widely used triangulation variant, which is 
based on the idea of verifying data obtained by one method by the data obtained by 
another. Where possible, I referred to different data sources produced through 
different methods to cross-validate a particular interviewee’s narration. Data 
triangulation refers to the use of more than one interviewee’s account as data. I also 
triangulated across interviewees in the sense that where possible I referred to 
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different interviewees from both European and Turkish interviewees to make sure 
that the information gathered in an interview is reliable and not overly biased.   
 
3.5 Summary and a definition 
 
This section pulls together insights drawn from chapters two and three 
together to summarise the definition of Europeanisation adopted in this thesis and the 
main tenets of the appropriate research design that is utilised. The definition of 
Europeanisation adopted for the purposes of this thesis can be made clear by moving 
from an abstract definition to a more concrete one as follows. The definition I adopt 
here is somewhat an amalgam of two strands of definitions. The first one is the 
explicitly institutionalist definition offered by Gross (see chapter two) who at the most 
abstract level has conceptualised Europeanisation as the EU institutions’ enabling and 
constraining effects on national foreign policy. To give more detail to Gross’ definition 
through combining it with role theory, I define Europeanisation of foreign policy in 
this thesis as the ‘institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role through domestic 
actors’ strategies, which significantly enable and/or constrain Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East.’  
Non-Europeanization therefore refers to non-usage of the EU candidate 
role by domestic actors. If any political action is not significantly enabled by the 
usages of the EU candidate role by domestic actors, that is non-Europeanization. As 
Europeanisation refers to a process of institutionalisation, it is also reversible. In other 
words, domestic actors can use the EU candidate role for a sustained period, thereby 
institutionalising it. They can also stop using it when and if they perceive a change in 
the context. Likewise they can also come to believe that using the EU candidate role is 
not actually a successful strategy given their objectives and the perceptions of the 
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context. This process leads to non-usage, therefore de-institutionalisation of Turkey’s 
EU candidate role in domestic politics. Non-Europeanisation, Europeanisation, de-
Europeanisation do not necessarily follow a linear evolution. Rather these processes 
are relational to each other and they can manifest themselves in cycles.  
Specifically in this thesis, Europeanisation will be observed if Turkish 
political actors’ usage of the EU candidate role significantly enabled Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Non-Europeanisation therefore refers to cases where 
either the EU was not used by domestic actors to achieve their foreign policy 
objectives or their usage of the EU did not significantly enable them to achieve their 
objectives. What is significant in enabling a policy outcome is assessed on the basis of 
counterfactual reasoning conducted both by the domestic actors at hand and the 
researcher. 
Such a definition requires a bottom-up research design in the sense that it 
does not direct the researcher to look for the effects of EU causes, rather it leads the 
researcher to specify how the EU candidate role prescriptions are received, 
interpreted, appropriated and used by domestic actors, which leads to the 
institutionalisation of EU candidacy in a certain form in the long run. Institutions do 
not always function according to their design, the way institutionalised subjects 
interact with the institutional architects and the institutional context shapes its 
institutionalisation and whether it takes root or not within a social context. The 
emphasis on ‘enabling and/or constraining’ foreign policy is in line with the account of 
causation explained earlier and it incorporates the assumption of causal complexes, of 
which the EU candidate role of Turkey might be a part.  
The rest of the thesis applies this conceptual framework to Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. The following chapter begins the empirical 
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analysis by an historical review of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East 
and the European Union within the context of Turkey’s predominant westernisation 
paradigm. It will be demonstrated that Turkey’s long-standing westernisation 
paradigm has shaped its relationship with both the Middle East and the EU. Therefore, 
the next chapter demonstrates the historical continuity and change in Turkish politics 
and foreign policy up until Turkey’s candidacy era before zooming into the 
consequences of the institutionalisation of EU candidacy in 1999 and its aftermath. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY-- 
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
 
Westernisation has been the dominant paradigm of Turkish foreign policy since as 
early as the late Ottoman Empire. The governing elite of the Ottoman Empire pursued 
westernisation reforms in order to catch up with European public administration 
methods and military power since the early 19th century. This policy paradigm 
continued its domination after the proclamation of the Republic to replace the multi-
ethnic Ottoman Empire, which ruled over large portions of European as well as Middle 
Eastern lands. Ottoman rule in the Middle East covered the territories that belong to 
Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen today for hundreds of years. These 
lands were lost at the end of World War I. 
The Kemalist elite, who had led the War of National Liberation from the 
occupation that followed the Ottoman defeat in World War I and founded the new 
Republic in 1923, have been keen to pursue the ideal of catching up with western 
civilisation, which has inevitably had repercussions on Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. The Middle East has traditionally been perceived by the 
Kemalist elite as a source of backwardness and conflict that the young Republic had to 
stay away from. This paradigm left its stamp on Turkey’s foreign policy choices almost 
throughout the whole Republican era since 1923. This is not to say there was no 
relationship between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, yet the depth and the 
goals of the existing relationship has usually been an extension of Turkey’s 
westernisation paradigm. 
This chapter explains the historical evolution of Turkey’s relationship 
with the EU and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East within a broader 
framework of westernisation of Turkey. Periodisation is based on the critical 
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junctures such as World War I, the proclamation of the new Republic in 1923, the 
World War II, the direct military coups of 1960 and 1980, the end of the Cold War and 
the period stretching from 1999 to 2009, which is the period under analysis that is 
marked by Turkey’s EU candidacy. The first section therefore begins by explaining the 
westernisation reforms in the late Ottoman period to demonstrate the emergence of 
the westernisation paradigm. 
 
4.1 Westernisation Reforms in the late Ottoman Empire 
 
Turkey’s westernisation dates back to the 19th century Ottoman Empire. 
The Empire had been surpassed technologically, militarily and economically by the 
newly emerging nation states of Europe but also militarily defeated by Russia, where 
new west European technological developments travelled while bypassing the 
Ottoman Empire by and large.331 Therefore, Russia had emerged as the archenemy of 
the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and technological inferiority towards Western 
technologies was seen as the main problem that needed to be addressed. In Muftuler-
Bac’s words, “Europe became a mirror through which the Ottoman elite perceived its 
own weaknesses, differences and traits.” 332  In this period westernisation, 
modernisation and Europeanisation were synonymous. The seeds of the ideas of the 
elite who have founded the Republic of Turkey on what and how to westernise were 
sowed in the demise of the Ottoman Empire. 
After its military defeats by Russia, the Ottoman leadership first decided 
to emulate European military technology to catch up with Europe. The first military 
reforms were undertaken by Sultan Selim III in 1792, which was called Nizam-i Cedid 
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(The New Order). The programme aimed at strengthening the state organization 
through military reforms such as the creation of a new and technologically advanced 
army. European practices and technologies were deemed as a model to emulate and 
Sultan Selim III “was prepared to accept European practices (and European advisers) 
to achieve his goals and the way in which his reign opened up channels of 
communication between Europe and the Ottoman ruling elite,” especially with the 
French.333 Selim’s reforms failed due to the strong opposition from the Muslim 
dignitaries, the military and the lack of financial resources and know-how. Yet similar 
attempts at westernisation of the Ottoman administration and military remained as a 
recurrent theme in the next hundred years. However, soon it was discovered that the 
adoption of only military technology was not sufficient, therefore the ideal of 
westernisation spilled over to other areas such as law, government and education.334 
As Hanioglu has argued, cultural westernisation in the Ottoman Empire was facilitated 
by the leadership of non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, the Ottoman statesmen’s 
perception of the Ottoman Empire as geographically European, and the lack of 
effective counter-ideologies produced by the Muslim dignitaries.335  
The Gulhane edict of 1839 was very significant in this process of 
westernization as it ushered in a new era of reforms. Important changes were made in 
the judicial system, so much that “[t]he canon law of Islam, the seriat, was never 
abrogated, but its scope was limited almost completely to family law and it was 
codified along European lines in 1865-88.”336 The Gulhane edict and the ensuing 
Tanzimat reforms were partly used to gain foreign support and prevent foreign 
intervention by granting equal rights to all subjects of the Empire thereby improving 
                                                             
333 Zurcher, Turkey, p.22 and 24. 
334 Ayla Gol, ‘The requirements of European international society: Modernity and nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire,’ Department of International Relations, Canberra University Working Paper, 4(2003). 
335 Sukru Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.10. 
336 Zurcher, Turkey, p. 61. 
99 
 
the position of the non-Muslim communities but at the same time they emerged out of 
a genuine belief in the need to adopt European-style reforms.337  
Throughout these reform attempts, there was always a struggle between 
different interpretations of westernisation within the pro-reform elite and also 
staunch traditionalists who opposed any kind of reform. Intellectual movements 
emerged from the former controversy, which left their stamp on the evolution of the 
Ottoman reform movement.338 Some intellectual movements were critical of the 
reformers for holding too much central state power and they argued that power 
needed to be checked and balanced.339 Increased centralisation of power in the hands 
of the Sultan intensified such calls for constitutionalisation. Coupled with the need to 
stave off European pressures on the Ottoman government to grant non-Muslims 
privileges, these pressures led to a short-lived constitution to be proclaimed in 1876 
which only survived until 1878.340 Despite its short span of life and the lack of 
constitutional power over the Sultan, this first constitutional era “served as an 
important precedent for the second Constitutional Period (1908- 18) and marks the 
starting point for the Turkish Republic’s elongated journey toward democracy.”341 
Another intellectual movement was the Young Turks that emerged in the 
late 19th century as a reaction to the centralisation of power in the hands of the Sultan 
and they played an important role in the start of the Second Constitutional Period. The 
Young Turk movement comprised of a loose network of secret committees of 
dissidents who aimed to overthrow the Sultan.342 The most significant and the 
dominant one of these committees was the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP), which had a membership predominantly of bureaucrats and military 
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officials.343 By galvanizing opposition, the CUP staged a revolution and overthrew the 
Sultan in 1908. The main goal of the CUP was not to liberalise the political system, 
rather they aimed at “conservation and survival,” therefore as Hanioglu has pointed 
out they did not aim to destroy and replace the regime but only to restore the 1876 
Constitution that was suspended after two years of operation.344 The ultimate 
motivation of the CUP was to earn credibility and support of the Western European 
liberal states by reinstating the constitutional regime.345  
The CUP ensured a relatively liberal political environment between 
assuming power in 1908 and 1913; however around 1912 they began establishing a 
power monopoly to the dismay of liberals.346 The elections in 1912 are known as 
“election with the stick” due to the intimidation used by the CUP to ensure that it 
retained the majority in the parliament.347 This led a group of military officers called 
“Saviour Officers” to demand the resignation of the CUP-backed government.348 This 
intervention by the military marked an early example of the Turkish military’s 
dividedness across the liberals, who wanted the resignation of the authoritarian 
government and the conservatives, who supported it. In this period, in tandem with 
the spread of nationalism across the Empire’s minorities, the CUP also adopted 
Turkish nationalism. In Zurcher’s words, “[w]hile the Committee officially supported 
Ottomanism (and, indeed, how could it have done otherwise, without voluntarily 
shedding two-thirds or more of the empire’s territory), its interpretation of 
Ottomanism came close to Turkification of the non-Turkish elements.”349 Alongside its 
growing inclination to a Turkish nationalism, the CUP also made reforms in the 
administration, culture and law, which altogether entailed further secularisation and 
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westernisation of the political system in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms included 
curbing powers of the Muslim dignitaries and religious schools, adopting a new 
inheritance law based on the German code which added to the ongoing secularisation 
of the system. Also, partly due to the war conditions, partly due to the reform policies 
of the CUP, women’s status improved in public life, including entry to the labour 
market.350 Therefore, the CUP’s reforms also represented the westernisation drive in 
the late Ottoman reformation and furthered the secularisation and westernisation of 
the political system. 
This brief history of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century reveals the 
historical struggles over power that gave birth to the ruling Republican elite who 
founded the Republic of Turkey after the World War I. They emerged out of a 
dominant political ideology of westernisation to restore the lost power of the Empire, 
but also they embodied the political struggles between the conservative forces and 
reformists that cut across the institutions of the Empire including the military. This 
period has also witnessed the emergence of nationalism alongside the ongoing 
secularism and westernisation trends, which altogether were incorporated by 
Kemalism in the post- World War I period. The Ottoman Empire went into World War 
I alongside Germany in 1914 and lost it. The Ottoman Empire was mostly occupied at 
the end of the War. This occupation gave rise to an armed national liberation 
movement led by Mustafa Kemal and some other military officers. The leading elite of 
this movement became the founders of the new Republic. The following section gives 
an overview of the Republican Turkey’s historical relations with Europe and the 
Middle East. As much as they seem to be autonomous geographical categories, in the 
political imaginaries of the Turkish foreign policy elite there is always a close link 
between the two. The next section demonstrates this link. 
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4.2 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1923-1945 
 
Turkey was defeated and largely occupied at the end of the World War I. 
The Sèvres Treaty signed between the winners and the Ottoman government at the 
end of the war, on 10 August 1920, contained very harsh terms for the Ottoman 
Empire. The Empire was reduced to a small state in Anatolia and its former territory 
was shared mainly among Greece, France, Britain, and Italy.351   
CUP government members fled the country, those that remained 
organised an armed resistance movement in Anatolia. The resistance movement was 
to be led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), whose legacy dominated the political scene in 
the Republic of Turkey, of which he was one of the founders. Mustafa Kemal was a 
member of the CUP, yet he was not part of the inner circle of government during the 
war. This gave him a clean political reputation as “he was not associated with wartime 
policies of” the CUP government.352  The resistance movement launched a national 
war of liberation and succeeded in repelling the occupying forces from Anatolia. This 
process led to victory in 1922 and then to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey 
in 1923. After the Republic was proclaimed, there was a dire need to focus on nation 
and state building. Peace, consolidation of the state and the nation, territorial integrity 
and westernisation were the main goals of this period.353  
The leader of republican Turkey, Ataturk, thought that the ills of the 
Ottoman Empire, which led to its demise, were caused by the Empire’s detachment 
from the west.354 Therefore the guiding ideology in this period was westernisation. 
The War of National Liberation was fought against the western states; however, the 
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same elite that fought the war believed that Turkey should aspire to become a 
member of the contemporary civilisations of the west.355 Westernisation involved 
reaching the level of the contemporary western civilisation, as was the case in 
previous westernisation efforts. The early years of the Republic also saw the 
emergence of a state ideology that was to dominate Turkish politics in the years to 
come, Kemalism, derived from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s name. Kemalism comprises of 
six principles, which Ataturk believed would elevate the Turkish society to the level of 
contemporary civilisations, i.e. the West.356 These were republicanism, secularism, 
nationalism, populism, statism and reformism. Some of these principles had been 
taking shape since the CUP era, some of them were included later and they were 
altogether included in the constitution in 1937.357  
Secularism and nationalism were already the predominant ideologies of 
the CUP in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, they were maintained by the elite 
who had grown out of the CUP and founded Republican Turkey.  The main political 
goal of these two principles was to consolidate an identity among the people based on 
citizenship rather than religion.358 Secularism meant the subordination of religion to 
the state rather than their separation, as religion was seen as an obstacle to 
progress.359 Republicanism meant granting sovereignty to the will of the nation 
instead of the will of the Sultan.360 Ataturk was aware that the past reforms remained 
only as cosmetic attempts and the Sultan had always been the supreme authority in 
the Ottoman Empire.361 Recognizing this as a central problem that led to the demise of 
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the Ottoman Empire, he adopted Republicanism as a principle for the new state. 
Populism referred to national solidarity and putting the nation’s interests before class 
interests. It was also based on the assumption that Turkish society did not comprise of 
classes in the European sense of the word.362 Reformism was meant to ensure the 
modernisation of the state and it rendered Kemalism itself open to adjustment to 
catch up with contemporary developments, if necessary.363 The incorporation of 
statism in economic policy into Kemalism later than the other principles was also an 
example of this flexibility. Initially after the proclamation of the new Republic, 
Ataturk’s government placed its faith into a liberal economic programme, the private 
sector was being encouraged and banks were established to provide private 
entrepreneurs with necessary loans.  Yet, two factors led to the failure of this policy: 
the lack of private entrepreneurship in Republican Turkey and the 1929 economic 
depression. Non-Muslim minorities were the main merchants in the Ottoman Empire, 
therefore after the dissolution of the Empire there were not enough people left who 
had the technical knowledge and capital to establish businesses.364 The 1929 
economic depression also led Turkish policymakers to begin to seek alternative 
economic policies, thus statism as an economic policy was adopted.  
All in all Kemalism originally was a pragmatic, flexible worldview that 
ultimately aimed for Turkey to catch up with the level of contemporary civilisations.365 
Westernisation initially occupied a central place in this worldview. Kemalist reforms, 
echoing previous reforms in the late Ottoman Empire, aimed to secularise and 
modernise society.366 The main difference is that Kemalist reforms were more drastic 
than any reform period before. The religious shrines (turbe) and dervish convents 
(tekke) were abolished; the religious dress code that included turban and fez was 
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replaced by Western style hats.367 The state, education system and law were 
completely secularised; the Western clock, calendar, numerals and Latin alphabet 
were adopted at the expense of the Arabic/Persian alphabet used by the Ottomans.368 
These were all measures designed to “cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and 
Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and to reorient it towards the West.”369 These 
reforms and the centralisation of power in the hands of the new Kemalist elite led to 
dissent within the country as after the war of national liberation certain groups (i.e. 
the Kurdish rebellions, rivals of Ataturk) were released from the leashes of a fight for 
survival and started to question the new leadership and the new regime.  While the 
Kemalist regime was trying to implement westernisation reforms, they were also 
suppressing opposition.  The nascence of the new regime led to a foreign policy based 
on westernisation, the preservation of the status quo370 and peace.371 This required 
the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the European powers 
against which they fought the war of national liberation. Indeed, the period’s foreign 
policy is often illustrated by Ataturk’s motto “peace at home peace abroad.”372 
All these factors led to a cautious foreign policy, including towards the 
Middle East. One of the earliest demonstrations of Turkey’s principle of legality and 
pragmatism in its policy toward the Middle East was the Mosul question. After the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the issue of Mosul, a former province of the 
Empire, remained unresolved between Britain and Turkey. By 1924, negotiations 
between Turkey and Britain proved to be futile and the issue was referred to the 
League of Nations, of which Turkey was not a member. The commission assigned to 
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the matter decided in favour of the British and Turkey signed the treaty with Britain 
and accepted ceding of Mosul to Iraq which was mandated by Britain.373  
Similarly, Alexandretta, a former district of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Middle East was another outstanding foreign policy issue in the early republican 
period. As part of the secret war treaty between Britain and France, Alexandretta was 
annexed to Syria, which was mandated by France. During the independence 
negotiations between Syria and France, the issue of Alexandretta was taken to the 
League of Nations, which then declared Alexandretta should be granted autonomy 
from Syria. The province declared its union with Turkey one year after it was granted 
autonomy and in 1939 it became a part of Turkey.374 Yet, Syria has never officially 
recognised Alexandretta as Turkish territory and this has become another source of 
conflict between Syria and Turkey until the 2000s.375 In both cases, Turkey did not 
pursue adventurist policies and respected the decisions of the League of Nations and 
managed to normalise its relations with France and Britain. 
Turkey’s pro-status quo stance is best illustrated by the Sadabad Pact of 
1937, which was signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. This pact was premised 
on non-aggression and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs rather than 
active cooperation or alliance among the signatories.376 In Mango’s words, “[f]ar from 
breaching Turkey’s policy of non-involvement in the Middle East, the Sadabad Pact 
helped to codify it.”377 Therefore, it exemplifies Turkey’s aloofness from Middle 
Eastern affairs and bilateral disputes in the region.  
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However, this status-quo and legalistic orientation was not without 
exceptions. When Turkey’s major projects were threatened, it did not hesitate from 
taking action. The issue of Kurdish rebellions and the border dispute the rebellions 
caused with Iran is quite illustrative of this principle in Turkish foreign policy toward 
the Middle East in the early republican years. Due to the porous border between Iran 
and Turkey, during the 1920s tribal movements on both sides of the borders 
undertook cross-border activities and issues arose when the governments suppressed 
them by force. The biggest border dispute happened when Turkish security forces 
crossed the Iranian border in pursuit of Kurdish rebels and finally invaded the Lesser 
Ararat region in Iran in order to be able to suppress the rebellion properly.378 The 
issue was settled in 1932, when Iran agreed to the secession of Lesser Ararat in return 
for a small Turkish territory, however, it is a perfect example of how Turkey could 
breach its principle of preservation of the status-quo, when its vital interests were at 
stake. In this case suppression of domestic opposition and Kurdish rebellions was of 
utmost importance and Turkey took whatever action necessary to achieve this goal. 
With the outbreak of World War II, Turkish foreign policy became almost 
non-existent towards the Middle East. When World War II broke out, Turkey was still 
a war-torn country and the fresh memories of World War I led Turkey to pursue its 
survival through active neutrality throughout World War II. Active neutrality in fact 
meant continuing a normal relationship with both parties, including signing defence 
and non-aggression pacts with the belligerents but avoiding direct military 
confrontation. Active neutrality went so far that even the make-up of the cabinets and 
the representations of the war in media were affected by the daily outlook of the 
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war.379 Therefore, the Turkish government managed to avoid being drawn into the 
war at the expense of losing prestige especially in the eyes of Britain. This loss of 
prestige partly led to overstretch on the part of Turkish governments especially after 
1950 when economic aid from the west was integral to the development of economy 
and newly started multiparty regime. 
 
4.3 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1946-1960 
 
In this period, the overriding goal of the successive Turkish governments 
was to regain the prestige and strategic importance they lost in the eyes of the west as 
a result of their hesitation to enter World War II against Germany.380 Yet, ‘the west’ 
was no longer simply Europe; it was an ideological category led by the United States 
against the Soviet Union in the emerging cold war environment.  
Combined with the threat perceptions of Turkish policymakers from the 
Soviet Union,381 the bipolar structure was quite influential on the foreign policy of the 
period. The Soviet Union’s territorial demands from Turkey drove the Turkey closer 
to the US. This was partly the reason why when the US launched the Truman doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan in 1947, Turkey was one of the beneficiaries. The Truman 
doctrine was a commitment by the US to help defend “free nations” who were under 
threat from the Soviet Union.382 The Marshall Plan was a massive financial aid 
extended to Europe to strike two birds with one stone: to reconstruct Europe as an 
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export market for the US industries and to contain Soviet expansion.383 The Marshall 
Plan was conditional upon free trade and joint decision-making by European states in 
using the financial aid.384 Marshall Plan was based on collective usage of the financial 
aid by the European states; the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) was created for this purpose in 1948.385 The NATO was established in 1949 as 
a collective defence organisation initially against the Soviet threat. Turkey also 
benefited from the Marshall Plan and became members of both OEEC and NATO. On 
the other hand, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg furthered 
their integration and formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to pool 
their coal and steel industries in 1952, which was transformed into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. 
This period is also characterised by the transition to multi-party politics 
in Turkey. Therefore, as mentioned earlier the allocation of resources came to 
dominate the policy agenda. With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1950, 
politics became a matter of promising economic welfare to the voters for both the 
Democrat Party (DP) government after the 1950 elections and the Republican Peoples’ 
Party (RPP) opposition.386 As Deringil has suggested, “[t]he development of the 
country’s economy, which had been frozen in the war years, was now moved to the 
top of the agenda.”387 This could only be achieved by ensuring resources and a strong 
alliance with the US, which proved to be the largest source of financial aid in the post-
World War II period.388 The Democrat Party was a champion of economic liberalism 
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and therefore their economic policies were more in tune with those of the US than the 
statism of the previous era.389  
All these factors led to hyper-westernisation during the Democrat Party 
rule that started in 1950 and ended with a military coup in 1960. As Karpat has put it, 
“[a]fter 1950, modernization came to be understood, much more in practice than in 
theory, almost as a total imitation of the West, and as a drive for achieving higher 
living standards or maximum material comfort” rather than its original usage as 
combining the civilisation of the West with national values, by the guiding ideology of 
Turkey.390 Therefore, in this period, Westernisation dominated Turkish foreign policy 
and the governments kept viewing regional matters through the lenses of western 
interests and strategies, at the expense of Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern 
Arab neighbours as Turkey’s extremely pro-western policies alienated its Middle 
Eastern neighbours. Turkey diplomatically recognised Israel in 1949 as an extension 
of its close relations with the US, which also strained Turkey’s relations with the Arab 
countries.391  
After firmly becoming part of western organisations such as the Council of 
Europe in 1950 and NATO in 1952, Turkey proved its western allegiance to a certain 
extent. However, especially NATO membership came at a cost for Turkey: It was only 
admitted to NATO “after a promise made to the British that Turkey would assume 
responsibility for the establishment of a Middle East Defence Organization.”392 The 
upshot of this promise was the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The 
Baghdad Pact was a multilateral regional security pact embracing Britain, Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran and Pakistan, created with the aim of repelling potential Soviet threats in the 
region. However, it was a failure from the start. It received harsh criticism from the 
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Egyptian president Nasser, drew Syria and Egypt closer together against Turkey, and 
made Israel suspicious of the nature of the pact.393 The pact simply gave the Arab 
countries the impression that Turkey was a puppet of the west in the region and drew 
them closer to each other and ironically to the Soviet Union.394 In 1959, the only Arab 
signatory of the pact, Iraq, left the pact after a revolution and the pact was renamed 
the Central Treaty Organisation. 
Turkey’s pro-Western policies were crystal clear during the 1956 Suez 
crisis, which erupted when France, Britain and Israel attacked Egypt after Nasser of 
Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal.395 Turkey harshly criticised Nasser for provoking 
the French and British interventions.396 In 1957, Turkey voted in the UN General 
Assembly against Algerian independence, which was an issue dearest to the Arab 
neighbours of Turkey as well as the Turkish public opinion.397 Moreover, Turkey fully 
supported the American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan against the spread of 
Arab nationalism.398 Turkey declared its support for these interventions and went so 
far that the Democrat Party government offered the US the use of NATO bases in 
Turkey. This offer was declined by the US government, who indicated that there was 
no NATO operation.399 
Turkish policymakers underlined the cultural and religious affinities 
between Turkey and the Arab Middle East in an attempt to gain strategic importance 
in the eyes of the west regarding their Middle East policies. As Criss and Bilgin state, 
“[w]hile Turkish policymakers did not know the Middle East well--lacking experience 
of involvement in regional affairs--they argued that ‘only the Turks really understood 
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the Arabs and therefore were in a position to approach the Arab states’.”400 However, 
as Turkey was only approaching the region through the lenses of the west and was not 
paying attention to the internal dynamics in the region at the time, neither this 
rhetoric nor Turkish efforts to unite the region around western organisations was 
successful. 
In the meantime, Europe had continued its integration by creating the EEC 
in 1958. The EEC envisaged progressive reduction of tariffs among the signatories 
with the aim of creating a common market. Unlike the ECSC, the EEC gave the 
opportunity to non-member states to associate themselves with the EEC and soon 
after the EEC came into effect Spain, Greece and Turkey applied for associate 
membership to the EEC in 1959.401 Turkey received a positive response shortly after 
the application.  The signing of the association agreement was to wait until after the 
military coup that toppled the DP government in 1960.  Turkey’s first application for 
association and the Association agreement that followed mark the beginning of 
Turkey-EU relations.402  
 
4.4 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1960-80 
 
The military, which had assigned itself the role of the guardianship of 
Kemalism, had been increasingly troubled by the DP’s religious references in politics, 
growing authoritarianism and friction with the military, as well as the military’s 
deteriorating living standards which culminated in the military coup of 1960. The 
military wanted to restore parliamentary democracy as soon as possible after the 
coup; therefore they commissioned a group of law professors to draft a new 
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constitution. The new constitution was drafted to prevent a power monopoly such as 
that of the DP and ushered in a new era in Turkish politics. 403 It allowed public 
scrutiny over foreign policy as well as public policy as it was a liberal constitution 
with regards to its provisions on civil rights, media, civil society, political parties.404 As 
a result of this period of politicisation, Turkish foreign policy became subjected to 
active criticism by both left-wing and right-wing public opinion.405 Nonetheless, the 
military never ceased to be an important actor in foreign policymaking as it was, in the 
final analysis, a period beginning with a military coup. The trials after the coup led to 
numerous DP members’ imprisonment and the hanging of the Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister in 1961.406  The new constitution 
also established the National Security Council (NSC) that included the force 
commanders, the chief of General Staff and the relevant ministers to advise the 
government on security matters.407 This institution was to gradually ensure the 
military domination over Turkish politics in the coming decades. Also the military 
leaders of the coup believed that the economic problems of the 1950s were due to the 
lack of planning under DP rule. Therefore they included the State Planning 
Organisation in the constitution and it marked the beginning of the import 
substitution industrialisation in Turkey.408 Yet, the industry still depended on foreign 
reserves, therefore export revenues, to pay for the imported materials and parts for 
production. This was to cause major economic problems during the 1970s. 
Turkey’s relationship with the west was not altered by the military coup, 
but was  affected later by the deteriorating position of Turkey in the eyes of the US409 
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and the isolation it experienced during the Cyprus crisis.410 After its disenchantment 
with the US, Turkey began to pursue a more multi-faceted and cautious foreign policy. 
As Criss and Bilgin have suggest,  
Turkey's foreign policy orientation, although subject to criticism by 
radical rightist and leftist circles alike, remained unquestioned at the 
policymaking level. Turkey's national role conceptions did not change 
either, though the role of faithful ally came to be less emphasized.411 
In this context, the Association agreement between Turkey and the EEC, 
the Ankara agreement, was signed in 1963 and came into force in 1964. The Ankara 
agreement was signed by all six members of the EEC and it envisaged economic 
integration, free movement of workers, and the eventual membership of Turkey. 412 It 
set out the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EEC in three 
stages. In the first five years, Turkey was going to receive financial aid and duty-free 
quotas from the Community on its four most important export products. During the 
second phase of twelve years, both sides were going to grant tariff concessions 
reciprocally. In the final phase a customs union was going to be created and economic 
policies to be harmonised.413  The Ankara agreement created the Association Council, 
which is responsible for implementing the agreement; the Association Committee and 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which are mainly advisory bodies.  
Turkey demanded the start of the transitional phase in 1969. The Justice 
Party (JP) government was seeking to gain political capital from intensification of 
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relations with the European Community (EC) by initiating the transitional phase of the 
Ankara agreement.414 The negotiations sparked a series of anti-EC protests by leftists, 
nationalists and Islamists alike.415 The Islamist Nationalist Order Party was a 
significant member of this opposition, whose members founded pro-Islamic parties in 
the coming decades. The Additional Protocol that was signed in 1970 delineated the 
details of transition phase up to membership and envisaged gradual establishment of 
free movement of persons by 1986 as well as free movement of industrial goods and 
services.416 The EC retained restrictions on the trade of products sensitive for its 
economy, such as agriculture, textiles, steel and iron, which were important export 
goods for Turkey.417 On the other hand, Turkey was to reduce its tariffs towards the 
EC gradually and receive financial aid as compensation for this process of tariff 
reduction.418 According to the Protocol, all duties and other trade restrictions used by 
Turkey against the EC were to be removed by 1995. Although full membership was a 
distant possibility, the conclusion of the Ankara agreement and the Additional 
Protocol made the EC the biggest trading partner of Turkey, replacing the US.419  
By 1970, political violence and polarisation in Turkey had grown to an 
alarming level, which the government was not able to stop. The Parliament was 
deadlocked and there was serious violence on the streets and university campuses.420 
The military gave a memorandum to the government in 1971, threatening with a 
military takeover of the government unless “a strong and credible government” 
capable to stop the violence on the streets and the deadlock of the political system.421 
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Through the memorandum, the military forced the government to resign and a series 
of technocratic governments to be formed by the Turkish Parliament. The military 
also secured the proclamation of a state of emergency a month after the memorandum 
and thousands of “anarchists” were arrested who were allegedly involved in the 
guerrilla warfare on the streets. This coup took place without the military directly 
assuming power, but it still led to the disruption of democracy between 1971 and 
1973. As Dosemeci has argued, the military was, “concerned that the military coup 
would lead to a deterioration of relations with Europe,” therefore the military made it 
clear that they wanted a swift ratification of the Additional Protocol, thereby 
effectively silencing political opposition to the Protocol.422  
The goal of pursuing a multifaceted foreign policy also led successive 
Turkish governments to seek closer ties with the Middle East in the 1960-80 period. 
Therefore this period was characterised by relative autonomy from the US policies in 
the Middle East.423  This discourse underlined the rupture from the perceived 
mistakes of the DP governments during the 1950s.424 Yet, the military still emphasised 
Turkey’s continued loyalty to the, due to their fear of being misinterpreted by the 
US.425 However, starting from 1965, this policy turned explicitly in favour of a more 
pro-Arab policy orientation. When the JP came to power in 1965, partly in order to 
please the party’s rather conservative constituency, the party programme declared 
that among other things the JP would seek closer ties with the Muslim and Arab 
“brothers” in the Middle East.426 The identity crisis of Turkey revealed itself clearly in 
this period. As Turkish foreign policy sought closer ties with the Muslim Middle East, 
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criticism raised from especially the opposition party, RPP, which criticised the 
government for risking Turkey’s “basic policy of neutrality towards the Israeli-Arab 
conflict and the country’s secularist standing.”427 There were economic reasons 
behind this shift too. Oil became a scarce resource with the 1973-74 oil crisis. As an 
oil-importing country Turkey’s dependence increased.428 This led Turkey to be more 
active in its trade with the Middle Eastern countries. 
Turkey also intensified its diplomatic visits to the Middle Eastern 
countries in an attempt to garner support for its Cyprus policy.429 These efforts were 
welcomed by the Muslim Middle East and Iraq expressed its sympathy for the Turkish 
Cypriot cause in 1966, a trade agreement was signed with Egypt in the same year and 
further diplomatic visits to Tunisia, Saudi Arabia followed. In 1969 Turkey also 
decided to participate in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting as an 
observer.430  
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey denied the US use of Turkish 
military bases to support Israel.431  Turkey supported the Arab position when Israel 
gained the upper hand in the war, by declaring its objection to possible future 
territorial encroachments by use of force. Moreover, Turkey extended humanitarian 
aid to the Arab countries that suffered intense casualties during the war.432  During the 
1970 crisis in Jordan, which brought Jordan against Syria and the Palestinian 
guerrillas, Turkey stayed aloof from the conflict whilst denying the use of its military 
bases to the US due to its policy that any external intervention in the crisis would 
aggravate the situation.433 Turkey repeated its guarantee to deny the use of its military 
bases in any Middle Eastern conflict more strongly in the 1973 Arab-Israel War. On 
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the other hand, Turkey allowed Soviet planes that carried aid to Arabs through its 
airspace.434 It recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only 
legal representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 and finally agreed to the 
opening of a PLO office in Ankara in 1979.435 However, despite establishment of closer 
ties with the Arab Middle East, Turkey never severed its ties with Israel and the 
west.436  
In the meantime, the deteriorating economy due to the balance of 
payments problems and the polarisation of domestic politics were aggravating 
political violence.437 By the end of the 1970s, extremist youth groups were killing each 
other and public figures, kidnapping, organising attacks to neighbourhoods.  Also the 
Islamist groups were actively organising demonstrations and demanding the 
reinstatement of Islamic law as part of the political polarisation. All these factors were 
alarming for the military, which took over government in September 1980. The 
reasons for the military coup were stated in the communiqué issued on the day of the 
intervention as follows: 
The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to 
provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the 
possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the 
existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that 
hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.438 
The 1980 military coup also drastically changed the domestic structure of 
Turkey and caused problems between the EC and Turkey. The makers of the 1980 
military coup were of the opinion that the anarchy prevailing in Turkey throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s was a consequence of the liberal and pluralist nature of the 1961 
constitution. Therefore, the first thing they did after assuming government of the 
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country was to curb freedom of association and civil rights as well as the autonomy of 
universities.439  Around 100.000 people were arrested by the military junta and 
torture was widespread in the prisons and 20 death sentences were executed out of 
3600 that were pronounced.440 In the aftermath of the intervention, the military 
sought to concentrate power in the hands of the president and the military by drafting 
a restrictive constitution. The leader of the military coup was installed as the 
President and parliamentary politics could only be restored under the shadow of the 
military. The military representatives obtained seats in the Higher Education Board, 
Radio and Television Supreme Council and Turkish Radio and Television. To this end, 
the NSC was strengthened by the 1982 Constitution. The council of ministers had to 
consider with priority the decisions of this council and since its creation it served to 
expand the military’s political influence. The military junta also clamped down on the 
leftist labour confederation and the universities, in order to prevent leftist tendencies 
spreading among workers and students.441 
Another overriding issue for the military junta was to fight Kurdish 
nationalism, which had gained pace in the late 1970s.  Kurdish nationalism had been 
rising in the 1970s on the back of rising political extremism. The Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) was founded in 1978, which was the armed Kurdish nationalist 
movement that has become an important problem for Turkish policymakers ever 
since.442 The military junta that orchestrated the 1980 military coup adopted 
hardliner policies to halt the Kurdish nationalist movement. After the coup, it was 
impossible even to utter the word ‘Kurd’ let alone using the Kurdish language. Indeed, 
Kurdish as a language was banned in 1983. In the wake of the 1980 military coup, 
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Kurdish nationalists were arrested or fled the country. The PKK sought refuge in Syria 
and succeeded in regrouping there.443 
 
4.5 Turkey between East and West: 1983- 1990 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Islamic revolution 
signalled threatening regional developments and the intensification of the Cold War 
again in the 1980s.444 As a response, Turkey aligned itself closely with the US once 
again and “became a pillar of Washington’s strategy to protect American interests in 
the Middle East.”445 The post-coup calm in domestic politics gave way to the 
resumption of the PKK’s violent opposition to the Turkish state in 1984. The PKK 
terrorism increasingly gained support from the Kurdish population since then due to 
the repressive policies of the Turkish state and economic backwardness of the south 
East Anatolia, where the majority of Kurds live. The increasing PKK terrorism led to 
the declaration of state of emergency in the south East of Turkey in 1987.446  
Turgut Ozal’s centre-right Motherland Party (MP) won the first elections 
in 1983 after the military coup. Ozal immediately started to implement an economic 
stabilisation programme. This programme was largely inspired by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and it aimed to create an export-oriented free market, reduce 
inflation and improve the balance of payments.447  The suppression of trade unions 
and the political left by the military coup made possible the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms. Wages were frozen to improve competitiveness, the Turkish lira 
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was devalued to boost exports, anti-inflationary measures were taken and exports 
were subsidised in various ways.448  
The early 1980s witnessed the downgrading of relations with the EC. The 
EC was critical of human rights violations that took place during the military rule.449 
The EC foreign ministers declared that the EC’s relationship with Turkey was 
contingent upon Turkey’s respect for human rights and the reestablishment of 
democratic institutions.450 The European Parliament (EP) was more critical and 
warned that the suspension of the Association agreement could be considered in case 
Turkey did not return to democratic politics soon. Yet, member states and the 
Commission were inclined towards maintaining at least the association ties with 
Turkey.451   
Yet, Turkey applied for full membership to the EC in 1987. There were 
several reasons behind this. First of all, the Association agreement was not to Turkey’s 
satisfaction anymore due to the successive enlargements of the EC, extension of its 
preferential trade regime to an increasing number of third countries and most 
importantly the Turkish policymakers’ interpretations of the EC political context. The 
EC was furthering its deepening, which was potentially going to make Turkish 
accession more difficult. Also Turkish policymakers expected a similar treatment to 
that afforded to Greece, Portugal and Spain.452 Having witnessed the EC’s use of its 
enlargement policy as an instrument of post-coup democratisation in these countries, 
Turkish policymakers thought they could receive similar treatment.453  That was a 
miscalculation: the EC was not ready for another enlargement just after the 
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Mediterranean enlargement that led to the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal.454 
It took two years for the Commission to give its opinion on Turkey’s application. The 
Commission also stated in its opinion on Turkey’s application that Turkey was not 
ready economically or politically to become a member, citing also Turkey’s strained 
relationship with Greece and Cyprus. The Commission thus delayed Turkey’s 
application for membership indefinitely, rather than rejecting it.455  
Due to the boom in world oil prices in the beginning of the 1980s, oil-
producing countries made enormous profits and this provided an attractive market 
for Turkish exporters, who were now subsidised by the government. 456  The 
relationship with the OIC was improved in the period. Turkey increased its level of 
diplomatic representation at the OIC to the presidency level in 1984.457 Turkey also 
continued strengthening its relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East at the 
expense of its relations with Israel. When Israel annexed Jerusalem in 1980, Turkey 
objected to this act and withdrew its ambassador to Israel and downgraded its 
representation in Israel.458 Likewise Turkey criticised Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 
1981 and became one of the first countries to recognise the Palestinian state in 
1988.459 In Mango’s words, in this period “[g]estures were made which cost Turkey 
nothing, but gave Arabs pleasure.”460  
1980 witnessed another important development in the region, namely the 
Iran-Iraq war. Turkey adopted active neutrality during the war, which lasted eight 
years. The war diverted Iraqi attention mainly to its southern borders and therefore 
left a power vacuum in the northern parts of Iraq, of which the Kurdish groups in the 
                                                             
454 Faucomret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.31. 
455 Arikan, Turkey, p.72. 
456 Zurcher, Turkey, p.310. 
457 Sander, Turkiye’nin, p.235. 
458 Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p. 128. 
459 Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’  pp.128-9. 
460 Mango, ‘Turkish,’ p.66. 
123 
 
region took advantage.461 These groups were supported both by Iraq’s opponent Iran 
and Syria, who wanted to acquire a leadership role in the region. As a response to this 
strengthening of the relationship among Syria, Iran and the Kurdish groups that were 
located at its southern borders, Turkey was pushed into closer cooperation with 
Iraq.462 Turkey remained the only outlet for the Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik pipeline and this was also another factor in the emergence of closer 
cooperation. Turkey and Iraq also reached a mutual agreement on border security and 
cooperation in 1983. This agreement gave both countries the right of hot pursuit 
against cross-border terrorism.463 Turkey used its legal rights of hot pursuit in Iraqi 
territory several times throughout the 1980s and 90s. 
In this period, Turkey began using water as a foreign policy tool. Turkey’s 
Southeast Anatolian Project (known as GAP in Turkish acronyms) to utilise waters of 
the Euphrates and Tigris alarmed Syria and Iraq, who were also heavily reliant on the 
waters of these two rivers that originate in Turkey and pass through Iraqi and Syrian 
soil.464 In the 1980s, Turkey started utilising its power over the control of the waters 
of Euphrates and Tigris as a political tool against Syria due to Turkish concerns over 
Syrian support for PKK terrorism. 465  Therefore, relations with Syria were 
deteriorating. Strained relations went so far that Turkey finally threatened Syria with 
use of force if they did not stop supporting the PKK.466 Syria agreed to expel PKK 
militants from its territories. However, problems persisted between Syria and Turkey 
as Syria kept resuming its support for the PKK and the Turkish officials kept feeling 
threatened by the Syrian support for the PKK. Finally, after several agreements signed 
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between Syria and Turkey, Turkey accused Syria of not honouring its promises to cut 
its support for the PKK in 1989 and warned that it could also breach their agreement 
regarding the amount of water to be released to Syria.467  
All in all, the 1980s witnessed Turkey’s economic liberalisation that led to 
a hunger for new export markets. This caused closer relations with the Middle East on 
the one hand and the replacement of the EC as Turkey’s biggest trade partner, with 
the oil-producing Arab countries in the early 1980s. Yet, towards the late 1980s the 
usual trade flow returned by making the EC the biggest export market for Turkey 
again.468 Relations with the EC returned to the top of the agenda in the late 1980s with 
the application for full membership, which was refused for the foreseeable future.  Yet, 
to compensate this decision, the EC agreed in 1993 to proceed to the final stage of the 
Association Agreement, which is a customs union, by 1995. The customs union 
decision and its background will be explained in the next section. 
 
4.6 Turkey between East and West: 1990- 1999 
 
The end of the Cold War threw Turkey into uncertainty as to its new role 
in the new post-Cold War world. This change in the international structure was 
coupled with Turkey’s domestic problems and together they “created new tensions. 
This was most clear in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East where the domestic 
challenges of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism intermingled with Turkey’s 
relations with this region.”469  
Turgut Ozal was President from 1989 until he died in 1993. The personal 
stamp of Ozal on foreign policymaking, i.e. bypassing other relevant institutions and 
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emphasising trade relations, remained intact during the early 1990s. He was fully 
attached to the western alliance of NATO and he upheld trade over militaristic 
security concerns. He demonstrated his vision of Turkey’s continued alliance with the 
West in the Gulf War of 1990, where Turkey sided with the US led alliance against Iraq 
and even shut down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Turkey’s support for the US-led 
alliance regarding the Gulf War cost the country a lot on many fronts including losing 
trade capacity with Iraq and the influx of Kurdish refugees to Turkey after the War, 
but it was an attempt at regaining Turkey’s lost strategic importance at the end of the 
Cold War.470   
However, Ozal’s one-man rule did not last long. After his death, Suleyman 
Demirel became President and Tansu Ciller, the leader of True Path Party (TPP), 
became the Prime Minister. In the meantime the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) had 
become one of the major parties in the political scene by 1994. Such ascendance of 
political Islam gave Prime Minister Ciller the opportunity to speed up the customs 
union decision by arguing to the EU representatives that the customs union decision 
would keep fundamentalist Islamists at bay. The WP had been increasing their votes 
steadily over the past decade but they reached their peak in 1994 and 1995 when they 
won 19% of votes in municipal elections and 21.4% in the general elections 
respectively.471 Partly due to Ciller’s warnings and partly to keep Turkey within reach 
but outside the EU, the customs union decision was made by the EU-Turkey 
Association Council on 6 March 1995. 472 Despite the EP’s negative position on the 
matter, the member states including France, Germany and Britain were in favour of 
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the customs union with Turkey.473 However, the EP had to give its assent to the 
decision and it made its approval conditional on Turkey’s alignment of its human 
rights regime with that of the EU.474 As a result, the Turkish government passed 
amendments on the constitution and the anti-terror law, which aimed to improve the 
standards of democracy and human rights in Turkey. These amendments marked the 
beginning of EU conditionality in Turkey, yet it was much smaller in scale than the 
period that started with Turkey’s elevation to candidacy in 1999. Despite the reforms 
that the Turkish government passed, the EP was still reluctant. At that point, lobbying 
by some member states such as Germany and Britain as well as the Turkish insistence 
that the customs union could successfully anchor Turkey to the west and prevent the 
political success of Islamists in Turkey succeeded in convincing the EP.475  
Although the Ankara agreement had envisaged the customs union as a 
stage of the EU-Turkey relationship, the terms of the customs union that took force in 
1 January 1996 were a step backwards from the Ankara agreement. The customs 
union did not include the free movement of workers, services or capital, whereas they 
were envisaged by the Ankara agreement.476 The EU and Turkey agreed to eliminate 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions between each other on industrial goods 
and Turkey also pledged to adopt the Union’s commercial policy and preferential 
trade agreements in five years.477 As a result of the customs union decision, Turkey’s 
weighted rates of protection for imports declined from 5.9% to 0%; for goods from 
third countries it fell from 10.8% to 6%.478The customs union has caused Turkey some 
loss of autonomy over trade policy as the Union could conclude preferential trade 
agreements with third countries in the future, with which Turkey had to align itself. 
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Otherwise, these third countries would be able to benefit from the preferential trade 
regime they have with the EU in their exports to Turkey due to the Turkey-EU 
customs union without having to reciprocate as their agreements only allowed goods 
originating from the EU to enter their markets with tariff reductions.479 
Along with further trade liberalisation, the customs union decision also 
brought about the obligation for Turkey to adopt significantly similar policies to those 
of the EU on standardisation and competition.480 Turkey put in effect a competition 
policy that was mostly modelled on that of the EU’s and eliminated its performance-
based export promotion schemes due to the customs union obligations.481 Yet, Turkey 
was expecting more than a customs union as the Turkish elite perceived the customs 
union as a strategy to facilitate membership, whereas the EU had only offered it as a 
temporary alternative to membership after Turkey’s 1987 application for 
membership.482  
By mid-1996, the WP was in a coalition with Tansu Ciller’s TPP and this 
alarmed the Kemalist military so much that they started monitoring activities of the 
WP with the goal of protecting the secular regime. Political Islam was not the only 
internal threat perceived by the military, Kurdish nationalism was also ascendant. The 
rise of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism also started challenging the basic premises 
of Kemalist ideology, on which Turkish foreign policy firmly stands. As Altunisik and 
Tur assert, 
in the 1990s the debate about Turkey’s national identity also intensified 
as the process of modernisation created its own discontents…For instance, 
when the Islamist Welfare Party came to power as the senior coalition 
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partner in 1997 it used foreign policy, particularly Turkey’s relations with 
the Islamic countries, as one of the main pillars of its counter-ideology.483 
Indeed, when he became Prime Minister in 1996, Erbakan’s first official 
visit was to Iran. Then he also went to Libya to intermediate in the collection of the 
Libyan debt to Turkish construction firms, where he sat by and listened to Muammer 
Gaddafi reprimand Turkey for its alliance with the NATO and the EU.484 He suggested 
an Islamic free trade area and an Islamic G-8 as alternatives to the Western alliance. 
Coupled with the raging PKK terrorism and Islamic terrorism these political 
manoeuvres boosted the threat perception of the military.  
In response to such perceived threat from Kurdish nationalism and 
Islamism, the military strengthened its grip on politics and further dogmatised 
Kemalism by attenuating nationalism and secularism to extreme levels and 
downgrading reformism and civilisationalism among the principles of Kemalism.485 
This led Kemalism to be articulated by the military elite as an ideology that requires 
the crackdown of any Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in order to maintain the 
unity of the Turkish state. The military elite and the nationalists perceived any 
intervention from the EU as an attempt to divide Turkey, just like ‘they’ tried at the 
end of the World War I. This led the military to increasingly interfere with 
policymaking.486  
The increased role of the military culminated in the 28 February 1997 
military intervention, which was to continue until the early 2000s.487 During the 
premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist WP, the military 
intervened in politics through a memorandum where they warned against the 
                                                             
483 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.91. 
484 28 Subat: Son Darbe, dir. Mehmet Ali Birand, CNNTurk ( 2012). 
485 Defne Gunay and Ali Tekin, ‘Strategic Adaptation to the EU: The Case of Turkish Armed Forces,’ 
unpublished manuscript. 
486 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.92. 
487 28 Subat : Son Darbe, dir. Mehmet Ali Birand, CNNTurk (2012). 
129 
 
expansion of Islamist fundamentalism.488 This intervention led to the closure of WP by 
the Constitutional Court and also the military put Islamists under extreme scrutiny. In 
the process the MUSIAD, the pro-Islamic business association, got damaged 
immensely as their members were banned from state procurement processes.489 By 
the late 1990s the military had assumed de facto control over the state’s employment 
procedures by doing background checks on candidate civil servants.490  
All these hard line, militaristic policies were leading to human rights 
violations and the EU, especially the EP, was growing more and more discontented 
with these violations.491 In December 1997, after the 28 February intervention, the EU 
declared the CEECs as candidates in the Luxembourg summit, but excluded Turkey. 
Also following a crisis between Turkey and Greece over the sovereignty of an islet in 
the Aegean Sea in 1996, Greece vetoed the release of the financial aid to Turkey that 
was allocated as part of the customs union decision.492 This caused significant 
frustration among the Turkish political elite. The Turkish Prime Minister declared that 
all political dialogue with the EU was to be cut off.493  
These factors resulted in a quite conflict-ridden foreign policy in the late 
1990s. Foreign policy under the iron fist of the military in the second half of the 1990s 
was still anchored to the US. But the military was at the same time actively seeking to 
safeguard the country’s territorial integrity against domestic and international threats 
mainly emerging from the south. While these activities weakened Turkey’s human 
rights record, it also deteriorated the relationship with its Arab Middle Eastern 
neighbours. During most of the 1990s, Turkey’s relationships with its Arab 
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neighbours were strained, at best unstable. Turkey came to the brink of war with 
Syria during the 1990s due to several reasons. Syria’s support for the PKK members, 
the dispute over the amount of water to be released by Turkey, its agreement with 
Greece to let Greek war planes to use Syrian airspace in case of a disagreement with 
Turkey were among the reasons.494 In 1998 Turkey had a showdown with Syria over 
its support for the PKK and the harbouring of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.  
Eventually, with the help of the US intelligence, Turkey could capture Ocalan in early 
1999.495 
The 1990s are characterized by Turkish military incursions into Northern 
Iraq in order to fight PKK terrorism as the central Iraqi government had limited 
control in the area after the creation of no fly zones that led to a power vacuum.496 
Turkey’s relations with Iran were also problematic during the 1990s on the grounds 
that Iran harboured the PKK during the 1990s.497 Other concerns of Turkey emanated 
from Iran’s aims to export its brand of Islamic radicalism and its support towards 
some Islamist terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. This tension escalated in 
1997, when the Iranian ambassador to Turkey advocated the adoption of Islamic law 
in Turkey.498 This speech indeed was one of the triggers for the 28 February 1997 
intervention. 
In the face of deteriorating relations with its Arab Middle Eastern 
neighbours, Turkey strengthened its relationship with Israel that had already been in 
a process of normalisation in the 1990s as a result of the Arab-Israeli peace process.499 
This rapprochement was partly the success of a group of policy entrepreneurs, led by 
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the military, over the Islamist circles that were sceptical of Israel and advocating 
integration with the Islamic world.500 
While Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was going through 
these conflicts, due to Turkey’s exclusion from the enlargement policy in 1997 
Luxembourg Summit, political relations with the EU were frozen too. The European 
Council asked the Commission to prepare Progress Reports for Turkey along with the 
candidate countries, although Turkey was not yet declared as a candidate.501 A year 
later, the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU to declare Turkey as a candidate led to the 
restoration of Euro-enthusiasm in Turkey. Turkey was to benefit from the pre-
accession strategy and be judged on the basis of its success in compliance with the 
Copenhagen political criteria for accession. The Presidency Conclusions read as 
follows: 
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the 
same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the 
existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will 
benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. 
This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on 
progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with 
particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues 
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).502 
The issues referred to in paragraph 4 are the EU’s call for a peaceful 
resolution of border disputes and any other outstanding issues, if necessary by 
bringing the issue to the International Court of Justice. The issue raised in paragraph 
9(a) is a specific focus on the Cyprus dispute and an expression of the EU’s strong 
support for the UN Secretary-General Annan’s efforts to resolve it. These matters were 
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brought forward as conditions on Turkey’s candidacy due to the Greek threat of veto 
unless they are worded in the decision.503  
 
4.7 Turkey between East and West: The 2000s and the puzzle 
 
The 2000s witnessed a significant transformation of Turkey’s domestic 
politics, its relationship with the EU and also its foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. The coalition government of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), DLP and the MP 
faced very serious twin economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001, which 
led to bankruptcies and rising unemployment. The JDP was a newcomer as a splinter 
from the banned Islamist WP. At the same time the fact that EU candidacy came with 
membership conditionality and the need to make reforms was getting clearer in the 
eyes of the government. 
The Accession Partnership Document detailing short and medium term 
priorities to comply with the Copenhagen criteria was adopted in March 2001, and 
was revised later in May 2003, January 2006 and finally February 2008.504 This was a 
sign that full accession was not going to happen as soon as the Turkish elite hoped it 
would. The preparation of Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (henceforth National Programme) took a long time and the document adopted 
at the end was rather vague on many critical issues.505 Yet, Turkey started the reform 
process in 2001 and since then the reform process continued until the present day. 
These reform packages have passed laws to ease restrictions on human rights, 
political and social rights, the role of the military in politics, the legal system, and 
economic governance. Capital punishment was banned, restrictions on learning and 
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speaking Kurdish were removed, the number of civilians increased in the NSC among 
a plethora of other changes. 
In November 2002 elections the JDP won a landslide victory by 34%.  In 
December 2002, the EU declared that depending on the Commission’s positive opinion 
on Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU would immediately start 
accession negotiations with Turkey. The view of the Commission on Turkey’s progress 
towards compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in its 2004 Progress Report was 
positive.506 Consequently, the EU declared the accession negotiations would start on 3 
October 2005.507 Turkey accepted to sign the Additional Protocol to extend the Ankara 
agreement to the new member states of the EU, including Cyprus and did so on 30 July 
2005, a few months before the start of the negotiations. 
The Negotiating Framework however was discouraging for the Turkish 
political elite. The Framework stated that the negotiations were open-ended and 
“[w]hile having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption 
capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations 
of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European 
structures.” 508  Also the Framework stated that “[l]ong transitional periods, 
derogations, specific arrangement or permanent safeguard clauses may be 
considered,” which alarmed Turkish policymakers509 so much that then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul refused to board the plane until he was reassured that 
the Negotiating Framework did not refer to any kind of “privileged partnership” 
shorter than full membership.510  
                                                             
506 Council of the European Union, Brussels Summit Presidency Conclusions, 16-7 December 2004, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
507 Available at IKV homepage. http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik.asp?konu=tarihce&baslik=Tarihçe (2 
December 2011). 
508 Negotiating Framework, Principles Governing the Negotiations, article 2. Luxembourg, 3 October 
2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf. (7 November 2006). 
509 Negotiating Framework, Substance of the Negotiations, article 12.  
510 Faucompret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.46. 
134 
 
The coordinating institution for the accession negotiations in Turkey is 
the European Union Secretariat General (EUSG). EUSG was later transformed into the 
Ministry of EU Affairs in 2011. EUSG is headed by an ambassador and coordinates the 
work of relevant ministries in the negotiation process. The chief negotiator was 
initially the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan who was responsible for both 
positions until 2009, when Egemen Bagis was appointed as the chief negotiator. The 
accession negotiations began with screening, through which differences and potential 
roadblocks in the way of implementing the acquis are discussed by EU Commission 
officials and Turkish civil servants, the screening process was completed on 13 
October 2006.  
Those in favour of Turkey’s EU membership have always been 
significantly higher than those against it in Turkish public opinion since 1996. 
Although volatile, this support has been an important contextual factor shaping the 
reception of Turkey’s EU candidacy. Although still much higher than opposition, the 
chart shows that in 2006, support for Turkey’s EU membership was lower than before. 
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Table 4.1: Public Opinion in Turkey vis-à-vis EU membership 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Mehmet Ugur, ‘Societal Perceptions of Turkey’s EU 
membership,’ in Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, 
eds., Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe (London: Routledge, 2004) and European 
Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, 2004 ,2005 ,2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion (12 June 2012). 
 
 
In December 2006, due to Turkey’s failure to diplomatically recognise the 
Republic of Cyprus as the sovereign state representing the whole island and open its 
ports to Cyprus, eight chapters of the negotiations were suspended.511 Other chapters 
were gradually opened for negotiations over the following years. Moreover, the new 
German and French leaders that assumed office in 2005 and 2007 respectively 
declared their negative views on Turkey’s membership by offering Turkey a ‘special 
status’ falling short of full membership.512 These developments have revitalized 
dormant Euro-scepticism in Turkey and convinced the Turkish public that there is no 
realistic prospect of EU membership in the near future.  
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While Turkey was going through such ups and downs in its relationship 
with the EU, its relationship with the Arab Middle East had been improving 
remarkably since 1999. High- level visits took place between Syria and Turkey for the 
first time in a long period along with an increased volume of trade.513 Moreover, Syria 
and Turkey signed a significant number of bilateral agreements,514 including a free-
trade agreement in 2004,515 an agreement for the joint management of waters of Asi 
and Tigris rivers,516 as well as a visa exemption agreement allowing each other’s 
citizens visa-free passage in 2009.517 Moreover, the two countries also agreed on the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline, which would connect an Arab pipeline with a 
Turkish pipeline.518 Therefore, Turkey went beyond normalisation of its relationship 
with Syria and both parties built up mutual trust and institutionalised bilateral 
cooperation in areas ranging from trade to energy.  
Turkey’s foreign policy toward Iraq was different too. When the US asked 
Turkey to authorize American troops’ use of Turkish bases in the operation against 
Iraq in 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted against the motion. The most striking 
aspect of this decision was the silence of the military, a long-term US ally, on the 
issue.519 Furthermore, Turkey kept consultations with the Iraqi officials with an 
agenda of preventing the war and making it clear to the Iraqi side the potential 
consequences of war.520 After the initial stages of the Iraqi war, Turkey grew 
concerned over the increasing importance of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq,521 
which alarmed Turkey on the possible emergence of a Kurdish state. Turkish 
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politicians reiterated their concerns over a possible independent Kurdish state and 
growing PKK presence in the region to their American counterparts several times in 
different fora.522 Turkey’s concerns grew so overwhelming that Turkish armed forces 
orchestrated a military excursion to Northern Iraq in 2008 in order to eradicate PKK 
bases in that region. After the military operation, Turkey’s policy toward Iraq has 
changed significantly. Turkey started dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish groups, 
acknowledged the regional government in northern Iraq as the legitimate governing 
body in the region,523 which are novelties considering the level of threat Turkish 
decision-makers had perceived from northern Iraq and the possibility of an 
autonomous or an independent Kurdish state emerging in northern Iraq during the 
1990s. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s relations with Palestine improved at the expense 
of the relationship with Israel in this period. The JDP hosted a Hamas delegation in 
Ankara after Hamas won the 2006 elections in Gaza.524 This meeting was criticized 
harshly by Israeli officials, who likened the meeting to one between the leader of the 
PKK and the Israeli government.525 A more recent crisis took place at the Davos 
Economic Forum in January 2009, where Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan harangued 
Israeli President Shimon Peres for knowing how to kill people. Turkey also provided 
humanitarian and development aid and “has been involved in capacity and institution-
building activities, such as supporting political reform processes and conducting the 
Young Palestinian Diplomats’ Training Program.”526 Relations with Israel continued 
deteriorating in 2010, when Israeli soldiers raided a Turkish humanitarian aid flotilla 
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and killed civilians who were aiming to defy the Israeli blockade against Gaza since 
Hamas’ election.527These developments point to a deterioration of relations between 
Turkey and Israel, which is quite the opposite of what happened during the 1990s.  
Apart from the improvements in bilateral relations with the Arab Middle 
East, Turkey also undertook initiatives to come together with countries in the region 
at different political fora in order to establish dialogue and cooperation. An early 
example of such initiatives was the EU-OIC joint forum first proposed by the then 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, in 2002. This forum was initiated as a 
venue to disprove the arguments that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US could be an 
indicator of a clash between the western civilisation and Islam. The participants 
included representatives from the EU Commission, EU Council, Council of Europe, OIC 
secretariat and around 51 ministers from all over the world.528 When the Iraq war was 
looming, Turkey held the first meeting of the “Summit of Iraq’s neighbours” with the 
participation of Egypt, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in January 2003 in order to 
discuss Turkey’s position on the issue and reach a common understanding as to the 
concerns of the participants regarding the US showdown on Iraq.529 Turkey also 
participated in the 2004 meeting of the G-8 “Broader Middle East and North Africa 
Initiative” as a democratic partner.530 Moreover, Turkey assumed co-sponsorship with 
Yemen and Italy of the “Democracy Assistance Dialogue” which brings together civil 
society groups and governments from the region, the G-8 to assist consolidation of 
democracy in the region.531 Turkey also took a joint initiative with the Spanish 
government of establishing the Alliance of Civilizations under the auspices of the UN 
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in order “to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures today, 
and to recommend a practical programme of action to address this issue.”532  
Furthermore, Turkey also embarked upon a mediation role in peace talks 
between Israel and Syria in 2008; 533 however Turkey lost its mediating role due to its 
strained relations with Israel later.534 Another example of Turkey’s initiatives for 
furthering political dialogue and mediation in the region is the meeting of Syrian and 
Iraqi foreign ministers with the secretary general of the Arab League in Istanbul. The 
goal of this meeting was to mediate the dispute between Syria and Iraq that was 
caused by the Iraqi government’s allegations that Syria supported terrorist activity in 
Iraq.  
Besides assuming key roles in newly-established organizations and 
helping institutionalise multilateral cooperation in the region, Turkey also levelled up 
its profile and impact in other institutions, of which it had already been a member. A 
good example of this is Turkey’s newly-acquired high profile in the OIC. Even though 
Turkey has been criticized by the members of the organisation for having close ties 
with Israel and even if Turkey itself had hesitated to get involved in the OIC due to its 
ideological reservations in the past, Turkey became a high profile member of the 
organisation recently. By the efforts of the JDP, a Turkish citizen, Prof. Ekmeleddin 
Ihsanoglu, was elected as the secretary-general of the organisation in 2004.535 Turkish 
policymakers also actively used the OIC forum to convey their observation that the 
Islamic world needs to put its house in order through democratisation, observation of 
human rights and increased participation in politics.536 Therefore, Turkey has started 
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using the OIC forum effectively to convey messages of the need for democratisation in 
the Islamic world and give the ‘Turkish experience’ as a model that combines 
modernisation and Islam. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
All in all, westernisation has been the dominant policy paradigm in 
Turkish foreign policy since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. Late Ottoman 
and Republican history is shaped by westernisation reforms undertaken by various 
governments, with the underlying objective of catching up with the west. This 
paradigm was strictly anchored to Kemalism, which has been the state ideology 
upheld by the military and bureaucratic elite and the RPP throughout the Republican 
history. Kemalist westernisation therefore has always defined the limits of legitimate 
or rational foreign policy throughout the Republican history. Within this policy 
paradigm, there have been times when the Turkish foreign policy elite have improved 
relations with the Middle East. These were still embedded within a commitment to the 
western alliance, either in the shape of closer ties with the US or the intensification of 
the relations with the EU. Those periods when Turkey established closer links with 
the Middle East are mainly due to economic reasons. 
Therefore, in the grand scheme of historical developments it could be 
argued that there is more continuity than change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. However, from a more limited historical perspective, there is change 
from the 1990s to the 2000s. As explained in chapter three, I argue continuity and 
change co-exist in every political development. Therefore, in accordance with this 
conceptualisation of political time and the review of the historical evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy, the goal of analysis has to be explaining and understanding the change 
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and continuity. The change and continuity can be observed on a less abstract level, 
having zoomed in on the foreign policy content, actors and discourses towards the 
Middle East in this period. The aim of the following three chapters is to understand 
and explain how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidacy role played a causal 
role in bringing about change and continuity in Turkish Foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in the 2000s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EUROPEANISATION AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS 
 
This chapter explores the EU candidate role prescribed by the EU in line with the 
Copenhagen political and economic criteria and its institutionalisation in Turkish 
politics. It is argued that the usage of the EU’s candidate role prescription by Turkish 
actors enabled certain strategies and constrained others, therefore altering the 
direction and the objective of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. The EU 
candidate role was institutionalised among Turkish foreign policy actors in such a way 
that the resulting balance of actors and paradigms has enabled the materialisation of 
the foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s. This chapter therefore 
scrutinizes how a certain articulation of Turkey’s foreign policy paradigm, namely 
post-Islamist westernisation, has come to shape Turkish foreign policy-making and 
implementation in the first place due to the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU 
candidate role. 
Past research on Europeanisation has pointed at how domestic 
opportunity structures ‘mediate’ the domestic impact of Europe.537 Yet this focus has 
been mostly from either the rational choice perspective or the sociological 
institutionalist one. Borzel and Risse’s oft-cited work on two different mechanisms of 
Europeanisation from rational choice and sociological perspectives has identified two 
separate pathways for Europeanisation to cause change at the domestic level. 
According to this model, the rational choice institutionalist path follows the change in 
the domestic opportunity structure due to the emergence of new resources at the EU 
level with the background assumption that actors are rational. According to Borzel 
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and Risse, from this perspective, “Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging 
political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert 
influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals.”538 
Borzel and Risse have also acknowledged that Europeanisation only causes 
redistribution of resources when there is misfit between the EU level and domestic 
level policies, minimal veto points in the decision-making system and favourable 
formal institutions. The strategies, discourses and willingness of these domestic actors 
to exploit the new resources created by the EU are not included in their framework.539 
In what follows I argue there are two important factors that cause the empowerment 
of actors: mainly their reasons for exploiting new resources, i.e. their ideas in the form 
of discourses and reasons. This interactive relationship between the EU’s role 
prescription and Turkish actors’ strategies, discourses and willingness towards this 
prescription shape the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role of 
compliance with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.  
In this vein, the chapter first overviews the EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey, which is codified in line with the Copenhagen criteria. Secondly, how this role 
prescription was institutionalised among Turkish foreign policy actors will be 
explained within the context of relations between the actors in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in the 2000s. Turkish foreign policy actors have adapted their 
strategies towards the EU’s role prescription for achieving their various objectives 
ranging from the westernisation of Turkey to acquiring political legitimacy in 
domestic politics. The actors analysed in this chapter include the primary state actors 
such as the government, the Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
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well as a secondary actor, the Parliament;540 and non-state actors such as the business 
associations that have been active in the Middle East.  
 
5.1 The EU’s Role Prescription 
 
The EU candidacy role prescribed by the EU has provided Turkish foreign 
policy actors with two broad sets of rules to comply with as part of the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria.  These criteria for accession to the EU have been set out by the 
Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The Copenhagen criteria broadly consist of 
political and economic criteria. Accordingly, an eligible country must have stable 
institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and 
the protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, ability to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU.541 These two sets of rules aim 
at macroeconomic stability, economic competitiveness as well as democratisation and 
civilianisation. The EU’s role prescription laid out by the Copenhagen criteria can only 
be institutionalised through its interaction with domestic agency.  The following 
section offers a brief overview of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey and the 
Copenhagen criteria that caused a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. Afterwards, an analysis will be offered of how Turkish political and economic 
actors adopted and institutionalised the EU’s role prescription due to their political 
projects and paradigms.  
 
5.1.1 EU’s Role Prescription for Turkey: Economic and Political Rules 
Turkey started its economic liberalisation in the 1980s, when it shifted 
from import-substitution industrialisation towards an export-oriented free market 
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economy as explained in chapter four. This shift also resulted in an export boom due 
to state intervention in the promotion of exports.542 The following decade, however, is 
dubbed as the “lost decade” due to the sinking growth rate and investment, rising 
unemployment, the economic crisis in 1994 as well as concurrent government crises 
due to instable coalition governments that characterised the 1990s. 543  State 
borrowing was at very high levels and a group of domestic financial elite emerged, 
mainly the big holding companies’ banks, whose profits were more based on their 
lending to the government than their industrial activities. 544  The coalition 
governments were still shaping the economic policy on extending favours to their 
particular electorates.  
The financial crisis of 1994 was addressed by borrowing from the IMF and 
the accompanying stabilisation programme was drawn up by this institution. 
However, the economic conditions preceding the crisis remained the same, huge 
budget deficits, very high rates of inflation reaching up to 70% at times and 
dependency on short-term capital inflows remained intact in the rest of the decade.545 
The EU factor in this decade was limited to the customs union between Turkey and 
the EU, which came into operation in 1996. While exposing groups of Turkish 
corporations to European competition, the customs union did not cause a significant 
political structural change as it did not institutionalise the goal of EU accession as 
much as EU candidacy did.546 
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In 2000 and 2001, the devastating twin crises hit Turkey. The first crisis 
broke out when Turkey had been following an IMF programme.547  The 2000 crisis 
was more of a liquidity crisis that could have been averted had the IMF programme 
been flexible enough to allow the Turkish Central Bank to inject more liquidity to the 
economy. The second crisis was different in the sense that it was mostly caused by the 
regulatory deficiencies and reckless lending practices in the Turkish banking system 
coupled with the lack of political will and capability to address these long drawn-out 
problems.548 Together, the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 were very costly for the 
Turkish economy and people.  
The Copenhagen economic criteria were largely in tune with the IMF 
programme that Turkey started implementing after 2001. They were so 
complementary that the 2001 Accession Partnership Document stated clearly that 
Turkey should comply with the structural adjustment programme agreed with the 
IMF.549 The components of the IMF programme were pointing to a neoliberal agenda: 
the decline of the state in the economy through privatisation and the depoliticisation 
of economic governance as well as fiscal austerity and disinflation.550 Similarly, the 
European Commission was emphasising political instability, excessive public 
borrowing, state’s extensive involvement in the economy, dysfunctional financial 
system and the existence of barriers for market entry/exit as problems in the Turkish 
economy’s alignment with the Copenhagen economic criteria in the annual progress 
reports.551 The Commission’s assessment of a ‘functioning market economy’ is based 
on certain sub-criteria such as the existence of macroeconomic stability; liberalisation 
of the economy and the retreat of the state from the economy; the existence of an 
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enforceable legal system and a well-developed financial sector; the removal of 
barriers to enter or exit the market.552  
On top of such rules that overlapped with the IMF programme, also 
important was the EU’s particular emphasis on the provision of support for the Small 
and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs). The 2000 Progress Report on Turkey pointed 
out the inconsistency of Turkish policies on the SMEs and those of the EU, as well as 
the problems for the development of the SMEs in Turkish economy.553 The 2001 
Progress Report observed some improvement of Turkey’s policies on the SMEs, 
especially in terms of the start of an action plan and consultation with the SMEs while 
formulating the economic reform programme to stabilise Turkish economy after the 
crisis.554 The 2003 Accession Partnership for Turkey prescribed the development and 
implementation of “a national SME strategy in line with the European Charter for 
small enterprises and the multiannual programme for enterprise and 
entrepreneurship [which] should include the improvement of the business 
environment for the SMEs.”555 The EU’s role prescription of supporting the SMEs was 
especially important in the context of Turkey’s historical path of development 
strategies. As Bugra has pointed out, historically the SMEs have been considered 
inefficient by the state elite in Turkey for the modernisation project; hence the 
favoured trajectory for development had come to be through big business and holding 
companies.556  
A different but very closely related aspect of the EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey was the rules on democratisation. EU candidacy rules on democratisation and 
the improvement of political and social rights and freedoms were important elements 
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in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document and the subsequent progress reports on 
Turkey prepared by the Commission.557  The 1998 Progress Report on Turkey has also 
pointed out issues surrounding Turkey’s treatment of rights to peaceful assembly and 
association. The 1998 report stated that associations were restricted in the sense that 
they could not “invite foreign associations to Turkey, issue public statements or 
organise any activities outside their premises without obtaining the prior permission 
of the authorities.”558 The 2000 report reiterated these criticisms as follows: 
Freedom of association and assembly (public meetings and 
demonstrations) is still not fully respected. NGOs’ activities such as 
conferences or distribution of leaflets require official permission. NGOs 
are prohibited from establishing umbrella institutions and from arranging 
institutional collaboration with other NGOs on an international scale 
(unless permitted by decree of the Council of Ministers).559  
The 2001 Accession Partnership Document also pointed out the need to 
consolidate constitutional and legal safeguards on the right of association and 
peaceful assembly as a political requirement for Turkey’s accession.560   
A very crucial part of democratisation rules was civilianisation. The 
Turkish military has traditionally occupied a central role in Turkish politics, especially 
more so in foreign policymaking during the 1990s. The Turkish Armed Forces have 
considered themselves as an institution above politics in Turkey and perceived 
themselves to be the guardian of the regime against internal and external threats as 
chapter four has explained.561 On the other hand the Commission’s Progress Reports 
on Turkey have always underlined the need for Turkey to ensure civilian control over 
the military as a candidate country.562 These rules had important impact on Turkish 
                                                             
557 European Commission, 2001 Progress Report on Turkey. 
558 European Commission, 1998 Progress Report on Turkey, p.16. 
559 European Commission, 2000 Progress Report on Turkey, p.17. 
560 European Council, 2001 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey (8 March 2001). 
561 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge Of Globalisation,’ European 
Journal of Political Research, 44 (2005), pp.175-201 
562 European Commission, 1999 Progress Report on Turkey, p.8; European Commission, 2001 Progress 
Report on Turkey, p.16. 
149 
 
foreign policy-making as domestic actors revised their strategies and discourses in 
response to them. 
 
5.2 Role performance 
 
The post-crisis era displayed significant improvement in the economic 
indicators that the EU has underlined. Growth increased and it evolved in a relatively 
sustainable path, inflation rates were reduced to single-digit numbers, privatisation 
and foreign direct investment increased remarkably, the budget deficit was reduced 
and the banking system was regulated through the creation of an independent 
agency.563 These indicators were not achieved because it was prescribed by the EU for 
Turkey; rather the EU’s role prescription that overlapped with the IMF programme 
was used by the domestic policymakers to ease the implementation of the IMF 
programme as will be explained below.  
In response to the EU’s role prescription of SME support, in 2002 Turkey 
signed the European Charter for Small Enterprises and steps were taken to improve 
the business environment and access to technology for the SMEs.564 Yet, it was still 
necessary to flesh out the commitment as a strategy. The Turkish government drafted 
an SME strategy and action plan by January 2004. This action plan has constituted the 
backbone of Turkey’s SME development strategy, which was developed in accordance 
with the EU’s candidate role prescriptions and with an aim to use the appropriate 
resources EU candidacy offers Turkish SMEs. With the EU candidacy role, the Turkish 
SMEs were given the opportunity to benefit from the EU’s multiannual programmes 
and framework programmes. The institution responsible for coordinating the Turkish 
SMEs’ participation in the multiannual programmes was designated as the SME 
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Development Organisation, and the one that is responsible for coordinating their 
participation in the EU’s framework programmes was designated as the Turkish 
Science and Technology Research Council.565 Yet, participation in these programmes 
was only possible by a financial contribution by Turkey to the budget, which was 
deducted from the pre-accession funds given to Turkey. This financial contribution 
made it a political choice: resources were to be allocated and it required prioritisation 
of the SME development to make this decision. An example of the SME development 
projects that used EU funds was the launch of ‘EU Business Development Centres’ 
across Turkey by the TOBB. The funding provided by the EU for this project was 
approximately €50 million and the aim of the centres is to improve competitiveness of 
Turkish SMEs through consultancy services and sector-specific development 
projects.566  
In response to the role prescription of civilianisation, the constitutional 
amendments of 2001 gave the civilian members of the NSC numerical superiority by 
including deputy Prime Ministers and the Minister of Justice. National Security Council 
decisions were reduced an advisory character, thereby de-emphasising the priority of 
its decisions. The seventh reform package (August 2003) made it possible for the 
Court of Accounts to exercise financial supervision of state properties in the hands of 
the Turkish Armed Forces. The 2004 Constitutional amendments eliminated the 
representative of the chief of the general staff from several boards of educational and 
cultural state institutions. All these reforms were passed with the consent of the 
Turkish Armed Forces, and raised an interesting question as to how come the most 
powerful actor in Turkish politics during the 1990s agreed with the curbing of its 
powers.  
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5.3 The Institutionalisation of EU Candidate Role and the Actors of 
Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 
 
The post-Helsinki period in Turkey’s foreign policy-making towards the 
Middle East has witnessed cooperation among key actors enabling the ‘new’ foreign 
policy toward the Middle East. 567  The actors of foreign policy toward the Middle East 
are the government, the Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Parliament and non-state actors such as the business associations.  
The first steps of the new foreign policy towards the Middle East were 
taken during the coalition government of the social democrat DLP, the centre-right MP 
and the nationalist NAP. The timing of Turkey’s start for improving its relationship 
with its Middle Eastern neighbours is mostly linked to the expulsion of the PKK leader 
Ocalan from Syria in late 1998 and his capture in 1999, rather than the Helsinki 
decision of the EU to declare Turkey a candidate to the EU.568 The leader of the DLP, 
Bulent Ecevit and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem always had an agenda of 
improving Turkey’s relations with its neighbourhood; however it was difficult to 
realise this agenda before the capture of Ocalan as the PKK problem was poisoning 
Turkey’s relations with Iraq and Syria altogether.569  
Therefore, the capture and trial of the PKK leader by Turkey in 1999 
presented a window of opportunity to start improving relations with Turkey’s Middle 
Eastern neighbours, especially with Syria. The coalition government responded to the 
perceived political opportunity presented by the capture of Ocalan, by improving its 
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relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours. By 2000 the Undersecretariat of Foreign 
Trade had already adopted the ‘strategy to develop trade with the peripheral and 
neighbouring regions’ in line with the government’s foreign policy vision towards the 
Middle East.570 It is imperative to note that this drive to intensify political and 
economic relations with the Arab Middle East started after the Turkish government’s 
codification of using common history, religion and geography as a foreign policy asset 
in improving relations with the region. The foreign minister of the coalition 
government from 1997 to 2002, Ismail Cem, has several times argued that Turkey 
should play a regional role in the Middle East due to Turkey’s common historical and 
cultural ties with the Middle East in his foreign policy statements. An illustration of 
this is as follows: 
One of our targets is to become a central, determining country in the 
growing and developing Eurasia region; our second target is to become an 
EU member.… We follow several methods to achieve these. First, which is 
what I have been working on, is that we are establishing a definition of 
Turkey’s historical geography. Turkey’s historical geography is a 
determinant of Turkey and our foreign policy.  What is Turkey’s historical 
geography? It is the historical geographical space, which is occupied by 
the societies that we have shared a history, faith, parallel culture, language. 
This is a very important asset for Turkey… Turkey’s historical geography 
is the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa, and even 
Sudan and Yemen in Africa.571 
In another session of the Turkish Parliament, Cem bluntly stated that 
Turkey had a mission in the 21st century. He argued that Turkey had a responsibility 
both to itself, humanity and its own historical geography, which covers the former 
territories of the Ottoman Empire.572  Yet, Ismail Cem’s ‘regionalism’ was still 
embedded within the broader westernisation paradigm in Turkish foreign policy. As 
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explained in chapter four, westernisation as a foreign policy paradigm has been 
deeply embedded in Turkish foreign policymaking since the proclamation of the 
Republic. The idea of westernisation as the source of progress and development dates 
even further back to the 19th century Ottoman Empire.  
Turkey’s foreign policy in the 2000s can be understood as the outcome of 
the transition within different articulations of the same paradigm rather than 
paradigmatic change. The westernisation paradigm as explained in chapter four 
remained intact, however in different articulations. When Kemalism as the 
coordinative discourse of the Turkish Armed Forces was articulated with 
westernisation as a foreign policy paradigm, it caused Turkish foreign policymakers to 
perceive close diplomatic and economic relations with the west, especially the US, as 
‘normal’; and close relations with the Muslim Middle East as ‘abnormal’. Although 
there were periods in Turkish history when closer economic ties with the Middle East 
had been sought, it was only possible when the Kemalist military did not perceive 
such foreign policy as outside the westernisation paradigm. When the military 
perceived foreign policy towards the Middle East as being representative of a rival 
paradigm, it has intervened as was the case in 1997. Therefore, the Kemalist 
articulation of westernisation had been normalised by the Turkish Armed Forces and 
the Kemalist elite in Turkish foreign policy, especially through military rule or 
informal domination of politics. Ismail Cem’s foreign policy vision that was centred on 
establishing balanced relations with both the west and the Middle East was therefore 
a transition period from Kemalist westernisation to post-Islamist articulation of 
westernisation. Cem’s foreign policy vision was still anchored to a social democratic 
perspective and he declared that he rejected politics based on religion or race.573 
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Therefore Cem’s policy was still part of the Kemalist articulation of westernisation, 
which was based on Kemalist rationality rather than religion.  
Enter the JDP with its founding members coming from an Islamist past. 
The parties they had been members of represented political Islam and they were 
banned from politics one by one by the Kemalist judiciary and the military. 574 When 
the JDP was formed out of the ashes of political Islam, it was its priority to convey the 
message that it had changed.  Islamism refers to those social movements that aim for 
the reordering of politics and society according to Islamic law, post-Islamist in this 
sense refers to the acknowledgment by the JDP of their Islamist past but at the same 
time their current rejection of Islamism.575  When the JDP was founded, the emphasis 
was on the new party not having anything to do with Islam576and the party ideology 
being one of “conservative democracy.”577 The central piece in their coordinative 
discourse as a party, therefore, was their close commitment to the EU candidacy 
process of Turkey and at the same time stronger political and economic relations with 
the Muslim Middle East.  
The difference between Kemalist westernisation and post-Islamist 
westernisation of the JDP is that Islam and the Ottoman past are central to the JDP’s 
foreign policy vision. Yet, the Islam they advocate is seen to be compatible with the 
westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign policy (see chapter six). In other words 
the JDP has articulated westernisation with their post-Islamist coordinative discourse, 
thereby achieving the “westernisation of Turkish political Islam.”578 The foreign policy 
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that was devised within this post-Islamist westernisation paradigm emphasizes the 
historical and geographical affinities between Turkey and its neighbouring regions 
due to the Ottoman rule and Islam that covered these regions including the majority of 
the Middle East.579  
The ‘strategic depth’ policy is the crystallisation of the JDP’s post-Islamist 
articulation of the westernisation paradigm, therefore is a significant and recurring 
theme in this thesis. Ahmet Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkish foreign 
policy since the first government of the JDP is also the architect of this policy. He 
delineated the basic assumptions of it in his various scholarly publications. The main 
departure point of the strategic depth theory is that Turkey should act as a central 
state within its surrounding regions rather than as a pivotal state. A frequently voiced 
principle of Turkish foreign policy within the strategic-depth doctrine is that “Turkey 
can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both.”580 What sets 
the post-Islamist articulation of westernisation different from the Kemalist 
articulation is the emphasis on Islamic faith instead of the Kemalist rationality. The 
architect of the foreign policy framework of the JDP combines the region stretching 
from northern Caucasus to the Gulf countries and the southern part of Central Asia 
together as “the Islamic civilisation.”581 Therefore, the delicate balance between the 
pro-EU but Islam-oriented coordinative discourse of the JDP is what has given 
meaning to the post-Islamist westernisation paradigm. The strategic depth policy 
seeks to achieve closer economic and political relations with the Muslim Middle 
Eastern countries. Another central pillar of this policy is the commitment of the 
government to Turkey’s EU candidate role, which is presented as the balancing 
element that anchors this policy to the west. Taspinar has outlined the main tenets of 
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this foreign policy paradigm as complementing ties with the east and those with the 
west; coming to terms with the Ottoman and Islamic heritage; and a sense of self-
confidence in regional politics and self-perception as a regional power.582 
It is argued below that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role played an important part in causing the shift from Kemalist westernisation to 
post-Islamist westernisation through the relevant foreign policy actors’ strategic 
usages of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey. 
 
5.3.1 The Government and the Turkish Armed Forces 
As Turkey’s experience of civil-military relations demonstrates, the 
government has never been the top executive institution in Turkish foreign policy in 
practice. The Turkish Armed Forces has always held a superior position and drawn 
the boundaries of legitimate politics in line with their Kemalist coordinative discourse. 
The Turkish Armed Forces has traditionally occupied a central role in Turkish politics 
and contributed heavily to the embedding of Kemalism within the Turkish political 
structure. The Turkish Armed Forces has considered itself as an institution above 
politics in Turkey, and perceived itself to be the guardian of the regime against 
internal and external threats.583 To this end, it has intervened several times in politics 
and toppled the government several times either through a direct coup d’état or 
indirectly through using its power indirectly (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997). These 
interventions were justified by the pretext of either Islamisation of Turkish politics 
(1960, 1997) or extreme civil disorder due to clashes between Marxist groups and the 
nationalists (1971, 1980). In every single episode the ultimate goal was to establish 
domestic stability in line with the Turkish Armed Forces’ vision of Kemalism and the 
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principles of Kemalism that were going to be prioritised after each intervention 
depended on the strategic context analysis of the Turkish Armed Forces at the time.  
Accompanying this, the Turkish Armed Forces had also held significant 
constitutional powers especially since the 1982 constitution, which were drafted 
under the auspices of the Turkish Armed Forces following the 1980 coup. The 1982 
constitution increased the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics by upgrading 
the military-dominated NSC from an advisory body to a body whose views will be 
given “priority consideration” by the Council of Ministers. 584  Also, the 1982 
constitution gave the military access to monitor certain civilian agencies such as the 
Higher Education Council and the Radio and Television Supervisory Council.585 
The Kemalist articulation of westernisation paradigm that the Turkish 
Armed Forces has advocated and in fact embedded in Turkish foreign policy has been 
based on certain assumptions. The Kemalist westernisation paradigm perceives the 
Ottoman past as backward and non-progressive as opposed to the west, which is the 
source of progress and civilisation. Islamic faith can never be at the heart of foreign 
policy according to the Kemalist westernisation paradigm. When Islam was to be 
allowed in politics; it had to be the kind of Islam that was enlightened and more 
importantly approved by the Kemalist Turkish Armed Forces.586 
In the shifting context of the post-Cold War period, changing discourses 
on legitimate violence, increased informal networks among actors and the growing 
influence of technology and media have placed the Turkish Armed Forces in a new 
context.587 Economic liberalisation, the aggravation of ethnic nationalism, the rise of 
political Islam has led to increased threat perception by the Turkish Armed Forces. 
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Due to such threat perception, the Turkish Armed Forces increased its domination 
over Turkish politics. As an extension of its sole authority to define security through 
the NSC, the Turkish Armed Forces has established itself as an influential actor in the 
foreign policy process, especially regarding Cyprus and the Middle East. In Bilgin’s 
words, “during the 1990s, Turkey… experienced a securitisation of its foreign policy 
whereby certain issues were pulled out of the realm of open debate and discussion by 
way of declaring them as national security issues.”588 As an initial response, the 
Turkish Armed Forces identified Kurdish nationalism and political Islam as domestic 
threats to the nature of the republican regime and further “expanded its domain of 
jurisdiction by redefining the idea of national security.”589 This new approach was 
devised not only through a strategic analysis of the changing context; it was also path-
dependent and habitual. Later, this approach turned out to be a not so efficient 
response to the context. As some of the military commanders later admitted, such 
hardliner policies created more problems than they solved.590 For example, the former 
Commander of the Land Forces, a renowned Kemalist, recognised such strategic 
learning as follows in 2007:  
The Kurdish problem was to be resolved in its social stage when it 
amounted to demands for cultural recognition. In that stage, we were 
taught that there were no Kurds, only a branch of Turks. We could not 
analyze the demands well back then. Therefore, we could not see the 
social dimensions of the phenomenon.591  
As the Turkish Armed Forces’ reading of the strategic context proved to 
be fallacious by the end of the 1990s, it had to rekindle its efforts to better 
comprehend the post-Cold War strategic context. Particularly after Turkey was 
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declared EU candidate in 1999, the institutionalisation of the EU accession paradigm 
began to insert additional substance into the strategic environment. 
With the 1999 Helsinki decision, Turkish Armed Forces’ position in 
Turkish politics reached a critical juncture.  Endorsing EU candidacy meant the need 
to secure the Turkish Armed Forces’ consent for the curtailment of its political 
authority. Not accepting the EU candidate role and the civilianisation rules associated 
with it would have put the Turkish Armed Forces in a difficult position in the face of 
its century-old objective of carrying Turkey to western standards of civilisation. The 
most tightly defined role prescription for Turkey as an EU candidate was the 
civilianisation of Turkish politics. Without institutionalising this role in Turkish 
politics, Turkey could not possibly join the EU.592 On top of the strictly defined nature 
of this position role, there was high level of public and business support in Turkey for 
the institutionalisation of this role prescription as it is, without any changes to it. As 
the then Turkish secretary-general of EU affairs has revealed, when the laws aimed for 
the civilianisation of Turkey were passed in Turkey, the public support was already 
ripe for it so that there was not significant public reaction to the laws.593 Business 
interests had all been in favour of civilianisation as they were demanding a more 
favourable business context without the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces to 
political and economic life.594  
As a consequence, the Turkish Armed Forces agreed on endorsing the 
civilianisation prescription of the EU for Turkey as an institutional objective after 
going through intra-institutional deliberation. Yetkin, a prominent journalist on civil-
military relations in Turkey, has written citing his source in the Turkish General Staff: 
“the Turkish Armed Forces made an assessment in the process of drafting the first 
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National Programme and passed its opinion on the programme to the government as 
every other state institution. The national programme was drafted in the light of these 
opinions.595  The Turkish Armed Forces remained committed to the civilianisation role 
prescription throughout the early 2000s. In 2004 the then vice-chief of Turkish 
General Staff Ilker Basbug made clear the Turkish Armed Forces’ position on EU 
candidacy by arguing that “[Turkey’s] relationship with the EU has entered an 
important episode…. The Armed Forces is showing due diligence to make our country 
succeed in this process. The same is expected from every institution and 
organisation.”596 This reveals the Helsinki decision as an important juncture for the 
Turkish Armed Forces. In the pre-Helsinki period there was no institutionalisation of 
the EU accession paradigm, therefore there was no immediate pressure on the 
Turkish Armed Forces to crystallise its position on the EU reforms and the EU’s role 
prescriptions for Turkey. In the post-Helsinki period, the Turkish Armed Forces went 
through an institutional deliberation process and came to adopt the EU’s candidate 
role prescription and the rules associated with it.597 The process of increased 
cooperative involvement of the military in developing Turkey’s pre-accession strategy 
is also observed by a senior diplomat as follows: 
We sought input from the military representatives. We shared ideas. This 
way, the military was included in the process, which brought 
harmonisation of our approaches. The military also felt the ownership of 
the [EU] process. We noticed that the opinion of the military developed 
over time. 598  
The Turkish General Staff perceived EU candidacy as a step closer to the 
EU membership of Turkey, a credible anchor for Turkish politics, which would 
eventually bring socio-economic development as an antidote to Islamic 
fundamentalism and Kurdish nationalism and a path for westernisation. For example, 
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former chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu (1998-2002) 
pointed out that economic development cannot be achieved by staying outside 
Europe.599 In a similar vein, Hilmi Ozkok, the following chief of Turkish General Staff 
(2002-2006) said:  
[t]here might be a situation in which the Kurds in the region… might say 
that there is no need for a Kurdish state. Suppose Turkey is already in the 
EU, with its per capita income is over $15 000. Under these circumstances, 
they might say that there is no need for separation... If Turkey becomes a 
member; the Kurds might say that they want to belong to such a 
Turkey.600  
The former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok was a key skilled actor, who 
contributed to the rearticulation of Kemalism by prioritising the principles such as 
reformism and catching up with the level of contemporary civilisations, which are 
compatible with the EU’s role prescription over the previously rigid interpretation of 
Kemalism that was adopted in the 1990s. Ozkok’s views on the issues pertaining to 
Kemalism in relation to the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role were 
quite important in many respects. First of all, he was literally the top military officer 
during the thorniest period of Turkey’s EU process from August 2002 to August 2006 
when significant EU reforms were passed. Secondly, his ideas contributed to 
institutional change of the Turkish Armed Forces. Indeed, one interviewee reported 
that at the time there was a wide spread belief among the policymakers that Ozkok’s 
views were a blessing for the EU reform process during the period.601 
Hilmi Ozkok repeatedly stressed that Turkey and the EU shared common 
values. He argued that Turkey has always sought to work together with the west and 
approach issues in line with western norms. Of course, there would be certain 
conditions for Turkey’s entry, which any integration project entails.602 Consistent with 
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this understanding General Ozkok evaluated tough items on the EU reform agenda in a 
different light. Regarding the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics, Hilmi Ozkok 
openly criticized the military coups in Turkey, argued that the military should stay out 
of politics, and promised that from then on the military would abide by civilian 
decisions.603 Ozkok argued further against the intrusion of Turkish Armed Forces in 
politics with a reference to his understanding of real Kemalism when he said: 
Some fake Kemalists wanted a Chief of General Staff that quarrels with the 
government in public view, which goes totally against Kemalism. Would 
Ataturk, who took off his uniform as he became the political leader of the 
struggle of the national liberation, have liked such a Turkey in the 21st 
century? Did his principles not suggest rationality instead of emotions and 
physical power? … Real Kemalism requires thinking of his principles and 
transformations, and to say and do what he would have said and done if 
he was alive.604  
An important declaration by Ozkok that demonstrates how he 
incorporates domestic and international drivers for change in Kemalism as the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ coordinative discourse, reads as follows: 
The Turkish Armed Forces is saddled with new and difficult tasks as a 
consequence of the reactionary and separatist movements that continue 
to become even more critical as time goes by. On the other hand, new 
democratic values and changing concepts of sovereignty make it 
necessary that we come up with new ideas and doctrines for the better 
fulfilment by the Turkish Armed Forces of the arduous tasks in 
question…The Kemalist way of thought, which is free from dogmas and 
based on reason and science, can and should be reinterpreted. Only then 
will Kemalism continue to be a guiding light for the future generations as 
well.605 
This statement of Ozkok highlights his ideas on the need to reinterpret 
Kemalism with an eye to the European and domestic challenges that the Turkish 
Armed Forces faces. The Turkish Armed Forces went along with the EU’s demands 
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due to their belief that Turkey’s EU membership is both the ultimate point of Turkey’s 
long drawn-out journey of westernisation and that it is also the most effective way of 
dealing with domestic pressures emanating from Kurdish separatism and Islamism.606  
The previous chief of Turkish General Staff (2006-2008), General Yasar 
Buyukanit, then commander of Turkish army, followed Ozkok’s path and argued that 
Turkey’s EU membership is a natural outcome of Ataturk’s goal of civilisationalism 
and that the Turkish General Staff gives full support to EU candidacy. He also argued 
that Kemalism should not be seen as a dogma. According to him, Kemalism is not 
meant to be a narrow ideological framework; but a humanist, modernist and 
innovative worldview.607 Ilker Basbug, then vice-chief of the Turkish General Staff, 
made a similar statement in 2004, coupling Turkey’s EU candidacy with the Kemalist 
goal of reaching contemporary civilisation.608 
The Turkish General Staff’s response to Turkey’s EU candidacy reveals 
that rather than being a veto player with fixed interests or behaving appropriately 
with the changing norms of legitimacy,609  the Turkish Armed Forces is also a strategic 
and reflexive actor. It did not respond to the EU’s role prescription for Turkey 
rationally or appropriately, but it reflected upon its institutional objectives defined by 
Kemalism and adopted EU candidacy role prescription of the EU through a 
rearticulation of Kemalism, which enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to adapt itself to 
the EU’s role prescription for Turkey. Skilled agency on the part of Ozkok and his 
followers at the helm of the Turkish Armed Forces, was imperative in this 
rearticulation. Consequently, the coordinative discourse of the Turkish General Staff 
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was rearticulated and made complementary with the EU’s role prescriptions for 
Turkey. Kemalism as a coordinative discourse was rearticulated so that it pointed at 
innovation, catching contemporary civilisation and reformism as enabling the Turkish 
General Staff’s adoption of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey.   
This process of course led to the resurfacing of old dividing lines within 
the military ranks through a discursive crystallisation of pro-EU and anti-EU 
officers.610 This led to several statements and declarations by senior officers, which 
were later countered by those representing the official position of the Turkish General 
Staff. For example Tuncer Kilinc, a high ranking General also the former Secretary-
General of the NSC, argued that the EU would never let Turkey in, so Turkey should 
seek alliances with Russia and Iran. 611 This statement and what followed clearly 
reveals this divide. After Kilinc declared his anti-EU stance, Ibrahim Firtina, another 
high-ranking general who is known for usually keeping a low-profile, said in a speech 
that a colleague showed his activism but forgot his role. Firtina’s speech was taken as 
a direct criticism of Kilinc and the whole picture is one of contending views on 
Turkey’s EU candidacy within the military circles, as well as the civilian circles, being 
debated openly.  
All in all, the Turkish General Staff agreed with the EU’s role prescription 
thanks to the skilled actors who redefined the priorities of Kemalism, the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ coordinative discourse, in tune with the EU’s candidate role 
prescription rather than yielding to the demands of a pro-EU public opinion or EU 
conditionality without any mediation of ideas such as Kemalist westernisation 
paradigm.612 Put simply, the Turkish Armed Forces did not retreat from a position of 
political domination completely, rather their withdrawal was in tune with their 
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reinterpreted coordinative discourse.  This explains certain issue areas that remained 
relatively untouched by the civilianisation dynamics. With regard to fighting PKK 
terrorism, which threatens to change the unitary form of Turkish state, they remained 
dominant, as protecting territorial integrity of Turkey is a goal of the Turkish Armed 
Forces that goes beyond any reinterpretation of Kemalism. While the Turkish General 
Staff initially decided to no longer classify neighbours such as Iraq and Syria as 
security threats, 613 which was “to the surprise of many” as the Kurdish leaders of 
northern Iraq had supported the PKK in the past.614 However, at the same time when 
PKK terrorism intensified after 2004 the military resumed resorting to military means. 
As an interviewee has acknowledged, the Armed Forces was still an important actor 
especially regarding northern Iraq. 615  The Turkish Armed Forces orchestrated 
military operations in Northern Iraq to eliminate the PKK presence there in October 
2007. These military operations, however, were undertaken after close coordination 
with the civilian government, so that the EU framed these operations as Turkish 
government’s response to growing security concerns that emanate from Northern 
Iraq.616   
It could be argued that although the military dropped its ‘red lines’ 
regarding other aspects of foreign policy toward the Middle East, it retained its 
vigilance regarding the PKK terrorism. Yet, even regarding issues pertaining to the 
PKK terrorism, the Turkish Armed Forces remained committed to its revised 
coordinative discourse by communicating with the civilian government and seeking 
legitimacy of its operations in the eyes of the EU. The implementation of the strategic 
depth policy by the post-Islamist government towards the Middle East was made 
possible by the military’s endorsement of the EU’s role prescription in the form of 
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civilianisation of politics. This led to cooperation between the military and the 
government in terms of foreign policy towards the Middle East, despite exceptions of 
PKK-related red lines of the military.617 
The most striking element of this cooperation is the harmony achieved 
between the Kemalist coordinative discourse of the Armed Forces and the post-
Islamist discourse of the JDP governments.618  In Robins’ words, “[p]ost-Islamists [JDP] 
and Kemalists had come to face in the same direction as far as foreign policy priorities 
and the EU were concerned.”619 This cooperation between the JDP and the Turkish 
Armed Forces was largely an outcome of Turkey’s EU candidate role that enabled the 
Turkish Armed Forces to harmonise its discourse on Kemalism with the EU’s role 
prescriptions for Turkey. At the same time, endorsing Turkey’s EU candidacy role gave 
the JDP’s post-Islamist coordinative discourse meaning and legitimacy.  
The JDP leadership had learned that the party needed to divorce the 
policies traditionally pursued by Islamist parties in the past and seek legitimacy in the 
eyes of the secularist establishment, of which the Turkish Armed Forces was the 
decisive component.620 Therefore, unlike its predecessors, the JDP has adopted 
Turkey’s EU candidate role, which in turn gave it legitimacy and meaning as a post-
Islamist party.621  The strong identification with the EU candidate role of Turkey was 
used to legitimise the party discourse that emphasised transformation from an 
Islamist political tendency to post-Islamist conservative tendency. This reflects 
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strategic learning on the part of JDP leadership. The new party drew lessons from the 
past interactions of Islamist parties with the Turkish Kemalist establishment, which 
has always had a tendency towards suppression of political Islam. 622 Based on 
previous experience the JDP leadership revised their strategies to achieve their goals 
and as part of this revised strategy the JDP embraced the EU candidate role of Turkey 
and acted as a pro-EU actor since its inception. The JDP leadership adopted the EU’s 
role prescription of civilianisation also to curb powers of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
An important figure from the leadership of the JDP, Bulent Arinc, explained this 
learning process in an interview as follows: 
Up until 28 February [1997, explained in chapter four] I was an enemy of 
the EU. I used to consider it treason to talk about Turkey’s EU 
membership. But it [28 February process] turned out to be an eye-
opening process, almost like a litmus paper for us. I entered the 
Parliament in 1995. I personally experienced certain events. While some 
others were sleeping peacefully in their beds, I could not. We evaluated 
the developments in a close circle and came to a decision. My experiences 
during the 28 February process convinced me to advance towards the EU 
membership target. I believed in the necessity of moving towards that 
target.623 
Therefore, the JDP’s adoption of the EU candidate role legitimised the JDP 
vis-à-vis the Turkish Armed Forces, while leading to strategic adaptation on the part 
of the Armed Forces. This process gave the JDP enough space for manoeuvre 
regarding the implementation of its post-Islamist strategic depth policy towards the 
Middle East without interference by the Turkish Armed Forces. 
                                                             
622 The National Order Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1971 for violating the principles 
of laicism; WP was abolished in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court on the same grounds. Before its 
abolition by the Constitutional Court, the military dominated National Security Council gave the WP-led 
coalition government a list of measures they deemed necessary to fight the rise of political Islam in 
Turkey. The government could not enact these measures, and the tension led to the resignation of the 
government. The process is dubbed ‘the 28 February process,’ which was a military intervention to 
politics through the pressure exerted on the Islamist WP. Nilufer Narli shows how Virtue Party that was 
founded in 1997 also as a spinoff of the WP underwent strategic learning and adopted a new strategy of 
embracing the EU membership process, downplaying the Islamic dress code discourse on the headscarf 
issue and reframing it as a human rights issue, and finally recruiting well-educated female members to 
the party, which are all in contradiction to what the WP stood for. Nilufer Narli, ‘The Rise of the Islamist 
Movement in Turkey,’ Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3/3 (September 1999), pp.43-4.  
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5.3.2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The emergence of the JDP as a single party government with a strong 
emphasis on Turkey’s relationship with both the EU and the Middle East has had 
repercussions on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs too. The Ministry has been part of the 
Kemalist civil bureaucracy throughout the Republican history.624 During the 1990s, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered from the political instability caused by 
successive coalition governments and political wrangling over bureaucratic 
appointments.625 This in turn led to frustration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As 
one commentator put it aptly, diplomats were “packed up with nowhere to go” in the 
period due to such political wrangling and instability.626 When Turkey was declared 
an EU candidate in 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has found itself in a strategic 
opportunity to use its crucial role as the institution with the most intensive knowledge 
of the EU.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the only institution that had access to 
EU-related information during the early candidacy period.627  
The EU candidate role of Turkey and the accompanying demand for 
expertise empowered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a certain extent, yet the JDP 
government’s control over the Ministry and especially Prime Minister Erdogan’s 
attacks on its members have been notable. The JDP government’s election and their 
policies that followed caused rifts within the institution between the Kemalist 
diplomats and those that favour more diversity in Turkey’s foreign relations. 
Therefore the Kemalist faction was mostly in a struggle with the JDP leadership. This 
struggle was evident in Prime Minister Erdogan’s scolding of Turkey’s ambassador to 
Germany in 2006 for not allowing a Turkish woman to use a veiled photo in her 
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passport.628 Also the tension culminated in 2009 when Erdogan dismissively called the 
retired Turkish diplomats who had criticised him, snobbish.629 Under the JDP rule and 
Erdogan’s premiership, therefore the Kemalist diplomats were disempowered. 
Ahmet Davutoglu’s appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs further 
consolidated the strategic depth policy within the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Ahmet 
Davutoglu, who has held important foreign policy positions since the JDP formed its 
first government in 2002, first as the Prime Minister’s chief advisor on foreign policy 
(2002-2009) and then as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 was an influential 
foreign policy actor leading the Ministry. After he assumed office in 2009, Davutoglu 
first had to deal with the problem of awaiting high level appointments. The choice of 
Feridun Sinirlioglu, who is an expert on the Middle East as the undersecretary and the 
complementary appointment of five out of six deputy  undersecretaries whose 
previous posts were in the Middle East reveals the importance of the Middle East in 
Davutoglu’s and the government’s strategic vision.630 Also the high-level appointments 
he made pointed to a younger generation of diplomats assuming top posts in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.631 Even if his official position came quite late in the JDP 
governments, Davutoglu “has long been considered the power behind the throne, 
having advised prime ministers and foreign ministers for the past eight years [since 
2002]”.632 Therefore, even if Davutoglu had the formal authority to effect these 
changes only in 2009, it can be argued that his input was quite influential on the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the previous ministers of foreign affairs since 2002, 
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such as Yasar Yakis (November 2002- March 2003), Abdullah Gul (March 2003- 
August 2007), Ali Babacan (August 2007- May 2009).633 
Davutoglu’s strategic depth policy had been adopted by all the previous 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. More importantly, the policy has been adopted by the JDP 
leader and the Prime Minister Erdogan. No policy can be advocated and formulated by 
the party members in the cabinet without the approval of the party leader due to the 
much centralised political party structure in Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish 
constitution assigns the duty of overseeing the coherence of the governmental 
decisions to the Prime Minister, which in effect gives the Prime Minister significant 
control over the policy direction of the government.634 All in all, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs bureaucracy remained at the back seat of Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, under the shadow of, first the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
secondly that of the Prime Minister. 
 
5.3.3 The Parliament 
Traditionally, the Parliament has been categorised as a second-order 
actor in Turkish foreign policymaking.635 Its constitutional responsibility is to give its 
opinion on signing international treaties and to authorise the presence of foreign 
military personnel on Turkish soil as well as sending Turkish troops abroad.636 
Moreover, Turkish political parties are heavily centralised and dominated by the party 
leaders. Party leaders nominate candidates for parliamentary elections, which has 
consolidated the culture of impressing the party leader for re-election.637 Such a 
culture has bred a lack of attention to issues of common interest such as developing 
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the policy research and parliamentary diplomacy potential of the Parliament as such 
issues do not necessarily ‘impress’ the party leaders.  
Turkey’s EU candidacy has exposed the Parliament to contradictory 
tendencies.638 As Grabbe has argued, EU candidacy empowers national executives 
over legislatures.639 The need to rapidly transpose EU legislation and directives in the 
accession process brings about less political debate in the parliament and more 
involvement of the government in pushing the reforms.  In Grabbe’s words, the 
legislative task in the accession process “is  presented  by  the  EU  as  being  largely 
administrative  rather  than  political:  candidate  countries  are  not  expected  to 
debate  the  introduction  of  the  acquis  because  it  is  non-negotiable  and  
community  law  takes  priority  over national  law  for member  states.”640 The 
Parliament being rushed into legislation by the executive through the adoption of 
“some kind of fast-track procedure for getting EU legislation through parliament”641 
points to the ineffectiveness of parliamentary deliberation in most EU reform 
packages.  In the Turkish case, this was more or less the case. As a secondary actor in 
foreign policy, coupled with the dominant culture of impressing the party leader, the 
Parliament had already been quite insignificant and this rubber-stamping duty had 
made it less influential. Yet, the Turkish Parliament has demonstrated remarkable 
autonomy from both the government and the Turkish Armed Forces, when it voted 
against the motion to open Turkish soil to US military use in the 2003 Iraq war. The 
military showed self-restraint before and during the process of parliamentary voting 
on the issue, to the extent that the Turkish Armed Forces was criticised by the US 
Deputy Defence Secretary for not seeing the motion through and making sure it 
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passed.642 Thus, the Turkish Armed Forces’ agreement to civilianisation opened up the 
possibility for the Parliament to leave its stamp for once in foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. The Parliament’s deliberation over the motion for the Iraqi war 
demonstrated to many observers the maturity Turkish democracy reached.643  
Yet, the Turkish parliament did not use the process of civilianisation to its 
advantage and exert itself more into the foreign policy making process. As Melen has 
explained, the Parliament did not try to become active in parliamentary diplomacy 
and have a more continuous involvement in foreign policy. As Melen has pointed out: 
The Parliament should adopt a model like ‘National Endowment for 
Democracy’ or so. Ministry of foreign affairs is doing its job, the 
government likewise, that is a different issue. But there is also such a 
thing called parliamentary diplomacy. Whenever we go abroad, our 
counterparts expect to see elected politicians from our side. We still 
handle this through the ministry of foreign affairs…. The expertise lies 
with the ministry of foreign affairs, however I [the parliament] am the 
highest institution, I am the highest civic institution, and I should be doing 
this myself.644   
Therefore it can be safely argued the Parliament did not strategically use 
the EU’s democratisation role prescription to its advantage to have a more permanent 
and more effective involvement in foreign policy towards the Middle East. In other 
words, the Parliament did not use Turkey’s EU candidacy to become an agent of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This shows that actors do not 
functionally use resources whenever they are available, rather actors should first have 
the reasons to use the resources. The Turkish Parliamentarians did not have the goal 
to make the Parliament a central foreign policy actor. 
To sum up, the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation has been adopted 
as it is by the Turkish Armed Forces and the JDP. Their perception of the EU’s role 
prescription of civilianisation as non-negotiable, highly popular among the Turkish 
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public opinion, and their objectives enabled the institutionalisation of the EU’s role 
prescription of civilianisation. Their coordinative discourses were complementary 
with the EU candidate role of Turkey, which enabled the usage of the EU’s role 
prescription by these actors. The usage of the EU’s role prescription by and large 
enabled Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East by leaving the post-Islamist 
JDP in control of foreign policy towards the Middle East, unhindered by the Kemalist 
military and the largely Kemalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
A very important consequence of this change in the relations between the 
state actors in foreign policy-making is the increased SME presence in the agenda of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Business interests have become the 
strongest supporters of adopting EU’s economic and political role prescriptions for 
Turkey as a candidate country, especially after the 2000/1 crises. Moreover, the 
expectations of both domestic and external business actors of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role caused the coupling of political and economic reforms to each other. The 
continuing adoption of political role prescriptions of the EU was signalling the 
government’s commitment to the economic role prescriptions.645  
 
5.4 Institutionalisation of the EU’s Economic Role Prescription and 
Economic Relations with the Middle East 
 
The 2000/1 crises were the definitive moment for the institutionalisation 
of the EU’s economic role prescriptions in Turkey. The EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey as a candidate was initially more focussed upon political reform when Turkey 
was granted candidacy in 1999, leaving the economic reform side of it to the IMF until 
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the 2000/1 crises broke out.646 According to Onis and Bakir, however, this pattern 
changed after 2001. The institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU accession prospect 
persuaded the public that EU membership and its material benefits were also near, 
thereby raising an expectation and making the public less resistant to the neoliberal 
economic reforms that the IMF and the EU’s role prescription required.647 The 
convergence between the IMF programme and the EU economic rules was also 
observed and used strategically by Turkish policymakers. In response to the IMF 
programme, the Turkish government adopted a ‘Programme towards Strong 
Economy’, which explained the measures to be taken as ‘intended to overcome the 
crisis, and to help meet the economic criteria for EU membership.’ 648 Public support for 
Turkey’s EU membership was around 74% in the opinion polls conducted in 2002.649 
According to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, “Turkey’s 
procrastination in making much-needed economic and administrative reforms 
resulted in a severe financial crisis in early 2001” and the reforms implemented after 
the crisis were therefore needed for Turkey’s economic recovery.650 Strong public 
support for EU membership and the overlapping economic policy prescriptions of the 
EU and the IMF therefore enabled Turkish policymakers to implement economic and 
democratic reforms without much opposition from the public.651  
The EU’s candidate role prescription was also used by Turkish 
policymakers to rule out more radical measures such as extensive capital controls or 
direct negotiations with external creditors.652 The JDP government likewise used the 
EU candidate role prescriptions for Turkey as a source of legitimacy for the 
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continuation of the IMF programme after their election in 2002. Due to the JDP’s pro-
SME political stance, the continuation of the IMF programme was not expected. 
However, the JDP continued the programme. Therefore, the JDP’s SME-based growth 
strategy needs to be placed in its context first. 
The Kemalist elite have traditionally had a growth strategy that was based 
on development through big holding companies, which are also referred to as the 
Istanbul capital.653 These big business groups have been outward-looking holding 
companies, they have supported Turkey’s agreements with the IMF, the neo-liberal 
agenda that the IMF advocates such as privatisation, fiscal discipline and the retreat of 
the state from economy.654  The financial capital in Turkey is historically owned by 
these big holding companies. They are mostly represented by the TUSIAD, which is 
one of the most influential and politically active business associations, which 
represents the big business in Turkey. The TUSIAD actively lobbies for 
democratisation in Turkey and anchors itself to Turkey’s relationship with the EU. 
Even if some of its members trade with both the EU and the Middle East, it is known to 
be a more active and influential player regarding Turkey’s EU policy compared to its 
presence in Turkey’s Middle East policy. Rather, the development of Turkey’s 
economic ties with the neighbouring countries is seen as a positive development by 
the TUSIAD, as long as the government remains committed to EU membership 
objective.655 TUSIAD members are largely too risk-averse to conduct business with 
politically and economically unstable regions and the ones who are already doing 
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business with the Middle East and relatively stable Gulf region have had their own 
contacts and did not much need the government’s help to enter these markets.656 
The JDP is strongly associated with the SME interests, which have first 
emerged in the 1980s with the liberalisation of Turkish economy. The so-called 
‘Anatolian tigers’ are largely involved in the real sector. They are mostly represented 
by the MUSIAD and the semi-public TOBB.  Another association is the Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON). The TUSKON is an umbrella 
organisation for regional-based entrepreneurs’ associations, which was founded in 
2005.657 Whereas TUSKON is an important driver of Turkey’s economic activism 
towards Africa, TOBB and MUSIAD have been actively involved in trade and economic 
projects with the Middle Eastern countries.658 
The JDP election manifesto revealed the details of their SME-based growth 
strategy. The manifesto declared that the JDP was going to place emphasis on the 
solution of the problems that the SMEs face such as their financing problems. However, 
the JDP also committed itself to the continuation of the IMF programme that the 
previous government started implementing in 2002 with reference to the EU’s 
candidate role prescriptions. In the election manifesto the JDP committed itself to: 
Participating in strong regional integration projects such as the EU, 
thereby utilising the opportunities provided by globalisation for 
increasing the welfare of our people. Membership to the EU is our priority 
with respect to ensuring democratic and economic development.  On the 
other hand, economic and democratic standards, legal and institutional 
arrangements that are put forward by the EU will be implemented 
regardless of EU accession conditionality. 659 
Also important was the way the EU candidate position of Turkey was 
believed to improve foreign direct investment to Turkey. In their manifesto, the JDP 
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has cited continuation of Turkey’s EU candidacy as a measure of attracting foreign 
direct investment to Turkey.660 While the IMF was seen as a temporary actor who is 
responsible for the recovery process, EU candidacy and the EU’s role prescriptions for 
Turkey were perceived by international investors as a signal of Turkish economy’s 
viability.661 Indeed the reports published by financial actors such as Deutsche Bank, 
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch have all underlined the importance of the continuing 
institutionalisation of the EU’s political as well as economic role prescriptions.662 
Several Turkish interviewees have noted how Turkey’s candidate role contributed to 
the inflow of foreign direct investment to Turkey especially from Europe before the 
2008 crisis.663 The political and economic reforms towards compliance with role 
prescriptions of the EU have improved investor confidence in Turkey. Especially the 
start of accession negotiations in 2005 boosted expectations of investors from Turkey 
in terms of political and economic stability.664  
The JDP has committed itself to the improvement of the SMEs’ working 
conditions as well as the consolidation of neo-liberalism in Turkey by following the 
economic role prescriptions of the EU. In other words, the JDP managed to achieve an 
economic policy that satisfied different business interests by using Turkey’s EU 
candidate role. On the one hand privatisation was promised to be implemented fully, 
the retreat of the state from the economy was to be ensured, macroeconomic stability 
was promised through an anti-inflationary policy and fiscal discipline, banking sector 
was to be strictly regulated, which all satisfied the big business in Turkey.665 Some of 
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these measures such as macroeconomic stability and anti-inflationary policies were 
also satisfactory for the SMEs. For domestic business including the SMEs,  
the combination of political and economic reforms constituted the means 
for establishing a rule-based economy, thereby transcending the highly 
unstable and perverse patterns of development of the previous era where 
economic success largely depended on clientelistic political ties and easy 
access to state favours.666  
However, other measures such as the strict regulation of the banking 
sector were not fully supported by the SMEs since strict lending standards for banks 
were likely to squeeze further the already tight credit prospects of the SMEs.667  
At this point, improving political and economic relations with the Middle 
East as well as the EU’s pro-SME role prescriptions came as a relief for the SMEs. The 
other leg of the JDP’s economic policy manifesto was to “continue economic 
cooperation attempts with other regional integration projects and neighbours, with 
whom Turkey has historical, geographical and economic ties as complementing the 
integration with the EU.”668  
The business associations that represent the SMEs have been benefiting 
the most from Turkey’s close political relations with the Middle East. 669 During the 
1990s, due to the Turkish Armed Forces’ central role in the making of foreign policy 
towards the Middle East and the associated securitisation of the Middle East, Turkey’s 
economic ties with the Arab Middle East were not strong. The SMEs’ economic 
situation had also been deteriorating in the 1990s due to the 1994 financial crisis, two 
earthquakes in 1999 and also the 2000/1 crises.670 The SMEs were affected by price 
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instability, high real interest rates and fluctuations in foreign exchange rates 
especially due to their dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods.671  
The institutionalisation of the EU’s economic role prescriptions has 
differentially empowered the SMEs. The EU’s pro-SME role prescriptions were 
willingly adopted by the JDP since the SMEs make up the core domestic constituency 
of the JDP.672 The JDP favours an SME-based, export-oriented growth strategy.673 The 
JDP’s post-Islamist coordinative discourse also overlapped with the MUSIAD-
represented “devout bourgeoisie” that mostly consists of the SMEs.674 Likewise, the 
TOBB is another representative of the SME interests in Turkey, which maintains close 
ties with the JDP. While the government has utilised EU funds and frameworks 
designated to support SME development in Turkey,675 it also opted for shaping 
legislation in favour of the SMEs when there was a clash with the EU demands, 
somehow editing the EU’s economic role prescriptions.676 For example, the JDP 
amended the Public Procurement Law that had been prescribed by the EU in order to 
favour its domestic SME constituency.  
The TOBB is a prominent business association in Turkey. The TOBB has 
been an active organisation with regards to Turkey’s policies towards the Middle East.  
The TOBB has launched the “Industry for Peace Initiative” in 2005 in order to 
revitalise Erez Industrial Estate in Gaza.677  This project brought together the 
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Palestinian, Israeli and Turkish authorities and civil society organisations with an 
agenda to create jobs, contribute to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but also to 
enable Turkish exporters to enter the American market since Palestinian territories 
had duty-free access to the US market.678  As part of this initiative the TOBB has 
institutionalised a tripartite forum for dialogue among the TOBB, Israeli 
manufacturers’ association and the Palestinian federation of trade, industry and 
agricultural chambers. This demonstrates that especially since 2002 the TOBB has 
gradually become an active player in Turkey’s foreign economic relations with the 
Middle East within the broader foreign policy coordination of the JDP government. 
The MUSIAD is another significant business organisation that represents 
the SMEs.679 The MUSIAD is known for its Islamic-orientation.680 After the 1997 
military intervention the association came under scrutiny by the military over the 
implication that it was financing political Islam. The ideational tie between the 
MUSIAD and the JDP government is best expressed by one of the founders of the 
association in an interview, who said “MUSIAD follows the government’s rhetoric. It 
says neither ‘no’ nor ’yes’ to Europeanisation.”681 Although the MUSIAD used to have 
an anti-EU position during the 1990s, it has switched tracks since 1997. Their 
opposition was largely due to the ideological orientation of its members and their 
preferences for a more protectionist economic model. MUSIAD members mostly 
prefer to be known as devout Muslims and they used to see the EU as a Christian club. 
In addition, they were SMEs that preferred a more protectionist economic policy, 
rather than the customs union with the EU and the trade liberalisation associated with 
                                                             
678 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010. 
679 Justin Vela, ‘The Sun Rises on Turkey’s Mittelstand,’ Business New Europe, 9 March 2011, 
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681 Interview with a founder of MUSIAD, Istanbul, Turkey, 28 February 2007. Cited in Yankaya, ‘The 
Europeanization,’ p.5. 
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it.682 The change in their strategy happened after the 28 February 1997 military 
intervention against the Islamist WP, which was also strongly supported by the 
MUSIAD. With the military intervention, MUSIAD members were also delegitimised in 
the eyes of the Kemalist military and many of its members were economically hurt by 
the intervention. 683  Since 1999, the MUSIAD has been benefiting from the 
institutionalisation of civilianisation as Turkey’s EU candidate role through regaining 
its lost legitimacy as a non-governmental organisation, which went through a sharp 
decline with the 1997 military intervention.  
Turkey’s EU candidacy role prescription on economic liberalisation and 
SME support frameworks significantly transformed the Turkish economy especially 
after 2001. Coupled with the JDP’s SME-based growth strategy, SMEs have grown to 
the extent that by 2010, almost half of Turkey’s exports were done by the SMEs. A civil 
servant shared his experience while he was attending a meeting of the EU Reform 
Monitoring Group of Turkey in an Anatolian city as follows: 
We hold Reform Monitoring Group meetings regularly and one of them 
was held in Konya. There a citizen stood up and said ‘you were going to 
open an embassy in Niger, what happened? We need state support there.’ 
These are not big businessmen from TUSIAD; these are ex-artisans who 
have become traders. Those who reach out to new markets are usually 
such people, the man on the street. Turkey has got such a power thanks to 
the EU candidacy process.684 
Turkey’s SME interest groups are enabled by the civilianisation and 
macroeconomic stabilisation rules of EU candidacy in general. Coupled with the JDP’s 
close links with the SME interests, this turned into reaching the capacity to become 
significant economic actors in the Middle East. Yet, they needed the Turkish 
government to establish good neighbourly relationships with the Middle Eastern 
countries. This was particularly an issue for the SMEs represented by MUSIAD and 
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TOBB, which are relatively more risk-taking and adaptive for entering new markets 
than the big business. This need had to be translated into government action since the 
Middle Eastern economies are not market economies, where Turkish SMEs cannot 
enter on their own merits. As a senior analyst from the TOBB has put it,  
Middle Eastern economies are not market economies; therefore we need 
to have good relationships with their governments. You need to have good 
relationships so that you can access their markets and sign the necessary 
deals with them for your businessmen to enter those markets... This 
translates into the necessity to be involved in constructive engagement 
with these countries, including Iran.685  
This led to a process whereby intergovernmental contacts and relations 
were established first and Turkish businesses entered these markets following initial 
political contacts and agreements. The Turkish government members’ official trips to 
these regions are usually accompanied by select groups of business people686 and 
business diplomats.687 A former MUSIAD chair person has pointed out that the 
MUSIAD has found it further encouraging to enter the Middle Eastern markets after 
the Turkish government’s agreements and initiatives with the governments of the 
region.688 Even the TOBB’s well-acclaimed ‘Industry for Peace Initiative’ in Palestine 
was encouraged by the Turkish government. As a senior TOBB analyst reveals, the 
then minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gul asked TOBB to come up with a concrete 
and sustainable project in Palestine, of which Turkey can speak proudly.689 After its 
initiation, the project was solely designed by TOBB and welcomed by the US and 
European countries that were active in the region.690 
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This chain of events does not mean that the Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East has been designed in response to the demands by the SMEs 
from the JDP. On the contrary, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade already had a 
strategy to improve economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries as early as 
2000. Therefore, while the improvement in the SMEs’ export potential and the JDP’s 
pro-SME policies fed the virtuous cycle that boosted Turkish exports to the Middle 
East, the JDP was not the initiator of this policy. It was the coalition government and 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, who had already had the idea of 
improving Turkey’s political and economic ties with its surrounding regions. The JDP’s 
foreign policy ideas overlapped with the already designed policy and fed into the 
implementation of it. 
The enabling impact of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role on the improvement of Turkish SMEs’ export potential is indirect yet significant. 
As the previous analysis has shown, without Turkey’s EU candidate role, the rules 
associated with it, Turkey’s IMF-led post-crisis recovery programme could have failed 
or could have taken a different direction. Also whatever the policy ideas that the 
politicians might have, they cannot be implemented without the material capacity that 
turns resources into capabilities, which is what EU candidacy has offered Turkey.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the impact of the institutionalisation of 
Turkey’s EU candidate role on Turkey’s foreign policy actors and their ideas regarding 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. This exploration has been 
undertaken not from the usual rational choice or sociological institutionalist approach 
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but from a strategic-relational approach that is sensitive towards usages of Europe 
and the ideas of Turkish actors. 
Already in 2000, the coalition government had put in place a framework 
to improve trade relations with neighbouring regions. Also the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government had been eager to establish 
close political ties between Turkey and the Middle East. Also the capture of the PKK 
leader in 1999 offered a window of opportunity to implement such policy ideas. Yet, 
the 2000/1 crises interrupted these flourishing policy ideas and frameworks thereby 
impeding their implementation. Another potential obstacle in the way of 
implementing this foreign policy framework was the uncertainty caused by the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ central role in Turkish politics. As a potential veto power, due 
to the overarching position it had acquired over the 1990s, the Turkish Armed Forces’ 
anchoring to civilianisation was crucial. 
In the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role, the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ behaviour played an important part. Had the skilled actors at the helm 
of the Turkish Armed Forces not used Turkey’s EU candidacy as a strategy to anchor 
Turkey to the west, the institutionalisation of the EU’s civilianisation prescription 
would not have been possible. The strategic usage was possible due to the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ Kemalist coordinative discourse, which offers contradictory priorities. 
Kemalism comprises of westernisation, reformism and catching contemporary 
civilisations as its principles along with an oppressive interpretation of nationalism, 
secularism and republicanism. Only by the work of skilled actors who could anchor 
the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation to the westernisation and reformism 
principles of Kemalism, was the Turkish Armed Forces’ adaptation to the EU’s role 
prescription possible.   
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  Secondarily, the JDP government used the EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey in order to gain legitimacy for its post-Islamist coordinative discourse. Both 
actors, the Turkish Armed Forces and the JDP, have displayed significant elements of 
strategic learning from their past. The Turkish Armed Forces has learned that 
hardliner policies can cause more trouble than they resolve and the JDP has learned 
that articulating their coordinative discourse with westernisation would bring them 
political legitimacy and survival. Consequently the Turkish Armed Forces has 
cooperated with the government in foreign policy towards the Middle East, while the 
government could have a free hand in the implementation of its post-Islamist strategic 
depth policy towards the Middle East.  
Moreover, cases of non-usage of Europe also merit attention.691 The 
Parliament for example did not use Turkey’s EU candidacy role to achieve a more 
central place in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. This was mostly due 
to the institutional culture that rewards actions of parliamentarians that are directed 
towards the hub of political power in Turkish political party system, which is the party 
leader. Coupled with the lack of skilled individual agency, who could have mobilized 
the parliamentarians around a different institutional goal, this led to the non-usage of 
Turkey’s EU candidacy role prescriptions by the Parliament.  
The EU’s economic role prescriptions were only used after the 2000/1 
crises. After the crises, the overlapping prescriptions of the EU candidate role and the 
IMF enabled Turkish political actors’ usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role as a 
justification for the economic reforms. The severe economic crisis and Turkish public 
opinion’s pro-EU attitude enabled the implementation of neo-liberal policies without 
much resistance. At the same time, the EU candidate role of Turkey constrained 
alternative post-crisis solutions and locked the reform process in a neo-liberal 
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direction. Turkey’s EU candidate role was also perceived by Turkish political actors as 
a means to attract the much-needed flow of foreign direct investment to Turkey. All 
these contributed significantly to Turkey’s recovery from the 2000/1 crises within a 
broadly neo-liberal framework. 
 Moreover, The JDP has filtered and edited the EU’s economic role 
prescriptions for Turkey in favour of the SMEs to develop and reach a capacity to 
boost trade with the Middle East.  As it has been explained earlier, it is the SMEs that 
are ready to undertake the risk of doing business in the highly volatile Middle East, 
rather than big holding companies. Therefore, the increase in the capacity of the SMEs 
was also necessary to implement Turkey’s foreign economic policy towards the 
Middle East. To complete the circle, due to the mainly authoritarian regimes of the 
Middle East, governmental relations were needed to establish political contacts with 
the state elite in the region and sign political and trade agreements to boost trade. 
All in all, it could be argued that there was an “ambiguous agreement” 
among various Turkish foreign policy actors on the usage of the EU’s political and 
economic role prescriptions for Turkey.692 The meaning of these role prescriptions 
varied for each actor depending on their perceptions of the context, reasons for action 
and discourses, therefore Turkey’ EU candidate role was institutionalised through this 
consensus. However, the overarching westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign 
policy significantly underlay this consensus. The foreign policy elite from the Turkish 
Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared the westernisation paradigm, 
which filtered their perception of the EU candidate role of Turkey and was also used 
strategically by the JDP. The new constellation of foreign policy actors enabled the 
implementation of the government’s strategic depth policy towards the Middle East 
coupled with other causes. As explained earlier, there is never ‘the cause’ but always a 
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causal complex. Therefore, in tracing the causal importance of Turkey’s EU candidacy, 
this chapter also touched upon other components in the causal complex behind 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. These other components include the 
capture of the PKK leader and the JDP’s support for the SMEs. Yet, it has been shown 
that the usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role prescriptions, and the consequent form in 
which Turkey’s EU candidate role was institutionalised in Turkish politics, 
significantly enabled the implementation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East in the 2000s. 
Yet, domestic consensus was not enough and the Turkish government 
devised specific foreign policy roles to be played in the Middle East to achieve 
Turkey’s political and economic re-entry to the Middle East as a regional actor. The 
next chapter discusses these foreign policy roles played by Turkey in the Middle East, 
which enabled the implementation of Turkey’s strategic depth policy in the Middle 
East. 
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CHAPTER SIX: TURKEY AS AN EU CANDIDATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Republican Turkey is the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated a large 
part of the Middle East for varying periods until its dismemberment at the end of 
World War I. Partly due to this, Turkey has traditionally been perceived negatively by 
the dominant Arab nationalist perspective during the Republican history.693 The 
Ottoman Empire had been narrated by the dominant Arab nationalist discourse as the 
former colonial power, which is responsible for the underdevelopment of the 
region.694 Another reason for the Arab Middle East’s dislike had been Turkey’s 
secularism and the abolition of the Caliphate by Republican Turkey. Secondly, on top 
of this broadly negative discourse on Turkey, sour relations between Turkey and its 
neighbours, especially the water disputes with Syria, and Turkey’s close ties with the 
US and Israel had turned the Arab world against Turkey and led to the omission of 
Turkey from discussions on the emerging regional order in the 1990s.695  
This picture was reversed in the 2000s. The rapprochement between 
Turkey and its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours was remarkable. A western diplomat 
acknowledged Turkey’s new role in the region by pointing out that in the past to 
understand the Middle East, one could have ignored Turkey but now it is an actor in 
the region in its own right, it is powerful on military, economic and ideational 
terms.696 Such levels of presence in the Middle East would not have been possible had 
Turkey not been in the possession of necessary resources that are meaningful in the 
Middle Eastern regional context, especially ideational, to change its negative image in 
the eyes of the Arab Middle East. Turkey’s image was improved both in the eyes of the 
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governing697, and reformist elite698, in large part due to its EU candidacy. This has 
turned out to be the largest foreign policy resource for Turkey to play a significant 
role in the Arab Middle East. The chapter first reviews the roles Turkey has played in 
the Middle East and how Turkish policymakers used Turkey’s EU candidate role in 
their foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East, thereby giving meaning to 
Turkey’s role in the Middle Eastern context as an EU candidate. After this review, an 
analysis will be offered of the selectivities of the Middle Eastern regional context in 
terms of Turkey’s role as an EU candidate in the Middle East. 
 
6.1 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Discourse in the Middle East 
 
The aim of this section is to explain how Turkey’s EU candidate role was 
incorporated into Turkey’s foreign policy discourse towards the Arab Middle East.699 
In the following, Turkey’s various role conceptions in the Middle East as explained to a 
Middle Eastern audience will be outlined first. Secondly, the usage of Turkey’s EU 
candidate role in this foreign policy discourse will be discussed. Finally the section 
will conclude by explaining how Turkey’s EU candidate role was used by Turkish 
policy makers in their foreign policy discourse that is communicated to the Middle 
Eastern actors.  
                                                             
697 Interview with Leyla Tavsanoglu, journalist, Istanbul, Turkey, 28 June 2010. 
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policy discourse of Turkish actors rather than a set of ideas or proposals that are hypothesised on the 
basis of EU’s foreign policy goals and the discourse Turkish actors adopted. I could have opted for 
associating references to democracy, human rights, rule of law outside an explicit context of EU 
candidacy, which are plenty, as indicators of Europeanisation of Turkey’s foreign policy discourse. 
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for investigating Turkey’s foreign policy discourse for EU candidacy-centrism embedded within it, with 
the exception of cases where the foreign policy actors in question have referred to these values as 
European values, which would only reveal their eurocentrism rather than mine.  
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National role conceptualisations, as coined by Holsti, are important 
analytical bridges between foreign policy actors’ objectives and their perceptions of 
opportunities and constraints of the historical and spatial context. Turkish 
policymakers have increasingly portrayed Turkey as a regional collaborator, reformer, 
example, bridge and EU candidate in the 2000s through their foreign policy discourse. 
This stands in sharp contrast to the militaristic, hardliner policies adopted by Turkey 
in the Middle East in the 1990s.  Each one of these roles is explained and illustrated 
below before showing how the EU candidate role was incorporated to Turkish foreign 
policy discourse towards the Middle East.   
 
6.1.1 Turkey as a Regional Collaborator 
This is one of the roles that appeared in Holsti’s original article. According to Holsti’s 
conceptualisation, this role indicates “far-reaching commitments to cooperative 
efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting 
subsystems.”700 Turkey’s presence in the region is to some extent justified with 
reference to this role. First of all, Turkish ministers of foreign affairs have repeatedly 
referred to Turkey’s common history with the Middle East as a means to place Turkey 
within the Middle Eastern regional system. For example, Abdullah Gul has made a 
reference to Turkey’s Ottoman legacy in the region in 2003 as follows:  “the peoples of 
this region have lived together in peace and harmony also during the Ottoman 
centuries. Therefore, we are a direct witness to the fact that the peoples of this region 
can live and prosper in peace.”701 After a decade of troublesome relations with some of 
the Middle Eastern countries and several decades of aloofness towards the region 
(explained in chapter four), Turkish policymakers have justified the country’s place in 
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the Middle Eastern regional system mainly by reference to the Ottoman past and by 
arguing that there is more interdependence in the region now than in the past. The 
Ottoman past as a reference is very clear in Abdullah Gul’s statement in 2007: 
The relationship between the Turks and the Arabs; Turkey and the Arab 
world has a long history. Our peoples are friends and siblings. We share 
our geography. We share the same religion. We are affected by the same 
problems, we face the same opportunities. There has been a unity of fate 
among us since centuries. Improving our relations with the Arab world in 
every respect, contributing to stability, security and prosperity in the 
Middle East are among the priorities of our foreign policy.702 
Likewise, a former minister of foreign affairs Ali Babacan has stated that 
Turkey is historically tied to the region and moreover obligated to “do what is 
necessary” to help alleviate the Middle Eastern problems.703 Another justification used 
for Turkey’s regional role is the growing interdependence in the region. Ahmet 
Davutoglu has ably voiced such an argument in 2007, when he said: “Developments in 
the Middle East are of great interest to Turkey. Not only our historical, cultural and 
social affinity with the region, also the direct and indirect effects of these 
developments on Turkey force us to focus on the regional issues.”704 The discourse 
that is used to justify Turkey’s role as a regional collaborator has therefore had two 
pillars: that of a common history and a common future due to increasing 
interdependence in the Middle East. 
Regional interdependence has also been linked to calls for and 
justification of Turkey’s attempts at boosting regionalism in the Middle East. The 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul has argued in 2007 that:  
[t]he Middle East is experiencing one of the most critical turning points in 
its history. The problems in the region have become complex and inter-
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related. It is impossible to address and solve these problems 
independently from each other… We believe it will be beneficial to have a 
regional arrangement in the Middle East that would include all countries 
in the region.705 
The same argument has been made by the current minister of foreign 
affairs Ahmet Davutoglu in 2009. He has stated that “it is not realistic to handle a 
single event, a single country separately from the broader regional dynamics. Events 
that take place in the region are extremely dynamic; they involve all the major players 
of international relations and are inter-related.”706 Therefore, successive Turkish 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs have advocated regionalism in the Middle East as a 
solution to the region’s interrelated problems and claimed authority with reference to 
Turkey’s Ottoman past in the region. The components of the regionalism that has been 
advocated are also important in terms of what type of a regional collaboration Turkey 
has advanced in the Middle East. 
The main building blocks of regionalism evident in the discourses of 
Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs are economic interdependence and cooperation 
following the European model of integration. Abdullah Gul has explained this in 2004 
as follows:  
We should prepare ourselves to take further step of building overall 
confidence in our wider region. Like Europe did after two world wars, we 
should draw our lesson from the successive conflicts and wars that 
constantly undermined our stability and well-being. With political resolve 
and inspiration, we can create our own multilateral framework for 
cooperation and security.707 
Also as Ahmet Davutoglu has argued in 2009, one aspect of Turkey’s 
foreign policy vision towards the Middle East has been to construct “economic 
interdependence among the countries of the region, which would benefit every 
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country and their people.”708 The underlying logic is that if economic interdependence 
can be used to foster increased economic and political liberalisation in the region, this 
would contribute to security and stability in the region and render it better equipped 
to face global competition. As Abdullah Gul has stated in 2003,  
[r]egional cooperation would improve the functioning of free market 
economies. The joint investments and initiatives would be strengthened. 
Obstacles to communication and transportation would be removed. Trade 
and production would be easier for firms of all sizes. If we achieve these 
the region as a whole will become globally competitive. This process 
cannot function without the necessary security and political inputs. 
Therefore we should establish codes of conduct, confidence building 
measures and develop conflict resolution methods.709 
According to Ahmet Davutoglu, such an economic cooperation in the Middle East 
would also help to bring political understanding, trust and stability to the region.710  
Turkey’s past experience in the organisations of economic and political 
cooperation is also used to convince the Middle Eastern elite of Turkey’s potential 
contribution to facilitate regional cooperation. A very good illustration of this can be 
seen in Abdullah Gul’s speech in 2003: 
Turkey is the only country that is both a member of the OIC [Organisation 
of Islamic Conference] and an accession candidate to the EU. Turkey’s 
experiences in arrangements like the OSCE [Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe], the Southern European Cooperation Process and 
the Stability Pact as well as in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organisation are equally valuable…. In the light of our experiences, we 
believe that it is the right time to establish the dynamics of multilateral 
regional cooperation in the Middle East. Our background in regional 
collaboration provides us with an opportunity to contribute to 
transforming the Middle East into a new area of cooperation.711  
All in all, Turkey is presented as a country that is tied to the Middle East 
with a common history and geography, which facilitates regional cooperation in the 
Middle East. The building block of such regional cooperation is economic 
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interdependence in the region. However, according to the Turkish Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, for economic cooperation and free market economy to succeed in the 
Middle East there was need for reforming domestic politics and most importantly 
reforming the interpretations of Islam. Parallel to this logic, another role conceived by 
the Turkish foreign policy elite for Turkey has been the role of a reform promoter in 
the region. 
 
6.1.2 Turkey as a Promoter of Reform 
Building on the role as a regional collaborator, Turkey has actively presented itself as 
a force for reform and innovation in the region. First of all, Abdullah Gul has placed 
special emphasis on the compatibility of “the contemporary level of civilisation” with 
Islam.  In a speech given in 2005, Gul has stated: 
We no longer regard the calls for reform as an ill-intentioned outside 
interference, aiming at derailing our stability and security, nor do we 
approach them with scare or hesitation. Instead, we consider them a 
domestic necessity and a way out strategy to be able to cure these 
illnesses. It gratifies me to see that over the last two years, we have 
altogether left the first phase—the necessity for reform—behind with our 
common determination. However, what we need now is to decisively step 
into the second phase of focusing on how to successfully steer this 
common desire in a direction which embraces the fundamental 
requirements of the current level of civilisation without drifting away 
from our own deep-rooted Islamic assets. This obliges us to launch 
comprehensive policy engineering in merging the values of Islam with 
today’s realities of the world.712 
An important aspect of this role is that Turkey is presented as an Islamic 
country, which has managed to achieve the synchronisation between Islam and the 
‘contemporary civilisation.’ What Abdullah Gul has meant by the requirements of the 
contemporary level of civilisation is as follows: 
For our societies, the 21st century will witness efforts to materialise values 
such as respect for cultural and religious diversity, institutionalisation of 
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democracy, and the protection of human rights including children’s and 
women’s rights and transparent and accountable government on the basis 
of rule of law. I strongly believe that these values are not only common 
values of the European Union, but they are also compatible in essence 
with the Islamic countries’ common culture and traditions.713 
The former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer has also advocated reform in 
the region in 2003 in the same manner as Gul:  
Can our organisation [OIC] play the role it is supposed to play fully? Do 
the decisions and suggestions we make and the reactions we give yield the 
results that we aimed for? It is a fact that we are having difficulty to 
respond to all of these questions affirmatively. Hence it is a common 
conviction that our organisation cannot increase its visibility and project 
its power sufficiently. Under these circumstances, what we have to do as 
member countries and as the organisation is to take a look at ourselves 
and to do our homework.  We believe it is necessary to find ways to catch 
up with the times, or even to shape it, without giving up our own values. 
We think this can be achieved through a serious renovation and reform 
process. Although at various scales, tides of reform are sweeping every 
country and regional international organisation today… We are facing a 
fundamental choice. Either we will not do our homework and settle for 
our current status, or we will question ourselves, take brave decisions and 
increase the standing of the Islamic world. We believe that our spiritual 
values also give us the responsibility to take brave decisions. 714  
 
According to Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the goal of the Islamic world should be 
to catch up with modernity, contemporary civilisation, which have always meant 
‘western’ in the Turkish context. Yet, Turkish foreign policy actors in the 2000s have 
tried to emphasise that these are in fact universal values and that they can also be 
found in the core principles of Islam. Both Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s and Abdullah Gul’s 
speeches demonstrate that Turkey is a promoter of reform in the region. While 
promoting reform to catch up with the contemporary level of civilisation, i.e. 
democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance, they do this by 
arguing that these values are intrinsically shared by Islam. Gul’s speech in 2004 
illustrates this point well:  
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The universal principles and values that aim for the well-being of 
humanity are obvious and these are also essential to Islamic faith. 
Therefore, the universal values that have been nurtured by the collective 
mind and conscience of humanity through the interaction of different 
civilisations throughout the history are capable of showing the way to 
Muslim societies. There is a rich and precious essence shared by Muslim 
societies. This essence is fully compatible with the universal values.715  
Therefore, Turkish foreign policy discourse has focussed on the necessity 
of reform in the Muslim Middle East and that it is only possible through the 
recognition that the values of Islam are in essence compatible with the values of the 
contemporary level of civilisation (read western values). Furthermore, Turkey has 
been offered as an example of such a harmony between Islam and democracy. The 
following section will demonstrate how Turkey has been offered as an example for the 
Muslim countries in the Middle East by the Turkish foreign policy actors. 
 
6.1.3 Turkey as an Example 
Holsti has defined the role of an example as countries emphasising “the importance of 
promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing 
certain domestic policies.”716 Turkey is portrayed in the foreign policy discourse as an 
inspiration for other Muslim-majority countries.  In Abdullah Gul’s words: 
The Turkish experience might serve as a source of inspiration for some 
other countries. This experience is about an effort to achieve democracy, 
civil rights and liberties, respect for the rule of law, civil society, 
transparency and gender equality. Our experience proves that national 
and spiritual values can be in perfect harmony with the contemporary 
standards of life.717  
The JDP government’s Islamic credentials have been especially effective in 
the conceptualisation of this role. Abdullah Gul also underlined this in a speech as 
follows: 
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I would like to take this opportunity to brief you on our own experience; 
our experience as a government, less than one year old. To many people, it 
seemed like a paradox: A government that was formed by a party known 
to be based on moral and traditional values was implementing a most 
spectacular economic and political reform campaign in Turkey; reforms 
that astonished even the liberals at home. There was nothing to be 
surprised about. We [the JDP government] acted on the premise that 
highest contemporary standards of democracy—fundamental freedoms, 
gender equality, free markets, civil society, transparency, good 
governance, rule of law and rational use of resources were universal 
expectations.718  
 
Therefore, in parallel with the role of a reform promoter in the region, the 
JDP government has also used its own experience as ‘a party based on moral and 
traditional values’ that has undertaken liberal reforms at home to highlight the 
possibility of marrying Islamic values with the ‘universal values of humanity’. 
However, this was not the only component of Turkey’s role as an example in the 
region. Turkey’s experiences in institution building and democratisation have also 
been used as arguments for Turkey’s role as an example in the region. For instance Gul 
has declared that Turkey was ready to share its experience in democratic reform and 
institution building with Palestine; as well as its experience in democracy and the rule 
of law with Iraq.719  
To a lesser extent, the same argument that Turkey is an example for the 
Muslim-majority countries and the Middle East can be found in the former President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s speech in 2006: 
The improvement of basic rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the 
construction of an accountable and transparent administrative structure 
are foremost in the wishes of our nations. This is also a requirement for 
staying on the positive side of globalisation…. The most important factor 
in the success of this process is the endorsement of the transformation by 
societies. International society’s support within the framework of good 
will and a sense of partnership and its adoption of an approach 
responding to each country’s special circumstances are important in this 
                                                             
718 Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the OIC Business Forum that was held during the OIC 10th Summit, 15 
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719 Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Palestinian Legislative Council,  5 January 2005, Gaza, Palestine. Also 
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respect. Turkey has been supporting the efforts at transformation in the 
region with such an understanding and has been sharing its authentic 
experience with all the willing countries.720 
 
6.1.4 Turkey as a Bridge 
This is another category that Holsti has outlined in his original study. According to 
Holsti, the themes involved in this role “usually imply a communication function, 
which is, acting as a ‘translator’ or conveyor of messages and information between 
peoples of different culture.”721 Turkish foreign policy discourse has consisted of 
references to Turkey’s role as a bridge both ideationally and geographically between 
the Middle East and other regions.  
As early as 2002, at the EU-OIC joint forum, the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ismail Cem has argued against identity building processes based on the 
conflictual relationship between the self and the other: 
In both ancient and modern times, history teaches us that the way we 
address the issue of 'the other' determines the dynamics of stability and 
peace. We have witnessed that trends to ignore or to snub the other, to 
dominate politically, economically or culturally the other, can only result 
in confrontation and hostility. We have witnessed as well that harmony, 
knowledge and welfare are nurtured when different nations communicate 
with each other, when they feel respect for other's culture. Political 
understanding and dialogue provide the platform which generates this 
web of relationships.722  
In line with this role, Turkey has been active in institutional dialogue 
between “different cultures and religions.”723 Abdullah Gul has explained the role of 
Turkey in the Alliance of Civilizations initiative later adopted by the UN as follows: 
The universal tenets of the human civilisation, to which every society has 
contributed in time individually or collectively is not paid enough 
attention. The cultural and religious differences which must be seen 
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within the understanding of the ‘unity in diversity’ are rather perceived as 
threats. The most functional and trustworthy means to get rid of this 
impasse and enable common sense to prevail is to immediately establish 
channels of a genuine dialogue between different cultures and religions, 
and to support this process with practical measures. In an attempt to 
foster such dialogue, Turkey has given strong support to the idea of 
‘Alliance of Civilizations’.724 
Alongside the role as an ideational bridge between different religions and 
civilisations, Ahmet Davutoglu has also highlighted Turkey’s role as a geographical 
bridge when he emphasised that Turkey has attached special importance to the 
regional transportation networks that would link the Arab countries to Europe, 
Central Asia and Caucasus.725 The same emphasis on Turkey’s geography was placed 
by the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2000 with reference to Turkey’s 
relations with Jordan. Sezer has stated with reference to Turkey’s relations with 
Jordan in 2000 that “Turkey is on Jordan’s way to European countries, whereas Jordan 
is on the way of Turkey to the Middle East.”726 Another role that is very important in 
Turkish foreign policy discourse is the role of a mediator, which is explained next. 
 
6.1.5 Turkey as a Mediator 
Holsti has defined this role as a state that is “capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or 
undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of 
states.”727 In the case of Turkey, the mediation role is more of a facilitator of 
communication between the conflicting parties rather than attempting to convince 
parties to a certain agreement.728  
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For example, Abdullah Gul has spelled out this role for Turkey in terms of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict in 2005 as follows: “Turkey’s participation in the TIPH 
[Temporary International Presence in Hebron] that aims to reduce the tension 
between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the city of Hebron falls in line with the 
‘good offices, facilitator and mediator’ roles that Turkey has been playing in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.”729 In the same speech Abdullah Gul has also argued 
that Turkey is well-placed for such a role due to its favourable relationship with both 
parties: 
Turkey sees both sides’ return to the negotiation table as the only solution 
in order to reach a comprehensive agreement that would enable Israel and Palestine 
to co-exist within mutually defined borders. In this respect, I would like to underline 
that Turkey is ready to do whatever it can and to make significant contribution to both 
parties’ peace efforts. As a country that is trusted by both parties and wants to help 
building peace in the Middle East, it would be an honour for us to make any possible 
contribution.730 Likewise, Ahmet Davutoglu has pointed out Turkey’s mediator role in 
the indirect talks between Syria and Israel as an example of Turkey’s strategy to adopt 
missions to provide stability, order and welfare in the region.731    
As can be observed in the previous statements, in all these roles Turkish 
foreign policy actors have used Turkey’s EU candidacy as a discursive resource and 
justification to a certain extent, either directly or indirectly. However, the most 
evident linkages are with the role as an example and the role as a bridge. The next 
section explains how Turkey’s EU candidacy was used by Turkish Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs while addressing the Arab Middle Eastern and/or broader Islamic audiences. 
As the interviews have suggested Turkey’s EU candidate role was perceived by 
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Turkish foreign policy actors as leverage and discursively used as such in Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, the following analysis will show how this was 
achieved.  
Interestingly a public opinion survey conducted across seven Arab 
countries in 2010 also confirms this perception of Turkish policymakers. 67% of the 
Jordanian; 72% of the Lebanese; 71% of the Palestinian; 70% of the Syrian and 59% of 
the Iraqi respondents have said that Turkey’s EU candidate role has had a very 
positive impact on its perception by the Arab Middle East.732  
 
6.2 An EU candidate in the Middle East 
 
The first role through which Turkey’s EU candidate role was explicitly 
used in Turkish foreign policy actors’ foreign policy discourse was Turkey’s bridge 
role. Successive ministers of foreign affairs have highlighted Turkey’s dual identity as 
both European and Asian and Middle Eastern. Ismail Cem for example has argued in 
his address to the EU-OIC meeting that Turkey was carrying a special responsibility 
due to being connected to both the EU and the OIC.733 Ismail Cem has stated that 
Turkey was “both European and Asian”.734 Turkey’s role as a bridge between the EU 
and Asia has been a recurrent argument with various foci over time, i.e. bridging the 
EU with Asia in general, bridging the EU with the Middle East, and bridging the EU 
with Islam.  
Abdullah Gul for example has argued in 2004 that Turkey’s membership 
of the EU would demonstrate the compatibility between the EU/Europe and Islam: 
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Our relationship with the west should not develop on the basis of 
opposition. Turkey’s Islamic identity has never been an obstacle in the 
way of Turkey’s close relations with the west and its participation in 
western institutions and organisations as an active member. We should 
develop our integration with the west on the basis of mutual benefits. The 
completion of Turkey’s EU accession process would be a proof that a 
Muslim society can be compatible with the European societies, united on 
the basis of common, universal and democratic values.735  
Similarly in 2005 Abdullah Gul has underlined that Turkey’s EU accession 
would also be beneficial for the Islamic world: 
As you know Turkey has gained a new status before the EU on 3 October. I 
am glad that this development is received well in the Islamic world. 
Indeed, Turkey’s new position in Europe will be positive for the Islamic 
world’s relationship with Europe too. Therefore, while Turkey is on 
course for further integration with the EU, Turkey’s relationship with 
other regions with which Turkey has historical, geographical, 
humanitarian and religious ties, will strengthen. It is pleasing to know 
there is international consensus that a Europe that includes Turkey will 
contribute to peace, harmony, stability and welfare in our region and in 
the world.736  
Secondly, Turkey has used both its experience as an EU candidate and the 
EU itself as examples for the reform and regional collaboration prospects in the region. 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s speech in 2001 is very illustrative of such a usage of the EU as 
an example of regional integration for the Middle East: 
It is inevitable that the steps taken in the EU towards economic 
integration and expansion will have impacts on the countries that make 
up the OIC. The EU will become a more important economic actor on a 
global scale in ten years, when it completes its enlargement process. In 
this context, I believe it is beneficial for the OIC countries to observe the 
EU experience closely and create the favourable conditions for their 
industries and economies in order to increase their share in international 
trade. Because, international practice has shown that regional integration 
processes have increased success and competitiveness of firms and 
sectors.737 
Therefore, the EU is demonstrated by Sezer as an example of best practice 
in regional integration to be monitored closely and mimicked by the OIC countries 
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including those in the Middle East. In conjunction with this, by being a candidate of the 
EU, Turkey is also presented as an example of best practice in reform and catching up 
with the EU standards. Abdullah Gul’s speech is illustrative in this respect. 
In the west and the east, there has been increasing interest in Turkey’s 
experience of harmonising contemporary values with a traditional 
identity. Indeed, in my country human rights, equality between men and 
women and accountability have risen to high standards lately. It has been 
welcomed by everyone that the universal standards that include European 
political criteria have been adopted.738 
An even more conspicuous example can be found in a speech in 2003, 
where Abdullah Gul has said: 
We decreased the number of ministries from 35 to 23, thus making the 
administration more streamlined and efficient. This was followed by a 
Public Administration Reform project aimed at the decentralization of 
most public services. This would give the Central Government more time 
and space to tackle the global issues while at the same time speeding up 
the delivery of the services. The Penal Code, the Civil Code and the Press 
Law are all being further modernized. In the last eight months, the 
Turkish Parliament adopted three major political reform packages. These 
were related to the process initiated by the previous governments to 
upgrade the Turkish legislation on fundamental rights and freedoms in 
conformity with Europe.739 
This speech demonstrates how Turkish policymakers portray the EU and 
Turkey’s EU candidate role as a source of modernisation for Turkey’s public 
administration and good governance. Also, it reveals how Europe and the EU are used 
interchangeably by the Turkish authorities. The representation of the EU as ‘Europe’ 
and administrative modernisation as ‘conformity with Europe’ demonstrates that 
modernisation and Europeanisation are perceived as synonymous by Turkish foreign 
policymakers, as was the case in the reforms of the late Ottoman Empire (see chapter 
four). This is a demonstration that westernisation remains to be the predominant 
paradigm in Turkish politics, either in the form of Kemalist westernisation that had 
dominated Turkish politics throughout the Republican era or in the form of post-
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Islamist westernisation, which ‘rediscovers the Middle East’ to balance the European 
vocation.  
 
6.3 The EU Candidacy of Turkey and the Middle Eastern Context740 
 
The EU candidate role of Turkey has significantly enabled Turkey’s return 
to the region. The Arab world has shown immense interest in Turkey’s EU candidacy. 
It is interesting to note that Arab media were the most represented group in the EU’s 
Brussels summit where the decision was taken to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey, with approximately 200 Arab journalists observing the summit.741 This was 
mostly due to the Arab perception of this event as akin to a decision of the EU on its 
relationship with the Muslim world, rather than only Turkey.742 Turkey’s EU candidate 
role was perceived by the Arab world as a benefit for regional stability. The EU’s 
decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 December 2004 in its 
Brussels summit was received positively and applauded by Arab media on the 
grounds that this decision could help alleviate the rift between the west and the 
Muslim world after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the thesis of civilisational conflict.743  
Moreover, the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role according 
to the Copenhagen political and economic criteria was an important resource for 
Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East by giving Turkey power of attraction 
in the eyes of the elite in the Middle East. Both the reformers and the ruling elite in the 
Middle East have watched closely Turkey’s democratic and economic reformation as 
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an EU candidate.744 Turkish policy makers were aware of this asset and used it 
discursively to implement its strategic depth policy in the Middle East.745 The JDP’s 
rise to power is particularly important for the reformists as it symbolises the 
possibility of combining democracy with Islam. El-Serif and Salha have aptly pointed 
out that as a result of Turkey’s EU reforms the democratic space in Turkish politics 
had expanded and a political party with Islamist pedigree could come to power.746 In a 
similar fashion Al-Azm argued:  
It is certainly noteworthy that Turkey, the only Muslim country with a 
developed and explicit secular ideology, tradition and practice, should be 
also the only major Muslim society to produce a democratic Muslim 
political party- something like Europe’s Christian Democratic Parties- 
capable of ascending to power without a catastrophe befalling the whole 
polity.747 
The EU factor in this perception was also emphasised by several 
commentators such as Eltahawy: 
the [JDP] programme avoided direct reference to Islam, proclaiming 
adherence to Turkey’s secular traditions and promising to encourage 
women to participate in public life and be active in politics; to repeal 
discriminatory provisions in laws; to work with women’s NGOs; and to 
"improving social welfare and work conditions in light of the needs of 
working women". How was the [JDP] able to pull all that off? Enter the 
"West", in the form of the European Union and Turkey’s determination to 
join it… [I]t seems at times that a twin obsession with women and the 
West is the defining characteristic of Arab Islamists - the [JDP] has been 
listening to both women’s groups and the European Union, which had 
demanded a reformed Penal Code as a prerequisite to starting talks in 
2005 on allowing Turkey into its club.748 
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The Arab Middle Eastern interest in Turkey cannot be reduced to the 
political victory of the JDP. As a journalist from the region has observed, Arab interest 
in Turkey declines if Turkey’s EU candidate role is hampered rather than the JDP 
losing office.749 Turkey’s economic progress and its western life style are also causes 
of attraction in the eyes of Middle Eastern reformists and the newly emerging middle 
class.750 Benli Altunisik has also pointed out that “[s]imilar to the discussion on 
Turkey’s political reform efforts, the issue of economic development is being used by 
critics of the regimes in countries like Egypt and Syria who argue that the states’ 
policies have failed.”751 As the preceding section has explained, this contextual factor 
enabled the usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role by Turkish foreign policy actors in 
their foreign policy discourse. One senior politician who has held a high profile foreign 
policy post in the early years of the first JDP government acknowledged that Turkey’s 
EU candidate role was the major leverage for Turkey in the Middle East and that 
Turkey’s standing in the Middle East would plummet had Turkey cut its relationship 
with the EU.752 Another good example is Syrian President Assad’s remarks to Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan during a visit in 2006, where he has stated that it was exciting 
that Turkey was going to become a member of the EU, as it meant Syria would be 
neighbours with the EU too.753  
The Middle Eastern regional context was also favourable to Turkey’s re-
engagement with the region as the increasing activism of Shiite Iran in the region was 
alarming for the Sunni Arab states. Therefore, there was also a strategic selectivity for 
Turkey to play an active role in the region, promoting increased economic integration, 
mediating conflicts and regional integration.754 Moreover, the US was getting more 
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and more confrontational in its foreign policy towards the Middle East, which also 
enabled Turkey to play the role of a regional player in the Middle East, in a way 
demonstrating the union of the west and Islam in the JDP government’s policies. 
The preceding analysis has offered a sketch of the change in the Middle 
Eastern regional context for Turkey. Turkey was perceived as a favourable player due 
to its ideational and geographical position in the region. The EU candidate role has 
therefore provided Turkey with a ‘power of attraction’ in the region mainly due to the 
institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and its geographical location 
acquiring a new meaning as both a European and a Middle Eastern Muslim-majority 
country.  Therefore, Turkey’s EU candidate role and the reforms it has undertaken to 
that end have altered the Middle Eastern regional opportunity structure by providing 
Turkey with a foreign policy resource in the Arab Middle East.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
All in all, Turkish foreign policy discourse has produced at times 
overlapping roles of a regional collaborator, a reform promoter, a bridge, a mediator 
and an example in the Middle East. The main message remains clear and the same: 
that Turkey is a significant regional actor, which aims to contribute to the Middle 
Eastern regional development. By articulating their identity both as Middle 
Eastern/Islamic and European, Turkish foreign policy actors have represented Turkey 
as a ‘Middle Eastern country that is also part of the EU’. In doing so, Turkish actors act 
as the advocates of political and economic liberalisation, rule of law but also economic 
interdependence and regional economic integration. The projection of Turkey as a 
European and a Middle Eastern Muslim country has significantly enabled Turkey’s 
implementation of the strategic depth policy in the Middle East.  
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This chapter has demonstrated that Turkish foreign policy actors have 
used Turkey’s role as an EU candidate to communicate Turkey’s foreign policy 
objectives in the Middle East to the Middle Eastern audience. Therefore, this chapter 
has demonstrated on the basis of interviews and the analysis of Turkish actors’ 
foreign policy speeches that the Turkish actors’ discursive usage of the EU candidate 
role has enabled Turkey to implement its foreign policy towards the Arab Middle East. 
The Turkish foreign policy actors have perceived Turkey’s EU candidate role as its 
most important source of power of attraction in the Middle East and tapped into this 
resource effectively by communicating Turkey’s EU candidate role to the Arab elite 
through their foreign policy discourse. Turkey’s EU candidate role has most frequently 
been integrated to the roles of a bridge and an example. Turkey has been portrayed as 
a bridge for the Middle Eastern countries to the EU both ideationally and 
geographically. Also the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has been 
portrayed as qualifying Turkey as an example to be followed by the other Islamic 
countries.  
Had Turkey not institutionalised the EU candidate role it would not have 
been possible for the Turkish actors to discursively portray Turkey as an EU candidate. 
According to the definition of Europeanisation of foreign policy advanced in this thesis, 
the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has to enable and/or constrain 
foreign policy significantly if it is to be called Europeanisation of foreign policy. In this 
respect, the discursive usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled the successful 
implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and these would not have 
been possible without the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role.  
Having monitored the reception of Turkey’s EU candidate role in the Arab 
Middle East, JDP foreign policy actors used Turkey’s EU candidate role as a foreign 
policy resource. They have drawn upon their ‘experience as an EU candidate’ that is 
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capable of bridging the EU and the Middle East both geographically and culturally.  
Such usage demonstrates that Europeanisation can take place not only through two 
distinct logics of consequences or appropriateness. Instead, Turkish foreign policy 
actors used ‘universal norms’ and Turkey’s role as an EU candidate strategically to 
achieve the position of a regional power in the Middle East, thereby demonstrating 
that roles and norms do not necessarily belong with the domain of the logic of 
appropriateness and that strategic usage of roles and norms is also possible. 
Bearing in mind that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role 
is not ‘the’ cause but part of the causal complex of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in the 2000s, the imperative question to establish the causal significance 
of EU candidacy is whether Turkey would be able to implement its foreign policy in 
the Middle East had it not adopted the EU candidate role? The answer lies with the 
communicative discourse of the actor who used the EU candidate role and the Middle 
Eastern regional context. If the JDP was not a pro-Islamic party that has adopted the 
role of an EU candidate, it would be unlikely that the same foreign policy could have 
had the same success. The combination of the EU candidate role and a conservative 
Muslim outlook is mostly what has enabled this policy’s successful implementation. As 
the previous chapter has shown, what makes the JDP different from its Islamist 
predecessors was its adoption of Turkey’s EU candidate role. Running the 
counterfactual question in the other direction, the JDP without its pro-EU outlook 
would also not be successful in the Middle East. However, the context in which the 
role of an EU candidate is used also makes a difference. As it has been shown, the EU 
candidacy role only enabled the Turkish actors’ strategy in the Middle East in the 
context of a favourable regional Middle Eastern context. The civilisational conflict 
thesis that has characterised the post 9/11 period and increasing activism in the 
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region by Iran had made the context favourable for Turkey to pursue an active foreign 
policy in the Middle East. 
Another important contextual factor has been the state of the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU. Turkish actors’ references to the EU candidate role in 
foreign policy discourse declined after 2005. As chapter four explained, this coincides 
with the period of the relations between the EU and Turkey cooling down. This 
cooling down has also been monitored by the Arab elite and therefore crippled the 
credibility of the EU and Turkey’s candidacy in their eyes.755 In sum, the EU candidate 
role has played an important role in this causal complex that enabled Turkey to 
implement its foreign policy in the Middle East.  
The next chapter now turns to the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU 
candidate role of alignment with EU foreign policy rules. The impact of the strategic 
depth policy that the JDP governments have implemented in the Arab Middle East on 
the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in terms of EU foreign policy 
rules will be analysed.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TURKEY’S EU CANDIDATE ROLE AND FOREIGN POLICY RULES  
 
This chapter analyses the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey regarding foreign policy 
rules that Turkey should align its foreign policy with. These rules are those emanating 
from the EU’s external trade policy and those emanating from the CFSP. Based on the 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation explained in chapter three, this chapter shows 
how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role significantly enabled or 
constrained Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. It will be argued that the 
external trade prescriptions regarding the Middle East were largely compatible with 
Turkey’s pre-existing agenda of improving economic relations with the Middle East. 
But the CFSP prescriptions offered a set of partially compatible prescriptions for 
Turkish actors to follow. Some of these prescriptions clashed with Turkey’s delicately 
manufactured regional role in the Middle East. Yet, the JDP needed the 
institutionalisation of the EU candidate role also in terms of its foreign policy rules to 
be able to give meaning to its strategic depth policy, which led to an arduous task of 
persuading the EU members and officials that the alternative foreign policy role 
prescription that Turkey was offering was better for the future of the EU with Turkey. 
To this end, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section is an analysis of the evolution of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East and an assessment of the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey regarding the Middle 
East. Then the perceptions and strategies of Turkish actors towards these rules will be 
analysed with an eye on the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in terms 
of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives.  
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7.1 The Evolution of the EU Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 
 
The EC/EU has a relatively long history in foreign and security policy 
cooperation. The idea of foreign policy integration was always present since the 
earliest stages of European integration.756 The very first attempt at creating the 
European Defence Community came as early as 1952, but could not take off due to the 
French Parliament’s rejection. The Foreign and Security policy domain remained 
dormant after the failure of the European Defence Community until the 1970s. 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was informally introduced in 1970 as a platform 
for the members of the European Community to coordinate their national foreign 
policies.757 It was not until the Single European Act in 1986 when EPC gained legal 
basis in treaty.758 Within the EPC framework one of the most significant foreign policy 
achievements of the EC/EU was realised,759 the Venice declaration of June 1980 on the 
Arab-Israeli peace process.760 The Venice declaration was the culmination of the Euro-
Arab dialogue in the late 1970s. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EPC gave way to the 
CFSP. The CFSP was coined as Pillar II with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, which 
based the EU’s institutional structure on a pillar system. Foreign policy was an 
intergovernmental pillar, which was strictly considered as a domain reserved for the 
nation states. 
The Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a CFSP pillar, despite 
intergovernmental, came as a brave step towards creating a European security policy. 
Not only the fact that it used the taboo words such as security, foreign, policy and 
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common together;761 it also was a symbol of transformation into a political union from 
a largely economic integration project.  As Smith has pointed out, the content was 
more or less based on the EPC;762  however, the language in the Treaty was very 
significant. The main difference between the EPC and the CFSP is that the latter covers 
security.763 This leap was the outcome of a causal complex whereby the changing 
international system as well as the internal developments such as the goal to establish 
the Economic and Monetary Union and the inadequacy of the EPC urged European 
policymakers to create the CFSP.764 
Another important step taken towards improving the EU's international 
presence was the introduction of new foreign policy instruments, common positions 
and joint actions. One more instrument was added to this repertoire later with the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which is the ‘common strategy’. The dividing line between 
the common positions and joint actions is quite vaguely stated due to a lack of 
consensus among member states.765 Common positions are defined as instruments 
“designed to make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination. The 
member states are required to comply with and uphold such positions which have 
been adopted unanimously at the Council.”766 Joint actions are supposed to imply a 
more concrete and visible policy outcome, which are defined as coordinated action 
utilising all kinds of resources (i.e. human, financial, etc.) by the member states in line 
with the goals decided by the European Council.767 Common strategies as introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam “set[s] out the aims and length of time covered and the 
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means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. Common strategies 
are implemented by the Council, in particular by adopting joint actions and common 
positions.”768 The Amsterdam Treaty also established new institutions such as those 
of the High Representative and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit inside the 
Council.769 The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was created as a response to 
the criticism that the EU was only reactive to crises rather than undertaking long-term 
analyses and strategies. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was staffed by 
the national and Commission officials and based in the Council Secretariat. 770 The 
High Representative was to assist in the formulation and implementation of the CFSP 
decisions, through his participation in the troika with the incumbent and incoming 
presidencies.771 The aim of establishing this post was to ensure continuity in the CFSP, 
yet this position was not capable of subsuming all the voices in the system and 
remained only as one of the foreign policy actors of the EU.772  
Security was also included in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty stated that 
the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union”773 as well as 
directing the Western European Union (WEU) to “elaborate and implement” any 
decision related to defence.774 However the WEU was not capable of implementing 
decisions related to defence by the time Maastricht Treaty entered into force. 
Therefore, in the 1992 Petersberg declaration, the WEU Council of Ministers declared 
that they would only engage in humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management 
related activities.775 Yet, the resources pledged by the WEU member states were not 
enough; thus there appeared a need that could be addressed by NATO. With the 
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clauses inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty, the Union acknowledged the importance of 
NATO in providing security for Europe as well as incorporating the Petersberg tasks of 
the WEU, into the CFSP framework. Petersberg tasks are defined as humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management, the WEU was not incorporated 
into the EU and gradually disappeared as an organisation.776  
The biggest leap in establishing EU defence capabilities came in 1998 with 
the Franco-British St. Malo declaration calling for the EU to devise “the capacity of 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”777 This 
goal of creating a European Security and Defence Policy was adopted by the EU at the 
Cologne European Council in June 1999, followed by the European Council in Helsinki 
in 1999 that made a commitment to develop military capabilities.778 
An important question to be resolved in the course of establishment of 
ESDP was the relationship with NATO and Turkey.779 Initially in the 1996 NATO 
Ministerial Summit in Berlin ministers of NATO member states agreed to let the EU 
use NATO assets in WEU-led operations. However due to subsequent blocking 
manoeuvres by Greece and Turkey the implementation had to wait until 2003.780 
Turkey blocked the EU-NATO arrangements by acting in its capacity as a NATO 
member from 1999 to 2002.781 Turkey was demanding the right of non-EU NATO 
members to participate in the planning of EU operations that use NATO assets, if a 
non-EU NATO member flagged up the said operation as threatening their national 
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security or being in geographical proximity.782 Turkey’s main concern was the 
possibility that NATO assets could be used in Cyprus against Turkish interests. The 
deadlock was resolved when the US, UK and Turkey presented a joint document 
outlining the framework of a future agreement. The compromise was the assurance 
that the ESDP was never going to be used in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby 
alleviating Turkey’s concerns.783 In March 2003 NATO and the EU concluded a 
framework for permanent relations, whereby NATO agreed to let the EU draw upon 
its planning, command structures and military resources on the basis of the so-called 
Berlin-Plus agreement.784  
 All in all, the EU has already undertaken plenty of civilian and military 
operations as part of the ESDP and appeared as an actor on the peacekeeping scene. 
There have been 23 civilian and military combined ESDP missions up until December 
2010.785 Among these there have been a few operations in the Middle East, such as 
operations for training Iraqi officials,786 monitoring the Rafah border crossing from 
Gaza to Egypt,787 and a police mission in the Palestinian Territories788.  
Despite all the institutionalisation over the years, the CFSP has been found 
disappointing by some observers.789 First of all it was argued that it was eventually an 
intergovernmental pillar, and reflected national interests even at the lowest levels of 
the CFSP machinery.790 Secondly, the CFSP was highly legalised and institutionalised 
as opposed to the EPC, which operated on the basis of a club atmosphere. This led to a 
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“path-dependence phobia” of the decision-makers as they were afraid to create 
precedents.791  
The ESDP operations also fail to save the CFSP from the allegations of 
incoherence and ineffectiveness since, as Keukeliere has observed aptly, “agreement 
on ESDP operations is sometimes a surrogate for a coherent common foreign policy 
on specific issues.”792 The main rationale is most of the time proving the EU 
integration process is ongoing and alive. The Iraqi war and the EU position regarding 
the Hamas victory in Gaza are the foremost illustrations of such inconsistencies 
and/or divisions in EU foreign policy. Iraqi War crystallised the division in both policy 
content and policymaking and the EU response to the election victory of Hamas in the 
Palestinian Territories revealed the inconsistency across EU policies.  
The EU was split down the middle on Iraq when the US showdown started 
in 2002.793 The German response was largely driven by domestic politics as it was 
election time for Chancellor Schroeder and he ruled out German participation even in 
a UN-backed operation to Iraq.794 The French leadership also refused participation in 
the US-led operation and wanted to make the UN Security Council the ultimate arbiter 
in the crisis in order to counter US unilateralism.795 UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Denmark, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia backed the US-led 
multinational operation and sent troops or contributed otherwise.796 Leaving alone 
the deep clashes regarding the policy, even the policymaking style was largely divisive 
and driven by a directoire approach. A gang of eight—Spain, Portugal, Britain, 
Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland-- openly declared their support for the 
US. Germany and France coordinated their positions and made public declarations 
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underlining that the war was not inevitable.797 Many countries withdrew troops from 
Iraq at later stages, sometimes due to changes in government.798 However the initial 
response to the Iraqi crisis clearly demonstrated that “for the EU, the more external 
issues at stake are sensitive to international politics, the more internal divisions 
matter.”799 The EU reflex to the crisis was simply no coordination except the 17 
February 2003 joint declaration urging Iraq to disarm immediately, stating use of 
force as last resort and committing the EU to work with the US on the matter.800 
Although this declaration was presented as showing the EU was united again by the 
Greek Presidency of the time,801 it was rather “a fairly loose compromise” that glossed 
over the substantial divisions among EU members over how much longer to wait 
before military action was to be taken.802 
The EU reaction to Hamas’ victory in Gaza in the 2006 elections displayed 
another inconsistency in EU foreign policy. Ironically, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one 
issue that the EC/EU has had a common approach for a long time.  The EU holds a 
common position, enjoys a single seat in the quartet that leads the peace talks 
between Israel and Palestine, and has a special representative in the region.803 The 
peak of EC/EU activity on this issue was the Venice Declaration in 1980, which meant 
“[i]n a radical diversion from the US position, the EC also called for the participation of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization in peace negotiations and branded Israeli 
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settlements as ‘illegal’ under international law.”804 Another important declaration was 
the Berlin declaration of 1999, which called for the creation of a viable Palestinian 
state.805 These points make up the backbone of the EU policy towards the Middle East 
peace process today. The EU objective in the process is “a two-state solution with an 
independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its 
other neighbours,” therefore having a regional approach to the resolution of the issue 
including Israel’s relations with Syria and Lebanon as well as Palestine.806 Upon the 
election victory of Hamas in 2006, the EU faced a dilemma between respecting the 
outcome of the elections in the context of its democratisation agenda, and cutting its 
support for a terrorist organisation that was on the EU list of terrorist 
organisations.807 The EU tried to strike a middle position by asking Hamas to renounce 
violence and recognise the Israeli state’s right to existence, but when Hamas rejected 
these conditions, the EU suspended its aid to Palestinian Authorities in 2006. As a 
means to minimise the adverse effects of this suspension on Palestinian people, the EU 
adopted the Temporary International Mechanism for delivering emergency aid and 
basic services. This chain of events damaged the EU’s image as they preached 
“democratisation, yet refused to recognise the winners of a free and fair election in 
Palestine, which the EU itself had funded and monitored.”808 
With the Lisbon Treaty, major changes were made to the decision-making 
structure of the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty, which aimed to streamline and simplify the 
EU decision making system, came into force in December 2009. The treaty abolished 
the pillar structure created by the Maastricht Treaty and introduced new posts such as 
the permanent European Council President and the High Representative of the EU for 
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Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which are hoped to give the EU more visibility in 
its foreign affairs. However the same new posts took away the agenda-shaping powers 
of member state presidencies. This shift in the agenda-shaping powers to the newly 
created posts raises concerns that if these posts are not used effectively it might lead 
to a decline in the foreign policy activity of the Union.809 It remains to be seen how 
effective the Lisbon Treaty will render the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Although the EU has largely remained divided in its foreign and security 
policy, it has built a united and strong front in its external trade policy. As Sapir has 
aptly pointed out, “[t]rade policy has been the principal instrument of foreign policy 
for the EC, particularly in the form of trade preferences.”810 In the Mediterranean 
context, the trade regime between the EU and the Mediterranean partners is 
determined by the 1996 Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched at the 1995 
Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean conference. The then non-EU Mediterranean 
participants were Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. Cyprus and Malta also participated in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership but they joined the EU in 2004. Up until the launch of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EC/EU had bilateral agreements with many of 
these Mediterranean countries but with the end of the Cold War and the rise of 
regionalism in the 1990s, the EU also switched tracks from bilateral relations to 
multilateralism in its structured relationship with the Mediterranean countries.811 
Another reason was the geographical patronage of certain EU member countries. In 
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the case of the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean, the drivers have been 
the Mediterranean members of the EU.812  
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership covers both bilateral and 
multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 
countries, aiming to achieve cooperation and progress in political, economic and social 
aspects of the relationship.813 The Partnership was targeted towards achieving a free-
trade area by 2010 between the EU and the Mediterranean partners as well as among 
the Mediterranean partners themselves. The partnership was legally based on 
Association Agreements signed by each partner and financial aid by the EU.814 This 
was a mix of political and financial instruments at the Union’s disposal to ensure 
stability in the region and to boost regionalism in the southern borders of the Union.  
New layers of institutional cooperation were added onto this basis until 2010 but the 
free trade area has not materialised yet.815 
One of those new layers in the EU-Mediterranean/Middle East structure is 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that was initiated in 2004. With the 
initiation of the ENP, the Barcelona process was relegated to a multilateral forum, 
while bilateral relations between the EU and the southern neighbours were going to 
be managed by the ENP and its Action Plans.816 The main rationale was to give 
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neighbours “everything but the institutions” in order to ensure stability within the 
EU’s neighbourhood.817  
The last layer added to the EU-Mediterranean structure was the Union for 
the Mediterranean, which originally was a French initiative but got adopted by the 
Union in 2008. The Union for the Mediterranean was aimed to revitalise EU-
Mediterranean relations and render the partnership more visible by funding projects 
in areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture, so as to 
make a difference in the lives of those living in the region.818 The Union for the 
Mediterranean is framed as a “Union for projects” whereby partners focus on 
cooperation with cherry picked partners in projects, without any human rights 
conditionality.819 The Union for the Mediterranean incorporates the Barcelona Process. 
However, it leaves out bilateral relations between the EU and partner countries within 
the remit of the ENP. Therefore a snapshot picture of the three different EU policies 
towards the Mediterranean countries displays some sort of a division of labour. The 
ENP offers development aid and incentives, even if quite vague, in return for 
improvement in harmonisation with the EU standards including human rights. The 
Union for the Mediterranean, incorporating the Barcelona process, takes the role of a 
regional forum focussing on particular sectors and projects, as opposed to the initial 
holistic approach of the Barcelona process820, offering a functional approach to EU-
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Mediterranean cooperation.821 The bilateral relations including trade are managed 
through the Euro-Mediterranean Association agreements. 
Association agreements have been signed between the EU and Israel 
(1995), Jordan (1997), Palestinian Authority (1997), Egypt (2001), Lebanon (2002) 
and an agreement was initialled but failed in ratification with Syria (2008).822 The EU 
also supports bilateral or multilateral trade agreements among its Southern 
neighbours as such agreements are seen to be an essential element in the creation of 
an overarching EU-Mediterranean regional free trade area.  
For the candidate countries, the only most significant role prescription is 
alignment with the CFSP acquis politique.823 The CFSP acquis politique includes the 
joint actions, common positions, statements and declarations, with which the 
candidate countries are expected to harmonise their foreign policies. In the case of 
Czech foreign policy, this is portrayed by Baun and Marek as “a relatively easy task 
since it was for the most part merely a rhetorical exercise.”824 The case of Turkey 
presents a challenge in this respect. The CEECs were relatively new states with a 
rather inexperienced civil service in foreign policy,825 whereas Turkey has had a 
century-old foreign policy tradition. 
 
7.2 The EU’s Role Prescription for Turkey in the Middle East 
 
The CFSP rules of EU candidacy are largely limited to the alignment with 
the EU foreign policy acts within the CFSP framework and the resolution of border 
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disputes. As one of the interviewees has pointed out, the rule of peaceful resolution of 
border disputes could be a plausible explanation for Turkey’s changing foreign policy 
towards the Middle East.826 As chapter four has explained, Turkey had strained 
relationships with its Middle Eastern neighbours in the 1990s. There were incursions 
into northern Iraq and also Syria had claims for Alexandretta since it lost the district 
to Turkey in 1939. However, many interviewees confirmed that the resolution of 
border disputes rule only refers to Turkey’s border disputes with Greece, Cyprus and 
Armenia and that it does not refer to Turkey’s conflicts in its Middle East borders.827 
Therefore, only the rule of alignment with the EU positions and acts as well as the 
harmonisation of Turkey’s foreign trade regime with that of the EU is dealt with in this 
chapter.  
The political dialogue meetings are usually in the format of presentation 
of EU foreign policy objectives without much discussion.828 This has constructed 
political dialogue meetings as a venue for the EU to express its foreign policy 
prescriptions for Turkey’s candidate role in general, including matters relating to 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.  
As opposed to the non-binding nature of foreign policy rules that originate 
from the CFSP, there are also trade rules that are part of the EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey, which are legally binding and materially effective. Trade being one of the most 
communitarised of all EU policies presents a highly cohesive policy with enforcement 
mechanisms for EU members. For Turkey, the role prescription of adaptation to the 
EU’s external trade policy came with the customs union decision in 1996, even before 
candidacy, and therefore presented Turkey with a highly cohesive policy template 
when aligning its trade policy and preferential trade agreements with those of the EU. 
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Some of these trade agreements were with the Middle Eastern neighbours of Turkey. 
The remainder of this chapter therefore also traces the role perceptions, conceptions 
and performance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Arab Middle East in the context of the EU’s 
CFSP and trade role prescriptions. 
Turkey has been in a customs union with the EU since 1996 and article 16 
of the customs union decision states that “Turkey shall align itself progressively with 
the preferential customs regime of the Community within five years as from the date 
of entry into force” of the decision.829 This transition period for Turkey’s alignment 
with the Community’s preferential trade regime was to end on 1 January 2001. As 
Turkey’s candidacy was layered onto the existing customs union between the EU and 
Turkey, unfulfilled customs union rules were also included in the EU’s candidacy role 
prescription for Turkey. This rule is communicated through the Accession Partnership 
for Turkey and the Commission includes a review of these issues in its annual 
Progress Reports. 
The requirements of the customs union decision were the full alignment 
of Turkey’s Preferential Trade Agreements with those of the EU. The Commission has 
acknowledged Turkey’s efforts at aligning its bilateral agreements with third 
countries, by negotiating free trade agreements (FTA) with Middle Eastern countries 
such as the Palestinian Authority.830 FTAs were signed with the Palestinian Authority 
and Syria in 2004, Lebanon in 2010, Jordan in 2010.831 The Commission also 
acknowledged the difficulty for Turkey to initiate negotiations with all countries that 
have signed a free trade agreement with the EU due to the reluctance of other parties 
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at times, while urging Turkey to continue its efforts to align its FTAs with those of the 
EU.832  Therefore, third countries’ perceptions of Turkey are also important factors 
that alter the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in foreign policy. As 
foreign policy is relational between the interior and the exterior of the state, it is not 
possible to implement foreign policies without the other party’s responsiveness. This 
was especially significant in the EU’s candidate role prescription of the alignment of 
the trade regime. 
An important stumbling block in the way of signing FTAs with these 
countries was that some of them did not respond positively to Turkey’s efforts to 
initiate negotiations for the FTAs and some of them were reluctant even after the 
negotiations were initiated.833 The reluctance of these countries was due to the fact 
that Turkey’s proposed FTA conditions were overshadowed by those of the EU, since 
the EU also offered aid whereas Turkey only offered trade.834 Another reason was 
Turkey’s lack of good political relations with these countries, which was central in the 
context of concluding FTAs with Middle Eastern countries.835   
Due to the customs union between Turkey and the EU, these countries 
were benefiting from Turkey’s customs union with the EU without having to extend 
the same privileges to Turkey. 836Once Turkey entered into a customs union with the 
EU the risk emerged of goods originating from the EU’s preferential trade partners 
entering the Turkish market via the EU. As there are no boundaries between Turkey 
and the EU in terms of circulation of industrial goods as part of the customs union, the 
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Etkileri,’ Durum: Turktrade magazine (August 2010).  
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origin of goods in free circulation is not checked.837 Another factor was that although 
Turkey joined a customs union with the EU and agreed to implement the EU’s 
common commercial policy, it had no say over either the countries the EU was going 
to sign FTAs with or the content of the agreements.838 EU officials argue that when 
they sign an FTA they urge their free trade partners to also sign an agreement with 
Turkey. However this informal suggestion that is called the “Turkey clause” is not 
binding on the partners.839 Coupled with some Middle Eastern countries’ reluctance to 
sign an FTA with Turkey, this problem has caused resentment in Turkish policy and 
business circles. 
In sum, the foreign policy rules that comprise of the EU’s candidate role 
prescription for Turkey offer a complex of binding and non-binding political and 
economic rules. In the next section, it will be showed that there is no systematic 
convergence or divergence between Turkey’s role performance and the EU’s foreign 
policy rules. Rather, it will be demonstrated that the causal power of the EU candidate 
role prescribed by the EU is how they are perceived by Turkish actors and how 
Turkish actors interpreted, appropriated or changed these expectations in the course 
of institutionalising Turkey’s EU candidate role. 
 
7.3 Role Performance 
 
Many authors have criticised the EU’s foreign policy as reflecting the 
lowest common denominator of member state foreign policy priorities.840 The same 
perception persists among the Turkish foreign policy actors. The intergovernmental 
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nature of the CFSP and the divisions over foreign policy have led to the perception of 
CFSP rules of EU candidacy as “a less imposing requirement… than in other areas of 
European integration such as, for instance, agricultural policies.”841 According to a 
Turkish civil servant of EU affairs, the EU finds it easier to make statements on issues 
and countries that are not of broader international significance, but finds it difficult to 
reach a common viewpoint on cases that are in the spotlight internationally.842 
Likewise, Turkey’s head of permanent representation to the EU has pointed out that 
the Middle East is an issue that reveals the most the EU’s internal divisions.843 Despite 
the Union’s unity over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkish foreign policy 
practitioners do not perceive the EU to be a coherent and effective foreign policy actor 
regarding Middle Eastern conflicts. Therefore they perceived foreign policy role 
prescriptions of the EU for Turkey as less strictly defined. Turkey’s alignment was 
selective, limited to those foreign policy decisions that did not clash with the existing 
foreign policy ideas of Turkey.  
Turkey’s alignment record with the EU statements, declarations, joint 
actions and common positions has been geographically skewed. All progress reports 
published by the Commission until 2004 have posited that Turkey has successfully 
aligned itself with the declarations, statements, joint actions and common positions.844 
The 2004 Report praised Turkey’s participation in the EU crisis management 
operations, including the EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, it pointed out that Turkey’s alignment with 
CFSP statements has been lower in the case of its neighbours, including the 2004 EU 
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policy on Iraq.845 The 2005 Progress Report has pointed up a similar geographical 
divergence. In its 2005 Report, the Commission has observed Turkey’s lack of 
alignment with the EU rules mainly on a geographical basis.846 The 2006 report 
pointed to Turkey’s lack of alignment with the EU’s list of terrorist organizations, 
which includes Hamas.847 However, these observations came alongside praise for 
Turkey’s placing pressure on Syria for compliance with the UN Decision 1636 
regarding the UN Commission’s investigation into the assassination of the former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.848 The 2007 and 2008 reports followed with 
observations on Turkey’s efforts at alignment with the EU positions as well as its 
efforts at establishing stability in its region, whereas the 2009 report pointed out 
Turkey’s lack of alignment with the EU on Syria.849  
There are a few issues that revealed observable divergence between the 
EU position and Turkey’s position, that of relations with Iraq, Syria and Hamas. In the 
case of Iraq, Turkey did not align itself with the EU position on Iraq in the aftermath of 
the Iraqi war. As the Commission has aptly stated: 
it is also clear that Turkey is hesitant to align itself to EU positions on 
issues which it feels touch its vital foreign policy and security interests, in 
particular regarding its geographical neighbourhood (Iraq, Caucasus, etc.), 
human rights and developments in Muslim countries, where it insists on a 
distinct national position.850  
 
For example while the EU welcomed the agreement on the Iraqi 
Transitional Administrative Law in 2004, Turkey was extremely suspicious of the Law 
and positioned itself against it. This was due to Turkey’s ongoing concerns about the 
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status of Kirkuk, Turcomans and northern Iraq.851 The transitional Law recognised the 
Turcomans, the Turkish speaking community in Iraq, as a minority rather than a 
constituent community of Iraq and also established an autonomous Kurdish region in 
Northern Iraq.852 The Law also did not address Turkey’s concerns over the rights of 
Turcomans in northern Iraq. This reflects Turkey’s initial post-2003 red lines vis-à-vis 
Iraq: the prevention of a federated or independent Kurdish entity emerging in 
northern Iraq, the prevention of the seizure of Kirkuk by such an entity and finally 
securing rights for the Turcoman communities in the region.853 The Transitional 
Administrative Law did establish a federal Iraqi state and a Kurdish regional 
government that was autonomous, which conflicted Turkey’s objectives in Iraq. 
However, Turkey dropped its ‘red lines’ later in the process and fell more in line with 
the EU policy of aiming to work towards state and institution building in Iraq. Turkish 
businesses’ growing presence in Kurdistan was an important driver behind this 
change of policy.854 
For Turkey, cooperation with Syria represented an effective gateway to 
the Arab Middle East both politically and economically.855 In the past, Syria had used 
Arab and Third World Forums against Turkey, therefore it served more or less as a 
gatekeeper for Turkey to improve relations with the Arab world.856  Similarly, Syria 
also served as a physical transit function for Turkish trade with the rest of the Middle 
East.857 After 2000, Turkey has gone beyond normalisation of its relationship with 
Syria and both parties built up mutual trust and institutionalised bilateral cooperation. 
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In the meantime, the EU has made several CFSP statements and declarations 
criticising Syria’s human rights abuses, with most of which Turkey did not align 
itself.858 This lack of alignment was mentioned in the 2009 progress report by the EU 
Commission on Turkey. Turkey’s lack of alignment demonstrates its ongoing efforts at 
building close ties with Syria, unhindered by the EU declarations criticising Syrian 
human rights abuses.859 While such EU concerns over human rights abuses in Syria 
coupled with US pressure led to a stalling of the EU-Syria Association Agreement in 
2009, Turkey has proceeded with its FTA and visa-exemption agreement with Syria, 
which were perceived by Syria as demonstrating the reliability of Turkey’s policies 
toward itself.860  
Another apparent case of divergence is the case of high-level contact with 
a Hamas delegation after Hamas won the elections in 2006 in the Palestinian 
Territories. However, in reality there is convergence. The 2006 elections in the 
Palestinian territories gave Hamas, which is the hardliner group that was infamous for 
its violent means and uncompromising stance, a victory and the right to form the 
cabinet. This was received negatively by the US and Israel.  In this context a Hamas 
visit to Turkey took place. Many commentators as well as politicians criticised Turkey 
for hosting Hamas, which still had not given up arms. Among these critiques the 
harshest ones came from the US and Israel. Israelis bitterly criticised the visit and 
likened Hamas to the PKK, and rhetorically asked if the Turkish government would be 
content with a PKK visit to Israel. US diplomats were as bitter as their Israeli 
counterparts in expressing their disappointment.861  Most recently, Robert Wexler, a 
member of the US Congress, said that he could not understand “why Turkey, a country 
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that has suffered so much from terrorism met with the ‘exiled leader’ of a terrorist 
gang.”862 This reaction was mainly due to the US and Israeli policy of isolating Hamas 
and cutting off the financial aid to Palestine until Hamas drops weapons. 
European responses to the Hamas visit were rather ambiguous due to the 
dilemma of how to deny the results of free elections held in Palestine. This dilemma 
faced by the Union is ably expressed by a Spanish member of the European Parliament 
who said, “but we cannot push for democracy and then deny the result of free and fair 
elections."863 Likewise the then High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, 
highlighted that the Palestinian people had “voted democratically and peacefully” 
while acknowledging that Hamas’ victory was going to present the EU with 
challenges.864  As a result of this dilemma, the EU adopted an official line of getting 
“the best of two worlds” by boycotting Hamas into renouncing violence, recognising 
Israel and the past agreements, while using Temporary International Mechanism -TIM 
to provide basic goods for the Palestinian people.865 This official position adopted by 
the EU was reflected in the 2006 Progress Report on Turkey, where the Commission 
pointed up the lack of alignment between Turkey and the EU on the recognition of 
Hamas as a terrorist organization. 
The Turkish government regarded talking to Hamas as a necessary step 
on the way to resolving the problems, and was behind its move. The then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul has stated that they were doing their share for peace in 
the region. He has also said:  
these days are important days. Correct messages should be given. 
Someone should do something; if the wrong paths are taken, both 
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Palestinian and Israeli people will get hurt…Peace negotiations will be at 
the table, and no doubt there should be no violence. 866  
The Hamas delegation’s visit was harshly criticised by Israel and the US. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was left in the dark according to US documents867 and 
the delegation was only hosted by the JDP, as Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan had to 
cancel the meeting with the delegation in his capacity as Prime Minister.868 In 
domestic politics the visit found warm reception among the JDP electorate that have 
largely had a pro-Palestinian position.869 In the international arena the main goal was 
two-pronged: a genuine belief that Hamas should be engaged before crises erupt in 
the Middle East.870 Secondly, the JDP aimed to achieve this goal by asserting Turkey’s 
regional power in accordance with its post-Islamist strategic depth doctrine that was 
in tune with the party’s Ottoman nostalgia. In Jenkins’ words, the main “motivation 
appears to have been simply to demonstrate that Turkey is a major player in the 
region rather than to make any contribution to alleviating the plight of the 
Palestinians.”871 
Relations with Hamas demonstrate an interesting case where there is a 
strict EU policy, which Turkey contradicted by holding a meeting with the Hamas 
delegation.  However, behind closed doors Turkish officials had coordinated with the 
EU their meeting with Hamas.872 The meeting was largely justified to domestic and 
international opposition as a JDP initiative rather than the government’s official policy 
                                                             
866 ‘Ankara Undertakes Risky Mission for Mideast Peace,’ Turkish Daily News, 17 February 2006. 
867 US embassy cable, 06ANKARA4688, 11 August 2006, 
http://wikileakscablegate.blogspot.com/2010/12/viewing-cable-06ankara4688-turkeys.html (3 
November 2011). 
868 Philip Robins, ‘Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP 
Government, 2002-2007,’ ISPI working paper, 11 (2007). 
869 Robins, ‘Between the EU.’ 
870 US embassy cable , 06ANKARA2199, 21 April 2006, 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06ANKARA2199.html (3 November 2011). 
871 Gareth Jenkins, ‘Comment: Opportunities gained or lost?,’ Al-Ahram Weekly, 783 (23 February - 1 
March 2006). Also ‘Turkey's Reform Efforts Wane,’ Deutsche Welle World, 8 March 2006. 
872 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 3 May 2010. 
234 
 
and the overriding legitimating discourse was that Turkey managed to give Hamas 
historic and correct messages.873  
From the outset, this seems like a severe divergence between the EU 
position and that of Turkey’s. However, a few interviewees pointed out that there was 
no divergence between Turkey and the EU on the issue of relations with Hamas.874 
The EU’s divided approach of promoting democratic elections but not respecting the 
outcome of these elections was due to Hamas being recognised as a terrorist 
organisation by the EU and that it would be difficult to justify to the EU public opinion 
contacting a terrorist organisation.875 Therefore, informally the EU wanted to have 
contacts with Hamas and they were content with Turkey’s contacts, while formally 
criticising them.876 Such inconsistencies further magnified the EU policymakers’ 
perception of the EU’s candidate role prescriptions of foreign policy as non-binding 
and insignificant. 
The preceding review shows a few cases where Turkey failed to align 
itself with the EU statements, declarations and positions, such as Iraq in 2004, Hamas 
in 2006 and Syria in 2009. However, there was a substantial level of alignment in 
other areas such as the Middle East Peace Process and the policy toward Iraq after 
2008. Many cases of Turkey’s broad alignment with the CFSP positions such as the 
Middle East Peace Process are cases where Turkey had congruent foreign policy 
objectives with the EU.877 This shows a selective alignment process where the Turkish 
government aligned itself with the EU decisions when that served Turkish political 
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actors’ own conception of their role in the Middle East or when the issue was not a 
matter of substantial concern. As Barysch has pointed out, most of the acts [CFSP 
rules] that Turkey adopted are not of significance for Turkish foreign policy or EU-
Turkey relations. However, the picture is different with the matters that are 
significant for Turkey.878  
The priority in the Arab Middle East for the EU is the Middle East peace 
process.879 The Palestinian plight is at the heart of the region’s disputes and it weaves 
a complex web among Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Egypt. In other words, 
“there can be no durable peace and stability in the Middle East until a just solution to 
the Palestinian plight is found.”880 In this respect, Turkey has always aimed for the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in order not to “need to maintain the difficult 
balance between keeping diplomatic and economic relations with Israel and showing 
solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world.”881 To this end, Turkey has first reluctantly 
started making contacts in the region to facilitate the solution of the Arab-Israeli 
disputes since 1998-9 as part of the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s visions and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem. This drive intensified under the JDP 
governments that first took office in 2002. Especially since 2002, Turkey has strived 
for visibility in the Middle East through its economic initiatives and many attempts at 
diplomatic facilitation.  
Turkey has undertaken several mediation/facilitation efforts in the Arab-
Israeli conflict including between Syria and Israel, Palestinian rival organisations 
Hamas and Fatah, as well as intra-Arab disputes such as Lebanon-Syria and Syria-Iraq 
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as explained in chapter four. In almost all of these initiatives Turkey was praised by 
the EU Commission. The progress reports repeatedly acknowledged Turkey’s 
alignment with the EU on the broad Middle East peace process agenda.  
Another example of Turkey’s alignment with the EU foreign policy rules is 
the alignment with the EU’s trade policy towards the Middle East. The EU’s external 
trade policy overlapped with an existing trend in the Turkish trade agenda from the 
1990s to establish FTAs and enter new markets.882 Indeed, Turkey had signed its first 
FTA with the European Free Trade Area countries in 1991 and approached the CEECs 
with the same objective, however without success.883 Therefore there has already 
been an ongoing trend in Turkish trade policy towards signing FTAs, which 
accelerated due to Turkey’s customs union obligations to align its trade policy with 
that of the EU.884 The motivation behind signing FTAs with the Middle East has largely 
been perceived economic benefits associated with developing trade with the Arab 
Middle East. According to a senior civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign 
Trade, Turkey’s efforts towards concluding FTAs with its Middle Eastern neighbours 
would have remained constant had there been no customs union with the EU or the 
EU candidate role of Turkey. The major difference that the customs union made has 
been the prioritisation of countries.885 Signing FTAs with the Middle Eastern partners 
was seen to be profitable and not problematic as these countries were not 
competitors for Turkish industries. As a Middle Eastern diplomat has acknowledged, 
Turkey has remarkable advantage over the Arab Middle East in terms of industrial 
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production.886 Therefore the perceived benefits of signing FTAs with the Middle 
Eastern countries as part of Turkey’s alignment with the EU trade policy were 
significant for the Turkish governments.887  
The FTA signed with Syria was an outstanding case of Turkey moving first 
before the EU-Syria agreement was ratified and put in effect. Syria and the EU started 
negotiations for signing the EU-Syria Association Agreement in 1998, which was 
initialled in 2004. However, it failed to reach the final signature stage due to the 
assassination of the Lebanese President Rafik Hariri in 2005, and the subsequent 
international pressure on Syria to cooperate with the International Tribunal on the 
murder of Hariri as the Syrian intelligence service was suspected to be part of the 
assassination.888 Another factor was the US’ classification of Syria as a rogue state 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US sanctions on Syria. In early 
2009, relations between the EU and Syria deteriorated once more due to some 
Member States’ distrust of Syrian willingness to improve the human rights situation 
and US pressure on the EU member states and the Czech Presidency to delay the 
debate on the Association Agreement at the Council.889 Afterwards, the Syrian side 
also grew colder towards concluding the Association Agreement due to the pressure 
from domestic industries demanding protection from EU competition. The EU’s trade 
relations remain governed by the 1977 EU-Syria cooperation agreement, which 
“provides duty free access to the EU market for most Syrian industrial goods, and 
assistance to Syria's ‘production and economic infrastructure’.”890 In this context, 
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Turkey signed an FTA with Syria, which came into effect in 2007, thereby predating 
the EU’s ratification and implementation of an Association Agreement with Syria.  
Therefore the Turkey-Syria FTA was important in the sense that the EU 
had not ratified and implemented an FTA with Syria at the time; however the EU still 
applied a preferential trade regime towards Syria. According to a civil servant from 
the Turkish Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, the fact that Syria was already 
benefiting from the EU’s preferential trade regime made the Turkish FTA 
unproblematic.891 Likewise an official from the EU Council noted that although Turkey 
did not consult with the EU prior to signing the FTA with Syria that was not a big 
problem as “a level of differentiation is also expectable”.892 On the other hand, 
Turkey’s conclusion of an FTA with Syria despite the failure of the conclusion of the 
EU-Syria Association Agreement gave Turkey credibility in the eyes of the Syrian 
government.893 Therefore, at this time Turkey did not restrict itself to the EU’s FTAs 
and has even gone further. In the Syrian case, the FTA with Turkey and the freely 
circulating goods from Turkey were used by Syrian domestic industries as an 
argument against the conclusion of the FTA with the EU.894 According to the Wall 
Street Journal, Syrian industrialists were “already reeling as a result of the country's 
2007 free-trade agreement with Turkey. Scores of firms have been forced to shut, 
fanning a public backlash against economic liberalization enacted by the authoritarian 
regime of President Bashar Assad.”895 Therefore, although there was materially no 
trade diversion of Syrian exports from the EU to Turkey due to the FTA signed with 
Turkey and the already existing preferential trade regime with the EU, the FTA with 
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Turkey had an ideational effect on Syrian businesses. The experience of the Turkish-
Syrian FTA caused Syrian people to perceive the idea of an FTA with the EU negatively. 
The preceding account shows that there is not much correlation between 
the EU’s candidate role prescription for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. There is hardly any pattern in Turkey’s foreign policy actions that is 
either in line or against the EU’s role prescription. However, it will be argued below 
that there is a deeper pattern, which has occurred due to Turkish foreign 
policymakers’ continuous attempts to alter the EU’s role prescription for Turkey in 
foreign policy rules in line with Turkey’s strategic-depth policy. A research design that 
utilises independent-dependent variables would not be able to detect any causal 
relation at this point. Further research into Turkish actors’ foreign policy ideas, the 
context as well as their discursive strategies reveal that Turkish actors in fact 
managed to change the selectivities of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey. 
 
7.4 The Foreign Policy Paradigm of Turkey and the EU Foreign Policy 
Rules 
 
In the pursuit of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the 
foreign policy paradigm of the Turkish policymakers was post-Islamist 
westernisation, which had been systematically pursued after the JDP came to power in 
2002 and the objective was to pursue strategic depth policy in the region mostly for 
boosting economic integration in the region. As a Turkish diplomat has also revealed: 
The priority is not mediation or conflict resolution per se; we are not 
really achieving many results, and that’s perhaps not the point anyway. 
The point is to be visible, to look like a power, to make our neighbours like 
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us, to achieve stability which will help economic growth and to increase 
trade and investments.896  
This policy has been reflected in the subsequent JDP government 
programmes in 2002 and 2003, where both Prime Ministers Abdullah Gul and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan highlighted that the spilling of blood in the Middle East worries and 
upsets especially the Turkish people who have got close historical and cultural ties with 
the region.897 Likewise, a senior member of the JDP has also underlined in an interview 
that many Middle Eastern individuals who are aged 90 and over are also Ottoman 
citizens.898 On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdogan also referred to the Ottoman 
Empire’s central place in the European state system while discussing Turkey’s 
relationship with the EU when he argued that “Turkey’s modernisation and 
civilisation efforts date back to centuries ago. The Ottoman Empire has been part of 
European history for centuries and played an important role in the emergence of 
contemporary Europe.”899  Therefore the JDP has balanced their advocacy of improved 
relations with the Middle East, which is former Ottoman territory, by using the 
Ottoman history in Europe as a counter balance. This balance is what, Taspinar has 
argued, makes strategic depth policy different from previous episodes of Islamist 
foreign policy, which only focused on improving relations with the Muslim world (see 
chapter four).900  
The post-Islamist westernisation paradigm and the strategic depth policy 
that Ahmet Davutoglu carved out of it have defined the contours of Turkey’s 
objectives in the Middle East. These objectives at times overlapped with the CFSP and 
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trade rules of the EU, with which Turkey’s EU candidate role prescribed Turkey’s 
alignment, thereby creating a shallow convergence between the EU’s and Turkey’s 
foreign policies in the Middle East.  
 
7.5 Institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU Candidate Role  
 
However, there is a deeper causality than there can be observed in 
Turkey’s partial alignment with EU candidacy rules on foreign policy. Turkey’s EU 
candidate role was necessary to give meaning to the foreign policy that was initiated 
in the beginning of the 2000s and has been pursued till the end of the decade. Turkish 
actors could not afford to simply not play the role of an EU candidate in foreign policy, 
they needed the continuation of Turkey’s EU candidate role for giving meaning to 
their foreign policy orientation. The legitimating power of the westernisation 
paradigm was perceived as necessary by the JDP leadership, which was 
operationalised as the party’s commitment to the EU candidacy role of Turkey in both 
domestic politics and foreign policy. The presence of continuing contradiction 
between the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions and Turkish actors’ role 
performance would threaten the pro-EU role played by the JDP in foreign policy. An 
example of this has indeed appeared in the form of a ‘shift of axis’ debate in Turkey’s 
foreign policy.901 Allegations that Turkey has shifted its foreign policy axis from the 
west towards the Middle East had come to surface and the Prime Minister responded 
by arguing that on the contrary to these allegations, Turkey was aiming for helping the 
EU by its foreign policy activism rather than being a burden upon its accession to the 
EU.902 Put simply, the EU’s role prescription and Turkish role performance needed to 
be made complementary and Turkish political actors have utilised discursive 
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strategies to achieve a certain level of complementarity by making references to the 
institutionalised goal of Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
The main discursive strategy was to emphasise the central importance of 
Turkey in the Middle Eastern regional structure. Accordingly, although sometimes 
defecting from the EU’s role expectations, Turkey was acting as a peacemaker and 
stabiliser in the Middle East thanks to Turkish policymakers’ (allegedly) extensive 
knowledge of the Middle Eastern affairs, i.e. common culture and religion. Turkey as a 
regional power rather than in perfect compliance with the EU’s role expectations in 
foreign policy would be a greater asset for the EU in the case of future accession of 
Turkey. 
Likewise, a former senior foreign policymaker and a JDP parliamentarian 
has said: [w]e say Turkey would be an asset for the EU, because Turkey knows the 
Middle East well. However, the EU alone can be effective in that same region. 
Therefore we do not claim that cooperation with Turkey is necessary. We only argue 
that if the EU cooperates with Turkey, it can achieve its goals more efficiently. We say 
that we are not indispensable but it would be better for you to cooperate.903  
A former parliamentarian has also supported this argument that Turkey 
could be an asset for the EU by saying that “there is an underlying proposition that 
Turkey can solve problems in the Middle East thereby contributing to the EU’s 
security.”904  
A JDP parliamentarian has also claimed that it is important for the EU that 
Turkey improves its relationship with the Middle East, because Turkey is a buffer 
between the EU and the Middle East and the Turkish government has been using this 
role in their dealings with the EU. The interviewee has argued that due to this, the EU 
has started adopting a more neutral approach to Turkey’s lack of alignment with the 
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foreign policy expectations of the EU.905 In a similar vein, another JDP parliamentarian 
has argued that “one of the most important arguments that we put forward is that a 
country with good relations with its neighbours and especially influential in the 
Middle East is a much better EU candidate.”906  
Turkey’s influence in the region is claimed to be based on Turkish 
policymakers’ knowledge of the Middle East, in other words, the role of a “Middle East 
expert” is being constructed for Turkey to underpin the argument that Turkey is an 
influential actor in the Middle East.907 As another Turkish diplomat has argued “We 
[Turkish foreign policy elite] grasp those regions [Middle East] better, because we do 
not see them as foreign. Many of us have personal ties with the countries in that 
region: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt. There are Turks still living there, they are our 
distant relatives. “908 
Although constructing such a role for Turkey with the knowledge 
requirements of the role, it does not actually reflect the real capabilities of Turkish 
actors. A Turkish bureaucrat has revealed that despite the discursive strategy of 
presenting Turkey as having trust-based ties with the Middle East, Turkish actors 
actually do not know much about the region.909 Likewise, a senior analyst has 
supported this view by saying that Turkey does not possess knowledge of the Middle 
East, because there is not sufficient expertise to analyse the region’s dynamics. In his 
words, “after the third second there is not much in common left to talk about except 
religion.”910 Indeed, such construction of Turkey as a ‘Middle East expert’ is in sharp 
contradiction to the historical aloofness of Turkey from the Middle Eastern affairs. Yet, 
it should be observed that the Ottoman past and the religious affinities with the actors 
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in the Middle East has given the post-Islamist conservative government members 
enough discursive material to build up such a construction. 
Yet, the strategy seems to pay off and the EU’s role prescription for 
Turkey has recently started showing changes. A Turkish diplomat has explained his 
personal experience confirming this argument as follows: 
There was a meeting in Damascus to mediate between Syria and Lebanon 
in 2008. An informal [Gymnich] EU foreign ministers meeting was going 
to be held after the Damascus meeting. Under normal circumstances, our 
minister of foreign affairs is invited to lunch in that meeting and after 
lunch he gives a maximum 10-minute presentation. This time in 2008, he 
was invited to the actual meeting and the foreign ministers of 27 member 
states asked him to tell them about his Damascus visit [and also his views 
of the conflict in Georgia]. This has never happened before; he was the 
leading actor in that meeting….These are very exceptional developments; 
the routine practice is only to attend the lunch. We [national diplomats 
following EU meetings] cannot even observe the lunch, they set up a 
screen outside the room and we take notes. In the previous meetings we 
[the Turkish delegation] used to wait outside for our turn to enter the 
meeting room. What I mean is although this informal Gymnich type 
meeting is such a rule-based institution, we [Turkish minister of foreign 
affairs] were invited to it as a proper participant.911 
Although this lengthy quote might seem like the biased view of a Turkish 
diplomat eager to show the achievements of Turkish diplomacy, the view that Turkey 
has been able to alter the EU’s role prescription has been also supported by EU 
officials. An EU official has argued that “[i]n Europe there is a realisation that we have 
to pay attention to Turkey, Turkey has a positive role, certain linkages that we do not 
have or certain actions that we cannot take.”912  Another EU official has also 
acknowledged Turkey’s discursive strategy to reconstruct its EU candidate role as an 
‘asset for Europe’ in the Middle East. When asked about whether this strategy was 
successful, he has replied by referring to an article co-authored by the British and 
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Finnish ministers of foreign affairs in Financial Times and added that Sweden, Italy 
Spain and Portugal would also support that article.913  
The former Finnish minister of foreign affairs and British foreign 
secretary declared their countries’ support for Turkey’s accession in the said article 
and added that Turkey’s growing presence in the Middle East, mediating conflicts, 
advocating and leading integration steps, and advocating reforms, would be an asset 
for the EU. Therefore, “the EU should not wait until Turkey joins to benefit from the 
strength of its relationships. But only by having a seat at the table will Turkey be able 
to contribute fully to the security and prosperity of the EU’s member states.”914  
Recently, this tendency has come to fruition. In 2011, the EEAS has started 
regular meetings with the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. It has been reported that 
the launch of these meetings was supported by the EU member states stated above as 
well as France and Germany, who frequently show their opposition to Turkey’s 
accession.915 The 2011 progress report by the Commission on Turkey has also 
reported the launch of these talks in these words: “[t]aking into account that Turkey 
has become more active in its wider neighbourhood, and in view of intensifying 
dialogue with Turkey on issues of mutual interest informal policy talks were launched 
in May 2011.”916 
All in all, in the context of Turkish policymakers having a strong 
motivation to pursue strategic depth policy, which they believed to be the right policy 
to be pursued by Turkey, and the EU’s sometimes contradicting role prescriptions, 
Turkish political actors could succeed in changing the EU’s role prescriptions for 
Turkey. Therefore, the EU candidate role of Turkey was institutionalised synthetically 
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in the domain of foreign policy rules. Using the right strategies within the right context 
enabled such change.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Successive Turkish governments have aimed to achieve certain foreign 
policy objectives in the Middle East, which are broadly embedded within the post-
Islamist articulations of the westernisation paradigm. These objectives are codified as 
the strategic depth policy, which has aimed to exert Turkey into the Middle Eastern 
regional context as a regional player, mediator of conflicts, a significant economic and 
political actor. 
Within the framework of these foreign policy objectives embedded within 
a post-Islamist foreign policy paradigm, Turkish foreign policy has demonstrated 
limited alignment with the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions for Turkey. However, 
post-Islamist westernisation foreign policy paradigm of the Turkish government was 
only meaningful when Turkey’s EU candidate role was institutionalised. 
Inconsistencies between what Turkey does in its foreign policy and what the EU 
prescribes as its EU candidate role could lead to the breakdown of this system that 
gave meaning to the post-Islamist westernisation paradigm of the Turkish 
governments and the subsequent strategic depth policy. Therefore Turkish actors 
actively sponsored the amendment of the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions and 
promoted their alternative role prescription. The Turkish government’s layering of a 
different EU candidate role prescription in foreign policy was achieved through the 
strategic usage of the institutional goal of Turkey’s accession. Turkish actors argued 
for a different role for Turkey as an EU candidate by making use of the argument that 
the active problem-solving role of Turkey in the Middle East, rather than Turkey that 
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is fully aligned with the EU’s foreign policy acquis, would be an asset to the EU when 
Turkey becomes a member of the EU in the future. There are indicators that this new 
role prescription has started to be accepted by the EU actors too. 
Therefore, it has been shown in this chapter that candidate countries are 
not completely passive receivers of EU rules and role prescriptions. On top of the 
domestic actors’ need to perceive, interpret and appropriate EU’s role prescriptions, 
they also can change the rules of the game through skilful strategies. The success of 
these strategies depends on their ability to use strategically the existing institutional 
structure and paradigms. In other words, the Turkish government has used the EU 
candidate role to give meaning to its foreign policy paradigm and acquire legitimacy. 
This was an interactive process of moulding both the EU’s role prescriptions and 
Turkey’s foreign policy to achieve a level of consistency among them, so that the 
meaning system that underpinned the post-Islamist westernisation and strategic 
depth policy was maintained. 
Therefore, this analysis has been a confirmation of the arguments that 
Turkey’s alignment with the EU foreign policy rules has been limited, yet not only in 
issue areas that are relatively less important for Turkey.917 On the contrary, Turkish 
policymakers have consistently pursued the strategic depth policy and even promoted 
an EU candidate role in foreign policy through active strategies, thereby disproving 
the argument that “the adoption of the CFSP rules is mainly the candidate country’s 
downloading of the decisions already made by the EU.918 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis was an exploration of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. Both Europeanisation and Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East have been heavily debated issues especially since Turkey’s EU candidacy was 
declared by the EU in 1999.  
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has long been 
characterised by a traditional aloofness from the Middle Eastern affairs. This policy 
has by and large been advocated by the Kemalist articulation of the westernisation 
paradigm in Turkey, which looked to the west for progress, civilisational standards 
and represented the Middle East as archaic and conflict-ridden. Although occasionally 
Turkish political actors have pursued relatively autonomous policies towards the 
Middle East, for example during the 1960s and a short episode in the 1990s, all these 
periods ended by the recalibration of foreign policy by the military in line with the 
Kemalist articulation of westernisation. The 1990s was no exception. The Turkish 
Armed Forces, confronted by new challenges of a changing international and domestic 
context had both tightened its grip on politics and adopted a very rigid, secularist and 
nationalistic interpretation of Kemalism as its coordinative discourse. Turkey’s 
relations with the Middle Eastern neighbours had been strained, at times coming to 
brink of war. This picture was reversed in the 2000s. The Turkish Armed Forces was 
no longer a predominant foreign policy actor, the government was able to pursue an 
activist foreign policy towards the Middle East. Turkey was presenting itself as a 
regional power, undertaking mediation efforts and promoting regional political and 
economic integration. This change was the main empirical puzzle of this research. I 
have answered the research question of whether and how the institutionalisation of 
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Turkey’s EU candidate role had a causal effect on the making and implementation of 
this foreign policy.  
Foreign policy objectives towards the Middle East have been largely 
determined by the objective of establishing closer political and economic relations 
with the Arab Middle East since as early as the minister of foreign affairs of the 
coalition government of 1997-2002. There was already a policy of improving 
economic relations with the neighbouring regions in place by 2000. This policy came 
out due to the then minister of foreign affairs Ismail Cem’s belief that Turkey could 
actually become a significant actor in the Middle East by strategically using the 
common geography and history shared by Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. 
Yet, due to the ongoing poisoning of relations by PKK terrorism until the capture of 
the PKK leader Ocalan in 1999 and the 2000/1 crises, the impact of the much 
anticipated Helsinki summit of the EU that declared Turkey an EU candidate could not 
be fully materialised before 2002.  
Since 2002, the policy of improving political and economic relations with 
the Middle East has been adopted and systematised by the post-Islamist JDP 
government. The Islamist background of the JDP leadership coupled with the EU 
candidate role of Turkey gave the party important discursive resources to fully 
implement a pro-active diplomacy and trade based foreign policy that is 
communicated to the Middle Eastern regional actors by the use of the party’s 
conservative religious identity and the EU candidate role of Turkey. The SMEs also 
emerged as leading business actors in trade with the Arab Middle East in the period. 
While the JDP had become the predominant foreign policy actor, the Turkish Armed 
Forces and the ministry of foreign affairs have been relegated. This thesis has traced 
the causal power of Turkey’s EU candidate role over Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. The main finding is that the institutionalisation of EU candidate role 
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has enabled and constrained certain strategies for Turkish political actors, which are 
briefly recapped below. 
Civilianisation of Turkish politics was enabled by the institutionalisation 
of Turkey’s EU candidate role. Due to the JDP’s and the Turkish Armed Forces’ usages 
of the EU’s candidate role prescriptions, civilianisation of Turkish politics was 
achieved. The underlying westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign policy enabled 
the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role through ideational struggles. In 
the process, the post-Islamist JDP government subdued the Kemalist Armed Forces by 
using the EU candidate role prescriptions strategically to legitimise itself in the eyes of 
the Kemalist elite. At the same time, the Turkish Armed Forces had gone through a 
rearticulation of its coordinative discourse, Kemalism, as it used the EU candidate role 
prescriptions for westernising Turkey through EU membership. Without the 
civilianisation of Turkish politics, Turkey would not be able to implement an activist, 
diplomacy-based and a pro-integration foreign policy towards the Middle East.  
Institutionalisation of the EU candidate role also enabled the 
consolidation of neo-liberalism in Turkey by making the public more amenable to the 
implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme after the 
2000/1 crises. At the time of severe economic crisis, Turkish policymakers perceived 
an opportunity to implement neo-liberal reforms by articulating economic reforms as 
part of the role Turkey had to play as an EU candidate. The economic reforms that 
Turkey implemented enabled the macroeconomic stability of the Turkish economy, 
thereby boosting the SMEs’ export potential both indirectly through anti-inflationary 
policies, low interest rates and much-needed incoming foreign direct investment to 
Turkey; and directly through SME support policies and funds. The SMEs’ export 
potential was needed for the materialisation of Turkey’s foreign policy that is based 
on increased trade relations with the Middle East. 
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There have been indirect consequences of the institutionalisation of 
Turkey’s EU candidate role as well.  The usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role in foreign 
policy discourse towards the Middle East also reveals that Turkish foreign policy 
actors perceived Turkey’s EU candidate role and the associated role prescriptions as a 
foreign policy resource in the Middle East. The combination of the Turkish 
government’s Islamic background and Turkey’s EU candidate role was used by 
Turkish foreign policy actors as a resource to construct Turkey as a mediator, bridge 
and a reform promoter in the Middle East. Without the institutionalisation of Turkey’s 
EU candidate role, playing such roles in the Middle East would not have been possible. 
Finally, the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in terms of 
alignment with the foreign policy rules of the EU enabled Turkish foreign policy by 
giving meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist government.  The 
strategic depth policy aimed to establish close ties with all neighbouring regions of 
Turkey. Diplomatic relations with the Middle East were to be improved by resorting to 
Islamic and Ottoman narratives of Turkey’s role in the Middle East. At the same time 
Turkey’s EU candidate role was giving meaning to the Turkish foreign policy of 
strategic depth. Yet, Turkey was not in full alignment with the EU’s foreign policy rules 
especially with regard to Syria and Hamas. This cleavage could potentially be used to 
question the meaning of the Turkish foreign policy framework. Indeed, it happened in 
2008 when there emerged criticisms of Turkey’s Middle East oriented foreign policy 
on the grounds that Turkey was dissociating itself from the west. The JDP, knowing 
this, had been attempting to upload an alternative EU candidate role prescription of 
foreign policy rules by making references to the common future of Turkey and the EU. 
As the EU candidacy institution is based on the ‘EU accession’ paradigm, an alternative 
role prescription could be promoted within the EU candidacy institution by Turkish 
actors, who used Turkey’s future accession as a discursive strategy. This strategy 
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seems to have been fruitful based on a preliminary reading of the EU member states’ 
and EU officials’ declarations and policies.  
The main thesis is that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role has significantly enabled Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, which 
is conceptualised as the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East.  
 
8.1 Foreign Policy Paradigm, Europeanisation and the Middle East 
 
Turkey’s long-standing foreign policy paradigm has been westernisation. 
The westernisation paradigm has also enabled the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU 
candidate role. Skilled actors such as the former chief of general staff Hilmi Ozkok 
have been able to re-prioritise westernisation as the institutional objective of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. By articulating Turkey’s EU candidate role as necessary for the 
realisation of Turkey’s westernisation, Ozkok enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to 
institutionalise the civilianisation role prescription of the EU for Turkey.   
The JDP, which is a conservative party with Islamist roots, has 
strategically used the westernisation paradigm to legitimise itself and its policies 
especially in the eyes of the Turkish Armed Forces.  Having been banned from politics 
in the past several times due to their non-Kemalist, anti-western policies, the JDP has 
learned from the fate of their precedents and strategically adopted westernisation. 
Westernisation has been articulated with the post-Islamist coordinative discourse of 
the JDP, thereby giving legitimacy to the party’s policies including its strategic depth 
policy.  Whereas the Turkish Armed Forces’ objective was westernisation of Turkey, 
the JDP’s objective was to pursue a proactive foreign policy towards the Muslim 
Middle East. Yet, their past was an obstacle, therefore they perceived adopting 
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Turkey’s EU candidate role as a way of legitimising their policies as well as 
civilianising Turkish politics. 
Significantly, there was no paradigm replacement. Only a new articulation 
of the westernisation paradigm was constructed by the JDP and layered onto the 
existing westernisation paradigm along with the Kemalist westernisation articulation. 
Confirming Palier’s argument of layering, institutional change can also occur through 
piecemeal promotion of new goals that are compatible with the overarching 
paradigm.919 However, it has been argued in this thesis that the compatibility of newly 
layered goals and institutions with the overarching paradigm is not based on the 
objective meanings that the goals and paradigms have. On the contrary, the 
compatibility of the layers is achieved through active discursive construction of 
compatibility.  
The JDP has had to actively construct its strategic depth policy as 
compatible with the westernisation paradigm to be able to prevent mobilisation of 
Kemalist groups in policymaking. Likewise, when the restrictively secularist Kemalist 
articulation of westernisation paradigm of the 1990 was challenged by the emergence 
of Turkey’s EU candidate role, skilled actors in the Turkish General Staff actively 
rearticulated Kemalism by prioritising reformism, civilisationalism and innovation as 
the primary principles of their Kemalist coordinative discourse. 
Reflecting on the nature of agency and its relationship with structure 
allowed me to analyse the normatively oriented but strategic behaviour of both the 
JDP and the Turkish Armed Forces in relation to each other and the EU’s candidate 
role prescriptions. The assumption that structures do not determine actors’ behaviour, 
but favour strategies in relation to each other and the context enabled me to analyse 
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how Turkey’s EU candidate role was institutionalised through Turkish actors’ 
strategies towards each other and the EU’s role prescriptions.  
In doing so, this research has not conceptualised domestic actors, 
domestic and regional opportunity structures as static transmission belts but has 
acknowledged that they are also part of the change. Rather than coming at a cost, this 
acknowledgment has opened up the possibility of a more realistic, multicausal 
analysis. Therefore, this research has analysed the interactive dynamics between 
policy, polity and politics instead of a narrow focus on policy uploading, downloading 
and socialisation. It was acknowledged that foreign policy is located within a broader 
political context, which is in flux throughout the Europeanisation process. Therefore, 
as much as the direct Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East through the institutionalisation of the EU’s foreign policy rules is evident, indirect 
Europeanisation through the changes in the role of the Turkish Armed Forces, the 
economic structure of the country and different political actors’ perceptions of the EU 
candidate role prescriptions was also evident in the analysis. Accordingly, the changes 
in foreign policy actors’ ideas, discourses and the domestic and regional opportunity 
structures they face were combined in a causal complex within a Europeanisation 
framework.  
 The overall conceptual, analytical and empirical contribution of this 
research to the literatures of Europeanisation, Europeanisation of foreign policy and 
Turkish foreign policy analysis will be explained next. Limitations of the research 
conducted will also be outlined before briefly discussing future implications of this 
research.  
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8.2 Conceptual contributions 
 
The first challenge for this research was to conceptualise the so-called ‘EU 
level’ before proceeding with the analysis of its impact. In other words, what about the 
EU could cause changes in Turkish foreign policy? Is Europeanisation simply an 
interaction between independent objects, i.e. the EU and Turkey, or is it an interaction 
between structure and agency? If so, what is the structured context within which the 
EU and Turkey interact and exert power over each other and over the material and 
ideational context? To address such questions, EU candidacy is conceptualised as an 
institutional context, defined in terms of the relational roles and rules it constitutes. 
Such a conceptualisation is new in the literature. Adapting role theory to strategic-
relational ontology and institutionalist advances, I have analysed Turkey’s 
Europeanisation in terms of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and 
its intended and unintended consequences for Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. 
By conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context, I was able to 
explore the so-called ‘EU impact’ beyond an analysis of accession conditionality on 
candidate countries. When the Europeanisation of candidate countries is analysed as 
the impact of EU conditionality on rule adoption, it is premised on the rational choice 
assumption that the domestic actors want to achieve EU membership and they adopt 
rules to achieve membership.920 Although very illuminating in terms of explaining 
some cases of Europeanisation, this thesis has shown that domestic actors do not 
always adopt EU rules for becoming EU members. They also use, edit, and even change 
EU rules. This is the case because domestic actors are normatively oriented but also 
strategic towards their context and each other while pursuing their objectives. Most of 
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the time they have their own objectives, which they pursue strategically through using 
the EU role prescriptions. Therefore, detaching the rules of EU candidacy from the 
promise of membership allowed me to discuss different motivations of agency in their 
responses to these rules, also including EU membership aspirations but broadening it.  
By the same token, this research has also not assumed domestic actors 
behave according to a logic of appropriateness. Studies on the Europeanisation of 
candidate countries that adopt the logic of appropriateness as the nature of actors’ 
motivation, have focussed on how domestic actors adopted EU rules as they were 
socialised to EU norms. Such studies have for instance argued that Turkish politicians 
are socialised to the EU norms of foreign policy. By delinking the rules of EU candidacy 
from their appropriateness, I was able to trace the process of norm advocacy from a 
strategic perspective. Actors in the framework I have adopted have various normative 
orientations towards their context, which they pursue as objectives. Whereas the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ overarching objective was the westernisation of Turkey, the 
JDP’s objective was the civilianisation of Turkey. Based on their past experiences, both 
actors have come to believe that the cure for Turkey’s problems was either 
westernisation or civilianisation. Quite contrary to the mainstream logic of 
appropriateness approach, however, both actors are strategic. They assess the 
material and ideational context, the role prescriptions for Turkey by the EU, their 
objectives and they pursue their strategies informed by such an assessment. The 
outcome of this assessment was the JDP’s strategic usage of the EU candidate role and 
the Turkish General Staff’s strategic usage of EU candidate role for achieving 
westernisation of Turkey. All in all, the conceptualisation of EU candidacy as an 
institution within a strategic-relational framework has enabled this research not only 
to combine the two paths of Europeanisation from a sociological and a rational choice 
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perspective, but also showed that EU norms can be used strategically and EU 
resources can be used ideologically.  
By focussing on the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and 
its impact on Turkish foreign policy, this conceptualisation has opened up space to 
analyse the Europeanisation of foreign policy from the perspective of role theory. Role 
theory has been applied to Europeanisation only by Aggestam; therefore its 
application on a candidate country is also a contribution to the literature on the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy.921  However, Aggestam has used role theory to 
bridge national identity with foreign policy behaviour, whereas I bridge foreign policy 
behaviour with EU candidacy as an institutional context. I adopt Barnett’s ‘position 
role’ concept without the assumption that position roles strictly constrain their 
holders. On the contrary, I have conceptualised Turkey’s ‘position role’ as an EU 
candidate within the candidacy institution as both enabling and constraining Turkish 
actors, therefore requiring institutionalisation by agency. The value added of a 
strategic relational conceptualisation of role theory is indeed offering a balanced 
approach to structure and agency. Accordingly, the institutionalisation of the EU’s role 
prescription for Turkey as an EU candidate is contingent on Turkish actors’ strategies 
towards each other and the EU’s role prescriptions. 
In this line of analysis, this thesis has suggested that the EU’s economic 
and political role prescriptions are institutionalised by Turkish foreign policy actors 
without much contestation. As the civilianisation and the economic role prescriptions 
of the EU overlapped with Turkish actors’ various objectives such as civilianisation, 
westernisation, SME support and the consolidation of neo-liberal economic policies, 
they were institutionalised. The institutionalisation of the EU’s economic and political 
role prescriptions have also been strategically used as a resource in Turkish 
                                                             
921 Aggestam, ‘Role Conceptions.’ 
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government’s foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East. As the usage of 
Turkey’s EU candidate role as a foreign policy resource in the Middle Eastern context 
was rewarded, the EU candidate role was further institutionalised. However, the EU’s 
foreign policy role prescriptions did not fully overlap with the government’s foreign 
policy objectives in the region. Yet, the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role was necessary to give meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist 
JDP government. Strategic depth policy was based on the balance between Turkey’s 
EU candidate role and Middle Eastern role in foreign policy. Therefore, the Turkish 
government promoted an alternative role prescription for Turkey by making 
references to the institutionalised accession paradigm in Turkey-EU relations. Such 
entrepreneurship has gradually led to the institutionalisation of the alternative role 
prescription layered by the Turkish government on the EU candidacy institution. 
Finally, this thesis has contributed to Woll and Jacquot’s ‘usages of Europe’ argument 
in several ways.922 Firstly, by analysing Turkish policymakers’ usage of ‘Europe’ in the 
Middle East, this thesis has demonstrated that it is fruitful to analyse usages of Europe 
in different spatial contexts. Spaces of Europeanisation are not limited to the EU and 
the traditional public policies, but also include foreign policy and the non-EU regional 
context. Secondly, the thesis has also contributed to the broader Europeanisation 
literature by offering an elaboration of the ‘using Europe’ framework. Woll and 
Jacquot’s framework by and large focuses on the usage of already existing EU 
resources—both cognitive and material. This thesis has offered a contribution to this 
literature by showing that the Turkish political elite have not only used the EU 
resources, but also co-constructed these EU resources to a certain extent. The role of 
an EU candidate was the resource that was used by Turkish actors and the definition 
of this role was co-constructed by the EU and Turkish actors. In other words, while 
                                                             
922 Woll and Jacquot, ‘Using Europe.’ 
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Woll and Jacquot offered a critique of the chain of command approaches by their 
bottom-up account of usage, in this thesis I have argued that the case of 
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is a synthesis of 
both. The command itself, which is the EU candidate role prescription, was actually 
co-constructed by the Turkish political elite, which was in turn used by them as a 
political resource to succeed in their projects. 
 
8.2.1Broader concept of causation 
The broad and anti-Humean concept of causation adopted in this thesis has 
demonstrated that the EU does not cause domestic change in candidate countries in 
the form of triggering events inside a vacuum. The EU exerts its causal powers 
through the candidacy institution that is relational between Turkey and the EU. This 
institution comprises of roles and rules for Turkey. The institutionalisation of 
Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East through its constituting and conditioning powers.   
First of all, Turkey’s EU candidate role conditioned Turkish economic 
structure in a way that it was possible for the Turkish government to implement a 
foreign policy that is based on Turkey’s economic power, i.e. exports and projects in 
the Middle East. The conditioning effect of Turkey’s EU candidate role was due to the 
perceptions of economic actors that as an EU candidate Turkey’s economic stability 
was more likely to be established than the previous period. According to Kurki’s 
categories, this kind of causation is material cause.923 Secondly, Turkey’s EU candidate 
role gave meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist JDP government. 
As the policy acquired meaning through balanced relations with both the EU and the 
                                                             
923 Kurki, Causation. 
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Middle East, the continuation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in a way served as the 
formal cause of the strategic depth policy. 
Moreover, the assumption of causal complexes means that the EU is never 
‘the cause’ as there are always multiple causes at work in bringing about a certain 
political reality. In this case, although the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role has enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, it was the Turkish 
political actors that used this opportunity and materialised Turkey’s regionally 
oriented pro-active foreign policy in a context that favoured such a foreign policy.  
One of the conceptual contributions of this thesis therefore is reflection on 
agency, structure and their relationship within Europeanisation. As Kauppi has also 
suggested, academics partly contribute to the conceptual making of the political 
reality they analyse, therefore carry responsibility to reflect upon their basic 
premises.924 By focusing on the strategies of Turkish actors towards the EU’s 
candidate role prescription for Turkey, I have fore grounded the objectives and 
perceptions of Turkish politicians in the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate 
role. Without making sweeping claims about Turkish actors’ socialisation to the given 
norms of the EU or the mindless pursuit of EU membership, I have conceptualised the 
grey area between non-membership and membership of the EU, where future 
members of the EU are constructed. This way, ontological reflection has been capable 
of opening new research agendas by changing the questions that are asked by scholars. 
In the case of the Europeanisation of candidate countries, rather than asking whether 
the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness explains better the 
behaviour of a certain candidate state, the question could be how the EU candidate 
role is institutionalised in a given candidate state and its intended and unintended 
consequences. 
                                                             
924 Niilo Kauppi, ‘Political Ontology of European Integration,’ Comparative European Politics, 8 (2010), 
p.22 
261 
 
 
8.3 Empirical contributions and limitations 
 
The Europeanisation of foreign policy literature has so far not dealt 
sufficiently with candidate countries and the Europeanisation of candidate countries 
has usually been studied with an empirical focus on other public policies. Relevant 
studies on the Europeanisation of candidate country foreign policies that stand at the 
intersection of these two literatures have only analysed the downloading of the EU 
rules by the candidates and the socialisation of the foreign policy elite without offering 
convincing empirical evidence.  
Moreover, most of these studies are journal articles, without too much 
empirical detail. On the contrary, this thesis builds upon extensive interviews with 
both Turkish and European policy-makers and documentary analysis. Therefore this 
study provides new empirical data for the literatures of Europeanisation and Turkish 
foreign policy analysis. 
This research has also contributed empirically by identifying non-
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East as a consequence 
of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role.  For example, the 
institutionalisation of the EU’s role prescription of peaceful resolution of border 
conflicts and good neighbourly relations did not feature in the making of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. The empirical research has confirmed that 
these rules of EU candidacy are mainly devised regarding Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards Greece and Armenia, not the Middle East.  
The limitations of the research need to be addressed and acknowledged as 
well. As all other research, this PhD project has been limited by time and resource 
limitations. First of all, individual socialisation to EU foreign policy norms was beyond 
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the scope of this thesis. Although ontologically I agree with the causal power of ideas, I 
find individual socialisation researchable only by deploying ethnographic methods 
and longitudinal analyses of the relevant actors. This is a daunting task for a PhD 
project that is only permitted to last for 3-4 years. Also, for my research to deploy such 
a methodology I would have to translate individual socialisation to state socialisation, 
which is very difficult to achieve if not impossible. Therefore this thesis did not 
analyse socialisation with the EU norms among the Turkish foreign policy elite.  
There are also limitations due to the temporal scope of the research. This 
research has covered the period from 1999 to 2010, when the substantial part of the 
fieldwork was finished. Therefore, some of the important developments in the Middle 
East had to be excluded from the research. The Lisbon Treaty was ratified in 
November 2009 and came into effect in December 2009. Although the treaty has made 
remarkable changes to the foreign policy structure of the EU, such as the creation of 
the European External Action Service, the dust had not settled until early 2011. 
Neither the European officials nor their Turkish counterparts knew what the 
organisation of the European External Action Service was going to be like during the 
fieldwork for this thesis. Therefore the Lisbon Treaty and its effects have remained 
outside the scope of this research.  
More importantly, the Arab spring has taken place in the Middle East and 
North Africa since the beginning of 2011. Although this change in the Middle Eastern 
context is not covered by the empirical analysis in this thesis, it is very interesting to 
note the ideationally path-dependent approach by the Turkish government to the 
crisis in Syria. When the first protests broke out, the Turkish Prime Minister had the 
belief that he could convince Syrian President Bashar Assad to reform the political 
system to alleviate the protests. As the Turkish government had used Turkey’s EU 
candidate role coupled with the historical, geographical and especially religious ties 
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with the Middle East successfully in the previous period, they still had the belief that 
they could convince Assad to liberalise the political system. However, it was soon 
realised that this was a misjudgement of the changing context, when Assad cracked 
down on the protestors instead of heeding the Turkish Prime Minister’s calls for 
reform. While this event marked the beginning of deterioration of the relations with 
Syria and the rest of the Arab Middle East except Palestine, this is a very fresh 
demonstration of however strategic and informed political actors are, they are always 
led by their interpretations of the context, which may prove to be fatally wrong when 
the context proves them wrong.  
 
 
 
8.4 Implications for future research 
 
First of all, the strategic usage of the EU candidate role can be applied to 
other candidate countries in general and their foreign policies in particular. Especially 
the bridging role that is adopted by many other candidate countries can be 
conceptually linked to EU candidacy and its constitutive impact on the roles candidate 
state actors’ play in their foreign relations.925  
Secondly, the discourse adopted by the Turkish policy-makers regarding 
Islam and its relationship with the Middle East deserves further research. There is a 
conspicuous call by the Turkish actors for the reformation of Islam, to return to its 
essence, which are allegedly complementary with the values of the ‘universal 
civilisation’. On the basis of the predominant westernisation paradigm in Turkey since 
                                                             
925 Piotr Smolar, ‘Slovenia keen to build bridges between Europe and the Balkans,’ Guardian, 15 March 
2011.  
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the late Ottoman period, analysing whether these so-called universal values are 
associated with the European values by the Turkish policy elite would be an 
interesting contribution to the literature on Turkish foreign policy. Such a research 
would also build a very useful bridge between the Europeanisation of foreign policy 
and Eurocentrism underlying this process. 
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